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15 October, 2013
Article 1.

The Washington Post
The world must tell Iran: No more half-steps
Ray Takeyh

Article 2.

Foreign Policy
Why the United States can't force Iran's nuclear hand
Colin H. Kahl, Alireza Nader

Article 3.

Bloomberg
The Rise and Fall of Israel's Settlement Movement
Jeffrey Goldberg

Article 4.

The Guardian<<http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian>>
As the M.E's power blocs fracture, so do hopes of stability
Wadah Khanfar<<http://www.theguardian.com/profile/wadah-khanfar>>

Article 5.

NYT
The Middle East Pendulum
Roger Cohen<<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/columns/rogerc=hen/>>

Article 6.

Foreign Affairs
The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies
Christopher Davidson

Article 7.

Foreign Policy
Do American Jews think peace with Palestine is possible?
Bruce Stokes

Article 8.

Chatham House
The 3D printer is threatening to change the world
Roger Highfield

Article 1.

The Washington Post

The world must tell Iran: No more half-steps

Ray Takeyh

October 14, 2013 -- The great powers are again resuming diplomatic efforts to settle the Iran nuclear issue. Expectations are high, as Iran is now presumed to be ruled by

pragmatists http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/rouhani-sworn-in-as-irans-president/2013/08/04/eb322736-fd25-11e2-829f-0ee5075b840d_story.html who seek to end its isolation. Although much of the recent international focus http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranian-president-hassan-rouhani-takes-diplomatic-tone-at-military-event/2013/09/22/313937f4-2393-11e3-9372-92606241ae9c_story.html has been on President Hassan Rouhani http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranians-await-presidential-election-results-following-extension-of-polling-hours/2013/06/15/3800c276-593-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html and his indefatigable foreign minister http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-irans-zarif-hold-unusual-private-meeting-on-sidelines-of-nuclear-talks/2013/09/26/d2fd-fac-2700-11e3-9372-92606241ae9c_story.html, Mohammad Javad Zarif http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-iranian-foreign-minister-to-meet/2013/09/23/b59fa3dc-2480-11e3-ad0d-b7c8d2a594b9_story.html, the critical decisions will be made by Iran's Supreme National Security Council. The composition of that body and its new leadership say much more than Rouhani's proclamations http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/iran-khamenei-approves-rouhanis-diplomacy/2013/10/05/75fa8336-2db9-11e3-b14f-298f46539716_story.html do about the direction of Iran's foreign policy.

The council increasingly is populated by a cohort of hard-liners who have spent much of their career in the military and security services. The head of the council is Ali Shamkhani <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/09/11/Iran-s-president-names-Ali-Shamkhani-as-new-supreme-security-council-chief.html>, a hardened member of the Revolutionary Guards and former minister of defense who has played a critical role in all of Iran's important national security decisions since the inception of the theocracy. Shamkhani's deputy is a shadowy Revolutionary Guards officer, Ali Hussein Tash, who for decades has been involved in Iran's nuclear deliberations. This new cast of characters was critical of former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his unwise provocations and rhetorical excess. They sense that as Iran increases its power, it behooves Tehran to present itself as a more reasonable actor, imposing limits on expressions of its influence and acceding to certain global norms. For instance, Iran has condemned http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/irans-president-rouhani-responds-to-syria-weapons-deal/2013/09/16/55c63526-1ec1-11e3-9ad0-96244100e647_story.html the use of chemical weapons in Syria http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nearly-1500-killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-us-says/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html and has declared its readiness to deal constructively with the nuclear issue.

Despite their interest in diplomacy and embrace of more tempered language, Shamkhani and his advisers believe that Iran must claim its hegemonic role. With the displacement of Iran's historical enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the unsteady political transitions in the Arab world, they sense that it is a propitious time for the Islamic Republic to claim the mantle of regional leadership. Tehran has been offered a rare opportunity to emerge as the predominant power of the Persian Gulf and a pivotal state in the Middle East. It is immaterial whether its assessment of regional trends is correct, as such perceptions condition its approach to international politics.

The newly empowered conservatives at the council's helm also believe that Iran needs a nuclear capability to enhance its influence. As Hussein Tash noted in 2006 during a rare public appearance, "The nuclear program is an opportunity for us to make endeavors to acquire a strategic position and consolidate our national identity." But they also recognize the importance of offering confidence-building measures to an incredulous international community. All of this is not to

suggest that Iran is inclined to suspend its nuclear program or relinquish the critical components of such a program. They are, however, more open to dialogue than the Ahmadinejad government was. Moreover, they stress that a reasonable Iran can assuage U.S. concerns about its nuclear development without having to abandon the program.

Despite its softened rhetoric, the new Iranian regime can be expected to continue asserting its nuclear "rights" and to press its advantages in a contested Middle East. The Islamic Republic plans to remain an important backer of the Assad dynasty in Syria, a benefactor of Hezbollah and a supporter of Palestinian rejectionist groups. It will persist in its repressive tactics at home and continue to deny the people of Iran fundamental human rights. This is a government that will seek to negotiate a settlement of the nuclear issue by testing the limits of the great powers' prohibitions. Washington need not accede to such Iranian conceptions. The United States and its allies are entering this week's negotiations in a strong position. Iran's economy is withering http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/irans-auteurs-stalled-by-sanctions/2013/10/14/515725aa-3261-11e3-ad00-ec4c6b31cb=d_story.html under the combined pressures of sanctions and its own managerial incompetence. The Iranian populace remains disaffected as the bonds between state and society have been largely severed since the Green Revolution of 2009. The European Union is still highly skeptical of Iran, a distrust that Rouhani's charm offensive has mitigated but not eliminated. Allied diplomats can use as leverage in the forthcoming negotiations the threat of additional sanctions and Israeli military force.

