

warranty extension -- along with monetary awards that will not be calculated in the aggregate until all claim submission periods have ended and Defendants have processed the claims. ECF No. 86 at 18.

2. The lodestar calculation supports an award of between \$1,917,673.40 and \$2,320,000 in fees and expenses

Plaintiffs seek attorneys' fees and expenses in the total amount of \$2,320,000, which is 31.5 percent less than their lodestar calculation of \$3,387,328.75. ECF No. 86 at 22.³ Defendants do not argue that Class Counsel is entitled to less than the lodestar amount, but instead argue that Plaintiffs' \$3,387,328.75 lodestar calculation is itself incorrect, based on unreasonably high billing rates and insufficient documentation of the hours reportedly billed by Class Counsel. ECF No. 90 at 1.

³ In their reply brief in further support of their motion for attorneys' fees, Plaintiffs submit that this sum has increased by an additional \$113,606. ECF No. 105 at 1, 1 n.1 (citing *Norton v. Wilshire Credit Corp.*, 36 F. Supp. 2d 216, 219 (D.N.J. 1999) ("Prevailing parties may also collect reasonable attorney's fees for time spent preparing the fee petition.") (citing *Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare*, 758 F.2d 897, 924-25 (3d Cir. 1985)). Because Defendants [*62] address the hours and billing rates reported in Plaintiffs' original motion, and because this calculation adequately supports the award Plaintiffs seek, the Court performs its analysis using the hours and billing rates reported in the original motion.

The Court calculates the lodestar amount by multiplying the number of hours "reasonably worked" on a client's case by a "reasonable hourly billing rate for such services based on the given geographical area, the nature of the services provided, and the experience of the attorneys." *Ins. Brokerage*, 579 F.3d at 280 (quoting *Rite Aid*, 396 F.3d at 302). "To examine the lodestar factor properly, a Court should make explicit findings about how much time counsel reasonably devoted to a given matter, and what a reasonable hourly fee would be for such services." *Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp.*, 223 F.3d 190, 199-200 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

With regard to the hours worked by class counsel, the court may exclude from its calculation hours that are "not reasonably expended," such as hours attributable to over-staffing, hours that appear excessive in light of the experience and skill of the lawyers, and hours that are redundant or otherwise unnecessary, as well as hours that are not "adequately documented." *Norton v. Wilshire Credit Corp.*, 36 F. Supp. 2d 216, 219 (D.N.J. 1999) (Walls, J.) (citing *Hensley* at 433-34). Although a "fee petition should [*63] include 'some fairly definite information as to the hours devoted to various general activities, e.g., pretrial discovery, settlement negotiations and the hours spent by various classes of attorneys, e.g., senior partners, junior partners, associates,'" *Rode*, 892 F.2d at 1190 (quoting *Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Phila. v. American Radiatory & Standard Sanatory Corp.*, 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973)), "it is not necessary to know the exact number of minutes spent nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted nor the specific attainments of each attorney." *Id.*

To determine whether an attorney's billing rate is reasonable, a court "should assess the experience and skill of the prevailing party's attorneys and compare their rates to the rates prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." *Id.* (citations omitted).

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