Given the stark realities, it is time for the great powers to have a maximalist approach to diplomacy with Iran. It is too late for more Iranian half-steps and half-measures. Tehran must account for all its illicit nuclear activities and be compelled to make irreversible concessions that permanently degrade its ability to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program at a more convenient time. Anything less would be a lost opportunity.

Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Article 2.

Foreign Policy

Six reasons why the United States can't force Iran's nuclear hand

Colin H. Kahl, Alireza Nader

October 14, 2013 -- Iranian president Hasan Rouhani's recent charm offensive has raised expectations for a diplomatic breakthrough heading into this week's nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States, Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia (the so-called P5+1) in Geneva. Sanctions have taken a heavy toll on the Iranian economy, and the Islamic Republic may finally be motivated to take steps to rein in its nuclear program, including accepting limits on uranium enrichment, in exchange for lessening the pressure.

Hawks in Israel and Washington, however, have been quick to describe Rouhani as a "wolf in sheep's clothing" http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/04/bibi_netanyahu_missing_cartoon_posters_iran_nuclear_threat," warning that the Iranian regime may agree to "cosmetic changes" to its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, but ultimately will do little to constrain its quest for the bomb. In particular, they have cautioned the Obama administration against acquiescing to an agreement that allows Iran to continue any domestic uranium enrichment, even at low levels suitable only for civilian nuclear power and under stringent international supervision. In his Oct. 1 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, for example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted that only a complete dismantling of Iran's enrichment program could prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. This position has been echoed by conservative think tanks in Washington and by numerous voices on Capitol Hill. Their collective mantra: "a bad deal is worse than no deal."

Attempting to keep Iran as far away from nuclear weapons as possible by insisting on "zero enrichment" seems sensible. But in reality, the quest for the optimal deal would doom diplomacy with Iran, making the far worse outcome of unconstrained Iranian nuclearization or a military showdown over Tehran's nuclear program much more likely. Uranium enrichment is one pathway to producing bomb-grade explosive material for nuclear weapons, and all else being equal, it is easier to verify the total absence of such activities than different gradations of them. Of course, it would clearly be preferable if Iran ended its uranium enrichment activities altogether. Moreover, most countries with civilian nuclear power plants forgo domestic enrichment, so it seems reasonable to demand the same of Tehran.

(Although it is also the case that Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands have domestic enrichment capabilities while remaining compliant with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.)

But while a permanent end to Iranian enrichment would be ideal, it is also highly unrealistic. The Iranian regime has invested enormous amounts of political capital and billions of dollars over decades to master the knowledge and centrifuge technology associated with uranium enrichment -- and nothing will put that genie back in the bottle. Indeed, one is hard pressed to find a single bona fide Iran expert on the planet that believes Tehran would accept a diplomatic deal with the P5+1 that zeroed out enrichment for all time.

And here's six reasons why:

1. Backing an end to enrichment would be political suicide for Rouhani.

Iran's new president simply can't agree to permanently end enrichment. In 2003, during his previous role as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, he convinced Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to accept a temporary suspension of enrichment. But further talks with the international community stalled in early 2005 over a failure to agree on Iran's right to enrichment, and Tehran ended its suspension shortly thereafter. Rouhani believes -- as do his critics in the Revolutionary Guard and the supreme leader -- that the West socked Iranian concessions and Tehran got nothing in return. The failure of Iran's earlier approach under Rouhani facilitated the rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his hardline policies, including the development of a much more robust uranium enrichment capability. Rouhani is unlikely to make that mistake again. And even if Rouhani were somehow convinced to do so, he would be savaged by his right flank, significantly undercutting his presidency.

2. It's a matter of pride and principle for the regime.

The regime has invested far too much of its domestic legitimacy in defending Iran's "rights" (defined as domestic enrichment) to completely capitulate now, regardless of the pressure. The nuclear program and "resistance to arrogant powers" are firmly imbedded in the Islamic Republic's ideological raison d'etre. Khamenei, the ultimate decider on the nuclear file, and the Revolutionary Guards will not give up on the program altogether, for it could be viewed by their supporters and opponents alike as a total defeat.

However, Khamenei may accept a deal that constrains Iran's nuclear program but still allows limited enrichment. Under such an agreement, he could tell the Iranian people: "I said we never wanted nuclear weapons and I have issued a fatwa [religious ruling] against them. I insisted that our rights be respected, and now they are." But if Khamenei cries uncle and dismantles the entire program, how will he explain the billions invested and justify the years of sanctions and isolation to his people? What would it all have been for? Khamenei likely fears such a humiliation more than he fears economic collapse or targeted military strikes against his nuclear facilities.

3. If Iran does want to go nuclear, sanctions aren't going to stop it in time.

Although hawks believe Tehran is on the ropes and that additional sanctions can force Iran to completely dismantle its nuclear program, economic and nuclear timelines don't align. To be sure, Iran's economy is in dire straits and a desire to alleviate the pressure is driving the regime's apparent willingness to negotiate more seriously. But despite the current pain, Iran is not facing imminent economic collapse. This may be a dark period in Tehran, but Khamenei likely believes that Iran weathered worse times during the Iran-Iraq war. Some analysts have warned that Iran could achieve a critical "breakout capability" -- the ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons so fast that it could not be detected or stopped -- sometime in mid-2014. Yet, even if the U.S. Congress goes forward with additional harsh sanctions, the regime is not likely to implode before it reaches this technical threshold and, if it did, it might make little difference. Even the imprisoned leadership of the Green Movement and Iranian secularists opposed to the Islamic Republic support domestic uranium enrichment. The only way to stop a breakout capability is to get a deal, fast -- and that means accepting some limited enrichment under strict safeguards.

4. Washington is still an effective bogeyman.

Khamenei likely believes that Rouhani's election and the Iranian president's new moderate tone provide sufficient domestic and international credibility to mitigate the downside risks of failed diplomacy. Congress could attempt to force Tehran to accept maximalist demands by increasing sanctions, but the supposed mechanism for pressure affecting Iranian calculations is the regime's fear of popular unrest. Yet, if P5+1 negotiations are seen to fail because of Washington's insistence on zero enrichment, the Iranian public is likely to blame the United States not the regime for the failure. Economic pressure on the regime may increase as a result, but popular pressure to change course may not.

5. Pressure will become less effective if the United States comes off as the intransigent party.

If talks collapse because of Washington's unwillingness to make a deal on enrichment -- a deal Russia and China and numerous other European and Asian nations support -- it will also become harder to enforce sanctions. Whether or not

Rouhani's diplomatic overtures are genuine, he has already succeeded in shifting international perceptions of Iran. If the United States, rather than Iran, comes across as the unreasonable party, it will become much more difficult to maintain the international coalition currently isolating the government in Tehran. Some fence sitters in Europe and Asia will start to flirt with Iran again, leaving the United States in the untenable position of choosing between imposing sanctions on banks and companies in China, Europe, India, Japan, or South Korea, or acquiescing to the erosion of the comprehensive sanctions regime.

6. An uncompromising stance could drive Iran toward the bomb.

Finally, if talks fail because the United States insists on a maximalist position, Khamenei and other Iranian hardliners will likely interpret it as definitive proof that Washington's real goal is regime change rather than a nuclear accord.

Solidifying this perception would likely enhance, rather than lessen, Tehran's motivation to seek a nuclear deterrent as the only means of ensuring regime survival.

* * *

A permanent end to Iranian enrichment is not in the cards. Instead of pushing for an impossible goal, the United States and other world powers should push for a possible

one http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/10/getting_to_yes_with_iran: an agreement that caps Iranian enrichment at the 5-percent level (sufficient for civilian power plants but far away from bomb-grade) under stringent conditions designed to preclude Tehran's ability to rapidly produce nuclear weapons, including restrictions on Iran's stockpile of low enriched uranium, limitations on centrifuges, intrusive inspection, and halting the construction of a plutonium reactor that could open an alternative pathway to nuclear weapons. Such an accord would allow Khamenei and Rouhani to claim Iran's "rights" had been respected, giving them a face-saving way out of the current nuclear crisis. Even this might be difficult for the Iranian regime to stomach. But if paired with meaningful sanctions relief, it has a much better chance of success than insisting on the complete dismantling of Iran's program.

Washington should not accept a bad deal. But if we are to avoid the worst possible outcomes -- unconstrained enrichment leading to an eventual Iranian bomb or another major war in the Middle East -- then a good-if-imperfect deal is preferable to no deal at all.

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Article 3.

Bloomberg

The Rise and Fall of Israel's Settlement Movement

Jeffrey Goldberg

Oct 14, 2013 -- Moments after Hanan Porat and his fellow Israeli paratroopers had crossed the Suez Canal as spearheads of a furious Israeli counterattack in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, he was severely wounded in an Egyptian mortar bombardment. The Egyptians and Syrians had surprised Israel on Yom Kippur, with an atrocious loss of life, and crushed the country's post-Six Day War belief in its own invincibility. As Porat lay recovering in his hospital bed, his chest ravaged by shrapnel wounds, he thanked God that he wasn't in the burn unit. And then, as Yossi Klein Halevi http://www.harpercollins.com/authors/19429/Yossi_Klein_Halevi/index.aspx writes in his new book, "Like Dreamers" <http://www.harpercollins.com/books/Like-Dreamers-Yossi-Klein-Halevi/?isbn=9780060545765>, "the next phase of Porat's life mission was revealed.

He read, in his hospital bed, an article in a kibbutz newspaper by a writer named Arnon Lapid, titled, "An Invitation to Weeping." Porat wasn't a member of the secular kibbutz elite; he was a member of a more marginalized group of religious Zionists, who envied the kibbutznikim, and respected them as well. He was stunned by what Lapid wrote: "I want to send you all an invitation to weeping ... I will weep over my dead, you will weep over yours ... we'll weep ... for the illusions that were shattered, for the assumptions that were proven to be baseless, the truths that were exposed as lies ... And we will pity ourselves, for we are worthy of pity." Halevi writes that when Porat read this lament he "felt as if his wounds were being torn open. He would have shouted if he had the voice. Pity the generation privileged to restore

Jewish sovereignty to the land of Israel? What small-mindedness, what weakness of character! Where would the Jews be now if, in 1945, they had thought like this Arnon Lapid? Israelis would do now what Jews always did: Grieve for their dead and go on, with faith and hope." Porat would soon help usher into existence a new movement, a settlement enterprise that would be self-consciously modeled on Israel's original settlement movement, the socialist, Zionist and fiercely anti-religious pioneering formations that built the original kibbutzim. The early kibbutzniks were the men and women who laid the foundations for the reborn Jewish state and led that state through the first decades of its existence, but by 1973 they appeared to be a spent force, exhausted spiritually, morally and politically. Porat's movement, which would cover the biblical heartland of the Jewish people with settlements -- a heartland the secular world referred to as the West Bank, but which Jews knew by the ancient names of Judea and Samaria -- would be driven by devotion to God and his demands, not by a secular vision of Jews liberated from the ghettos and freed from the fetters of capitalism.

This movement, which coalesced around Porat's Gush Emunim -- the "Bloc of the Faithful" -- has defined Israel's political agenda for the past 40 years, just as the kibbutz movement and its leaders shaped Israel and its priorities through the early period of its existence. What is so fascinating about these two movements is that, for all their transformative success -- they have both failed to complete their missions. The kibbutzim didn't turn Israel into a socialist paradise, and the hubris and shortsightedness of the Labor elite, which sprung from the kibbutz movement, brought Israel down in October 1973.

And the religious-nationalist settlement movement has succeeded in moving hundreds of thousands of Israelis into the biblical heartland, but it has never been able to convince the majority of Israelis that the absorption of the West Bank into a "Greater Israel" represents their country's salvation, rather than a threat to its existence. The thwarted utopianism of the two movements is the subject of "Like Dreamers," which is a magnificent book, one of the two or three finest books about Israel I have ever read. Halevi tells the story of seven men -- paratroopers who participated in the liberation of Jerusalem in 1967 -- who became leaders and archetypes of Israeli's competing utopian movements. When I met Halevi in New York recently, I was filled with questions about what this history augured for Israel's future. The first one to cross my mind: How did the Orthodox settlers so easily supplant the leftist kibbutz elite as the nation's pioneering vanguard?

"The left lost its vigor at precisely the moment that religious Zionism discovered its own vigor," Halevi told me. "The key here is 1973. After 1967, not much happened. There were a couple of settlements, but the Labor government kept everyone on a tight leash, and the religious Zionists were intensely frustrated. The empowering moment for religious Zionists was due to Labor's failures in the Yom Kippur War. A generation of young kibbutzniks came out of 1973 deeply demoralized. People like Porat realized that the left had lost the plot."

Halevi went on, "In Israel, you never naturally evolve from one state of thinking to another. We careen. So we careened toward religious Zionism and the settlement movement."

But in your book, I said, you suggest that the settlers have failed to gain legitimacy for their movement among the mass of Israelis. How did they fail? "The settlement movement failed during the first Palestinian uprising. Israelis realized then the price of the occupation, that there was no such thing, as settler leaders promised, as a benign occupation. That kind of illusion went in the late 1980s."

Halevi noted one small irony here: If the first Palestinian uprising dispelled the idea that Israel could occupy the Palestinians cost-free and in perpetuity, the second Palestinian uprising -- which began after the peace process failed in 2000, dispelled the left-wing argument that territorial compromise with the Palestinians would be easily achieved once Israel opened itself to the possibility of peace.

"The second uprising was the end of the dream of the Peace Now movement, because the worst terrorism in Israel's history happened after we made the offer for real territorial compromise at Camp David, and after the Clinton proposals, and after we offered to redivide Jerusalem, becoming the first country in history to voluntarily offer shared sovereignty in its capital city."

So, reality has discredited both the right and left. What comes next? The next great ideological movement in Israeli history is centrism, Halevi said. "The Israeli centrist believes two things: A. the Arab world refuses to recognize our legitimacy and our existence; and B. we can't continue occupying them. I believe passionately that the left is correct about the occupation, and I believe the right is correct in its understanding of the intentions of the Middle East toward the Jewish state."

I argued that "centrism" possesses neither the magnetic power of social transformation nor the messianic qualities implicit in the settlement enterprise. Halevi disagreed. "Centrism is taking a people that hasn't functioned as a people,

hasn't functioned as a nation, for 2,000 years -- that is in some ways an anti-people, who have so many different ideologies and ways of being -- and learning how to function as a working nation. That's a large cause." Will centrist Israel overcome the power of the right? And what is its program? In a coming post, I'll look at the ideological and practical challenges to the solutions centrism puts forward to the Israeli-Arab crisis. In the meantime, go out and read Halevi's book; nothing explains more eloquently why Israel, more than most any other country, lives or dies based on the power and justice of its animating ideas.

Article 4.

The Guardian <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian>>

As the Middle East's power blocs fracture, so do hopes of stability

Wadah Khanfar <<http://www.theguardian.com/profile/wadah-khanfar>>

14 October 2013 -- In the Middle East, long-established alliances are shifting dramatically. As one political leader in the region said to me recently: "The ground is shaking under our feet and we must keep all our options open." Three major events over the past three months have destabilised the old order: a military coup against Mohamed Morsi's government <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-revolution>> in Egypt; the Russian-American agreement to destroy Syria's chemical weapons <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/syria-deadline-destroy-chemical-weapons-november>>; and a phone call between Obama and the new Iranian president Hassan

Rouhani <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/obama-phone-call-iranian-president-rouhani>>.

But first: what did the old order look like? Before Hosni Mubarak's regime was overthrown in Egypt, the Middle East was split into two main axes. The so-called axis of moderation -- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE and Kuwait -- was aligned with the west, supported the Palestinian National Authority and encouraged a political settlement with Israel.

The axis of resistance -- Iran, Syria and the political movements of Hamas and Hezbollah -- had a strained relationship with the west and considered a political settlement with Israel as a surrender. Qatar and Turkey stood close to this axis, maintaining good relations with the axis of moderation.

The fall of Mubarak's regime in January 2011 removed Egypt from the axis of moderation and triggered the current regional turmoil. The Syrian uprising against the Bashar al-Assad regime drove the Hamas leadership out of Syria <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17192278>>, and out of the axis of resistance. Turkey and Qatar also moved further away after both expressing public support for the Syrian rebels.

In this way, the axis of resistance was transformed into an axis of Iranian-Shia power, extending from Tehran to Nouri al-Maliki's government in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon -- a resilient axis united by support for the Assad regime.

After Morsi's election, Turkey and Qatar lent Egypt financial and political support, forming a new strategic alliance. Thus the coup that overthrew Morsi in July was a strategic earthquake. But it was welcomed by what was left of the axis of moderation: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan. The Saudi king congratulated the interim president of Egypt and, with Kuwait and the UAE, offered him a package of aid exceeding \$12bn, and King Abdullah II of Jordan was the first Arab leader to visit Cairo after the coup. However, Qatar and Turkey condemned the coup. Iran, though not sorry to see Morsi go given his support for the Syrian revolution, was concerned to see Egypt wrongly aligned once more with Iran's enemies.

The aftershocks of the coup continue to affect the region. The countries supporting it had hoped the military would enforce its rule in a matter of weeks, but they miscalculated: three months on the Egyptian scene hasn't settled down. There are still constant marches and protests, as well as an imposed evening curfew. Military and security measures have been taken against the Sinai and several cities and villages opposing the coup, and are driving the country into a state of economic paralysis.

On a regional level, there were other miscalculations, too. The new axis of moderation tried to topple the Islamist movements in Tunisia and Libya, while the Egyptian army began destroying the tunnels linking Gaza and Sinai as well as launching an extensive campaign against Hamas with the hope of ending its control of the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the new axis of moderation also strained its relationship with Turkey, one of the most strategically important countries in the region.

However, the greatest miscalculation the new axis made was its evaluation of the Russian and American position on Syria. This axis hoped Bashar al-Assad's regime would be quickly eliminated and replaced with a regime aligned with the

axis of moderation, while also excluding jihadists from the scene. Saudi and UAE diplomacy supported an American military strike against Assad. They communicated with Russia to give assurances and incentives to ensure that the Russians would refrain from effective rejection of any strikes. However, the Russian-American deal to disarm Syria's chemical weapons was a surprise. This was then followed by the developing closeness between Iran and both the US and Britain <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/02/obama-rouhani-phone-call-us-iran>, which further complicated the situation and derailed the aims of the axis of moderation.

The restructuring of regional alliances is still ongoing. The two countries that would benefit most from being politically close would be Turkey and Iran. Iran, burdened by an economic blockade and on the verge of talks with the west <http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-iran-nuclear-talks-0131014,0,2879074.story>, has an interest in the Iraqi and Syrian crises being resolved in a manner that would guarantee the preservation of its power while bringing stability to the region.

Meanwhile, Turkey also has an interest in putting an end to the bloodshed in Syria and Iraq because of the detrimental impact the conflicts are having on Turkey's own stability and economic development. In addition, Turkey's relationship with the axis of moderation has deteriorated since the coup in Egypt, and it needs to make diplomatic moves to revive its regional influence.

However, the transformations in the region are expected not only to affect the position of countries, but that of the Islamist movements as well. In particular it will be interesting to see how Hamas re-evaluates its regional relations and whether the targeting of the movement in Gaza will drive it to restore close relations with Iran.

The region as a whole has suffered from conflict between the two axes for years, and this has led to civil wars and sectarian conflict. It is now clear that the struggle in Syria has reached a critical point for both sides, and there will be no solution unless Iranians, Turks and Arabs can work together. As for Iraq, its legislative elections will be held in a few months. Sectarian polarisation in the country is claiming hundreds of lives on a monthly basis. Without reconciling Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, Iraq too is heading for more violence.

Conflicting axes cannot achieve stability in the region; only co-operative efforts of all the parties and countries involved can hope to do that. Today this all seems a distant hope, and the region may have to experience more turmoil and chaos before this fact is accepted.

Wadah Khanfar is a former director general of the al-Jazeera television network.

Article 5.

NYT

The Middle East Pendulum

Roger Cohen <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/columns/rogercohen/>

October 14, 2013 -- The Middle Eastern strongmen are back. The counterrevolution is in full swing. Islamists and secular liberals do battle. The Shiite and Sunni worlds confront each other. A two-state Israeli-Palestinian peace looks impossible. Freedom is equated with chaos. For this region there is no future, only endless rehearsals of the past. Poisoned by colonialism, stymied by Islam's battle with modernity, inebriated by oil, blocked by the absence of institutions that can mediate the fury of tribe and ethnicity, Middle Eastern states turn in circles. Syria is now the regional emblem, a vacuum in which only the violent nihilism of the jihadi thrives.

Just two and a half years after the Arab Spring, talk of the future — any future — seems preposterous. Countries build futures on the basis of things that do not exist here: consensus as to the nature of the state, the rule of law, a concept of citizenship that overrides sectarian allegiance, and the ability to place the next generation's prosperity above the settling of past scores.

Syria's Bashar al-Assad has gassed his own people. Iraq is again engulfed in Sunni-Shiite violence. The U.S.-trained Egyptian Army has slaughtered members of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is hard to recall the heady season of 2011 when despots fell and Arabs spoke with passion of freedom and personal empowerment. The Arab security state has shown its resilience; it breeds extremism. As the political theorist Benjamin Barber has noted, "Fundamentalism is religion under siege."

A scenario of endless conflict is plausible. Yet there are glimmerings. Repressive systems have survived but mind-sets have changed. The young people of the region (the median age in Egypt, where nearly one quarter of all Arabs live, is 25)

will not return to a state of submission. They have tasted what it is to bring change through protest. As in Iran, where the deep reformist current was crushed in 2009 only to resurface in 2013, these currents run deep and will reemerge. Here in Turkey, the closest approximation to a liberal order in a Middle Eastern Muslim state exists. That is the region's core challenge: finding a model that reconciles Islam and modernity, religion with nonsectarian statehood. So it is worth recalling that Turkey's democracy is the fruit of 90 years of violent back-and-forth since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the Republic in 1923, and imposed a Western culture.

Only over the past decade, with the arrival in power of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has the idea taken hold that Islam is compatible with a liberal order. For many secular Turks the swing of the pendulum has been excessive. The protests at Gezi Park this summer were about Erdoğan's invasion in the name of Islam of Turks' personal lives. This was democratic pushback from Turkey's secular coast against the conservative Anatolian heartland.

If in Turkey it has taken 90 years for a democracy to evolve that is not anti-Islamic, then the 30 months since the Arab Spring are a mere speck in time. Moreover, as Mustafa Akyol points out in his book "Islam Without Extremes," Turkey, unlike most other Muslim countries, was never colonized, with the result that political Islam did not take on a virulent anti-Western character. It was not a violent reaction against being the West's lackey as in Iran.

Now Iran, under its new president, Hassan Rouhani, is trying again to build moderation into its theocracy and repair relations with the West. Such attempts have failed in the past. But the Middle Eastern future will look very different if the U.S. Embassy in Tehran — symbol of the violent entry into the American consciousness of the Islamic radical — reopens and the Islamic Republic becomes a freer polity.

Nothing inherent to Islam makes it anti-Western. History has. The Islamic revolution was an assertion of ideological independence from the West. As power in the world shifts away from the West, this idea has run its course. Iranians are drawn to America.

The United States can have cordial relations with Iran just as it does with China, while disagreeing with it on most things. A breakthrough would demonstrate that the vicious circles of the Middle East can be broken.

I believe the U.S. Embassy in Tehran will reopen within five years because the current impasse has become senseless.

With Iran inside the tent rather than outside, anything would be possible, even an Israeli-Palestinian peace.

If Arabs could see in Israel not a Zionist oppressor but the region's most successful economy, a modern state built in 65 years, they would pose themselves the right questions about openness, innovation and progress. Israel in turn, by getting out of the business of occupation and oppression, could ensure its future as a Jewish and democratic state.

There is another future for the Middle East, one glimpsed during the Arab Spring, but first it must be dragged from the insistent clutches of the past.

Article 6.

Foreign Affairs

The Arab Sunset: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

Christopher Davidson

October 10, 2013 -- Since their modern formation in the mid-twentieth century, Saudi Arabia and the five smaller Gulf monarchies -- Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- have been governed by highly autocratic and seemingly anachronistic regimes. Nevertheless, their rulers have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of bloody conflicts on their doorsteps, fast-growing populations at home, and modernizing forces from abroad. One of the monarchies' most visible survival strategies has been to strengthen security ties with Western powers, in part by allowing the United States, France, and Britain to build massive bases on their soil and by spending lavishly on Western arms. In turn, this expensive militarization has aided a new generation of rulers that appears more prone than ever to antagonizing Iran and even other Gulf states. In some cases, grievances among them have grown strong enough to cause diplomatic crises, incite violence, or prompt one monarchy to interfere in the domestic politics of another. It would thus be a mistake to think that the Gulf monarchies are somehow invincible. Notwithstanding existing internal threats, these regimes are also facing mounting external ones -- from Western governments, from Iran, and each other. And these are only exacerbating their longstanding conflicts and inherent contradictions.

HOME BASES

The existence of substantial Western military bases on the Arabian Peninsula has always been problematic for the Gulf monarchies. To their critics, the hosting of non-Arab, non-Muslim armies is an affront to Islam and to national sovereignty. Their proliferation will likely draw further criticism, and perhaps serve as yet another flashpoint for the region's opposition movements.

Among the largest Western installations in the Gulf is al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which owes its existence to the country's former ruler, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani. In 1999, al-Thani told the United States that he would like to see 10,000 American servicemen permanently based in the emirate, and over the next few years, the United States duly began shifting personnel there from Saudi Arabia. Today, al-Udeid houses several thousand U.S. servicemen at a time and has also served as a forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), a U.S. Air Force expeditionary air wing, a CIA base, and an array of U.S. Special Forces teams. Nearby Bahrain hosts http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18fleet.html?_r=0 [2] the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the entire U.S. Fifth Fleet, which includes some 6,000 U.S. personnel. The United States recently downsized its force in Kuwait, but four U.S. infantry bases remain, including Camp Patriot, which is believed to house about 3,000 U.S. soldiers and two air bases.

The United States plans to further expand its regional military presence in the near future. As CENTCOM recently announced, the country will be sending the latest U.S. antimissile systems to at least four Gulf states. These are new versions of the Patriot anti-missile batteries that the United States already sent to the region and are meant to assuage the Gulf rulers' fears of Iranian missile attacks. Tellingly, the announcement did not reveal exactly which states had agreed to take the U.S. weapons. Yet analysts widely assume that the unnamed states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.

Equally, if not more, problematic than hosting so many foreign military bases has been the Gulf monarchies' ever-rising spending on Western arms. Although much of the equipment is inappropriate for bolstering defensive capabilities or is superfluous to peacekeeping operations -- the kinds of missiles Gulf soldiers are likely to find themselves undertaking -- Gulf leaders regarded the trade as necessary for their protection.

By most measures, such spending has gotten out of hand. As a proportion of GDP, the Gulf monarchies' purchases make them the biggest arms buyers in the world. Even the poorer Gulf states, which are grappling with declining resources and serious socioeconomic pressures, spend far beyond their means.

Of all of the monarchies' purchases, Saudi and UAE procurements have attracted the most attention. In 2009 alone, the UAE purchased nearly \$8 billion in U.S. military equipment, making it the United States' biggest arms customer that year. Saudi Arabia, for its part, purchased about \$3.3 billion in hardware. In December 2011, the United States announced that it had finalized a \$30 billion sale of Boeing-manufactured F-15 fighter jets to the Saudi Royal Air Force. And a UAE firm has reportedly partnered with a U.S. company, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, to bring predator drones to the UAE. This venture makes the UAE the first foreign buyer to acquire U.S. drone technology.

In the West, the sales have not been without criticism. The pro-Israel lobby, for example, has repeatedly argued that the sale of such high-grade equipment to the Gulf monarchies will erode Israel's "qualitative edge" in the region. The programs will also prove troublesome inside the Arab kingdoms, as the region's ruling families will find it increasingly difficult to justify such massive transactions to their beleaguered national populations. Given existing regional tensions, they are likely to continue increasing spending anyway -- be it on tanks, warplanes, or naval vessels.

COMMON CAUSE

The monarchies are also under pressure to deal with Iran, and some of them see posturing against Tehran as a convenient mechanism for containing domestic opposition, distracting from growing socio-economic pressures, and manipulating sectarian tensions. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Gulf monarchs have gone to great lengths to highlight Shia membership in opposition movements, a tactic that has allowed them to delegitimize critics -- falsely -- as Iranian agents.

Thus far, the strategy has enjoyed some limited success; members of the Gulf's Sunni populations have been quick to accuse Shia activists of being traitors. Many Western authorities continue to lend support to the monarchies on the grounds that the alternative would be Iran-style theocratic, revolutionary, and anti-Western governments. Still, the risks of such rabid anti-Iran sentiments are serious and possibly existential. By acting on such attitudes, Gulf monarchs have undermined their longstanding position as neutral peace brokers and distributors of regional development aid, and made themselves into legitimate targets in any conflict in the Persian Gulf. It is unlikely that the fathers of today's Gulf rulers would have allowed that to happen, no matter how deeply they distrusted their neighbor across the Gulf. This previous generation sidelined most confrontations with Iran -- including even the 1971 seizure of

three UAE islands by the Shah -- in recognition of shared economic interests and the substantial Iranian expatriate populations that reside in many of the monarchies.

All that is now ancient history in states like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Saudi officials have taken a particularly aggressive stance. According to a leaked U.S. diplomatic cable from 2008, the Saudi king has "repeatedly exhorted the United States to cut off the head of the snake" -- Iran's nuclear weapons program. Another cable from the same year quoted a veteran Saudi minister for foreign affairs suggesting a U.S. or NATO offensive in southern Lebanon to end Iran-backed Hezbollah's grip on power there. And a former Saudi intelligence chief has said publicly that Saudi Arabia should "consider acquiring nuclear weapons to counter Iran."

In early 2011, Bahrain's rulers took full advantage of anti-Iranian sentiments to act against domestic opponents, announcing that they would deport all Shia residents who had "links to Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard." In practice, that meant expelling hundreds of Bahrain's Lebanese residents, suspending all flights between the capital Manama and Beirut, and warning Bahraini nationals not to travel to Lebanon due to "threats and interference by terrorists."

Abu Dhabi's attitude toward Iran originally appeared to have been more hesitant, perhaps because of its previous ruler's more moderate policies. According to a 2006 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, the UAE government told U.S. officials that "the threat from al-Qaeda would be minor compared to if Iran had nukes...but that it was reluctant to take any action that might provoke its neighbor." Nevertheless, as Abu Dhabi's forceful Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan and his five full brothers gained control over most of the country's foreign policy, the emirate's views have fallen in line with those of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Since 2007, the crown prince's circle has pushed Western officials to put more troops in the region to counter Iranian hegemony. In 2009, the crown prince forcefully warned the United States of appeasing Iran [3], reportedly saying that "Ahmadinejad is Hitler."

Qatar, which has sought a role as regional peace broker, has been more careful with its public statements on Iran. Even so, in a private meeting in 2009, Qatar's then prime minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani, characterized Qatar's relationship with Iran as one in which "they lie to us and we lie to them." Qatar's calculated diplomacy perhaps owes to its precarious balancing act: the country hosts major U.S. military facilities while sharing its largest gas resource -- the offshore North Field -- with Iran.

THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY

Perhaps even riskier than their hawkishness toward Iran is the Gulf monarchies' dovishness toward Israel. Since independence, the Gulf monarchies have upheld laws requiring government personnel, businesses, and even individual residents to boycott Israel. In the UAE, the federal government has always housed an Israel boycott office. One federal law, passed in 1971, stipulates that "any natural or legal person shall be prohibited from directly or indirectly concluding an agreement with organizations or persons either resident in Israel, connected therewith by virtue of their nationality of working on its behalf."

For many years, however, the boycott extended well beyond such restrictions. The state-owned telecommunications company has barred telephone calls to Israel and blocked Web sites with an Israeli suffix. The government has not permitted Israeli nationals to enter the UAE, nor -- in theory -- any visitors that possess Israeli visa stamps in their passports. Yet trade opportunities have occasionally prompted the UAE to ignore its own boycott. After joining the World Trade Organization in 1996, UAE authorities were clearly under pressure to drop or at least relax their stance. When Dubai agreed to host the WTO's annual meeting in 2003, delegations from all of the organization's member states had to be invited; there was no way to prevent the arrival of an Israeli delegation or the flying of an Israeli flag on top of the Dubai World Trade Centre tower.

Concerns over Iran have further thawed relations between some of the Gulf monarchies and Israel. An open channel of communication now exists between Qatar and the Israeli security services. In late 2010, Qatar hosted a large delegation of senior Israeli policemen, among them the head of the Israeli police's investigations and intelligence branch, ostensibly as part of an Interpol meeting. Thus far, there is little firm evidence of growing security ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, or at least there have been no blatant admissions of them (as has been the case with Bahrain and Qatar). Nevertheless, rumors of significant Saudi-Israeli cooperation, prompted by the existence of a mutual enemy, have circulated in diplomatic circles for years.

The monarchies' new policies toward Israel are particularly dangerous given domestic political realities. The Gulf's national populations are, for the most part, anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian. Gulf nationals grew up watching the Palestinian intifada on television, and the liberation of Palestine remains a shared ideal among the region's youth. There

are also substantial communities of Palestinians in every monarchy; naturalized Gulf nationals who were born in Palestinian refugee camps are even known to hold powerful official posts in some rulers' courts.

SUCCESSION STRUGGLES

The pressures facing the Gulf states make for a very tense region, one in which disagreements over the United States, Iran, and Israel threaten to boil over. Quarrels between the kingdoms have at times grown so bitter that one monarchy has tried to alter the course of dynastic succession in another. Following the death of a ruler or a petty internal dispute in one monarchy it is now commonplace for neighboring monarchs to interfere, either by discreetly backing a preferred candidate, or, in the more extreme cases, by sponsoring a coup d'état. The resulting power vacuums have often allowed foreign powers to interfere as well.

The best example of a modern-day coup and subsequent foreign interference took place in the UAE's northernmost emirate of Ras al-Khaimah. In 2003, after allegedly burning an American flag at an anti-Iraq war demonstration, Prince Sheikh Khalid bin Saqr al-Qasimi, the emirate's long-serving crown prince, was replaced in the order of succession by a younger half-brother, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr al-Qasimi. Their very elderly father, Sheikh Saqr bin Mohammed al-Qasimi, later signed a decree in support of this change, but many analysts questioned the ruler's decision-making abilities, given his advanced age and poor health. The new crown prince had the apparent backing of Abu Dhabi, which sent military tanks to take positions on the streets of Ras al-Khaimah. The ousted crown prince's supporters still took the streets to show their support; security forces with water cannons disbursed them. The crown prince was then duly exiled, crossing the border to Oman before leaving for the United States.

As the emirate's Dubai-like development program began to flounder in 2008 the new crown prince Saud became increasingly vulnerable to criticism, including widespread allegations that he accepted kickbacks from the construction industry. The deposed prince, who was still in exile, enlisted a U.S. public relations firm and a British lawyer to conduct an international media campaign to persuade Abu Dhabi and the international community that the incumbent crown prince was a liability.

The campaign focused on Saud's apparent connections to Tehran, claiming that his effective deputy -- a Shia Lebanese businessman -- had major commercial interests, including factories, in the Islamic Republic. In 2009, the campaign even claimed that Iranian customs officers had been visiting Ras al-Khaimah's port and that the emirate was serving as a conduit for nuclear materials destined for Iran. Local media alleged that recent terror plots there, including a 2009 attempt to blow up Dubai's incomplete Burj Khalifa skyscraper, had originated in Ras al-Khaimah. The exiled crown prince even courted Israeli support, reportedly meeting with Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, who said that he was "working with certain people from his side" and "promised that the matter will be solved in his [the former crown prince's] favor."

In late 2010, the campaign appeared to be gaining traction. Abu Dhabi's ruling family allowed Khalid to return from exile to visit his father Sheikh Saqr, who still held the throne but was undergoing treatment in an Abu Dhabi hospital. When Saqr died in October, Khalid

Article 7.

Foreign Policy

Do American Jews think peace with Palestine is possible?

Ruce Stokes

Article 8

hatham House

The 3D printer is threatening to change the world

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[Arti=le 1.](#)

The Washington Post=

The world mus= tell Iran: No more half-steps

Ray Takeyh

October 14, 2013 --The great powers are again resuming diplomatic efforts to settle the Iran =uclear issue. Expectations are high, as Iran is

[now presumed=to be ruled by pragmatists](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/rouhani-s=orn-in-as-irans-president/2013/08/04/eb322736-fd25-11e2-8294-0ee5075b840d_=tory.html)

[who seek to end its isolation. Although much of the recent](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranian-president-hassan-rouhani-ta=es-diplomatic-tone-at-military-event/2013/09/22/313937f4-2393-11e3-9372-92=06241ae9c_story.html)

[international focus](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranians-await-presidential-elect=on-results-following-extension-of-polling-hours/2013/06/15/3800c276-d593-1=e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html)

has been on

[President Hassan Rouhani](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-iran=-zarif-hold-unusual-private-meeting-on-sidelines-of-nuclear-talks/2013/09/=6/d2fddf-fac-2700-11e3-9372-92606241ae9c_story.html)

and his

[13](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-irits nuclear program or =elinquish the critical components of such a program. They are, however, mo=e open to dialogue than the Ahmadinejad government was. Moreover, they str=ss that a reasonable Iran can assuage U.S. concerns about its nuclear development without having to abandon the =rogram.</p>
<p>Despite its softene= rhetoric, the new Iranian regime can be expected to continue asserting it= nuclear “rights” and to press its advantages in a contested Middle Ea=t. The Islamic Republic plans to remain</p>
</div>
<div data-bbox=)

an important backer of the Assad dynasty in Syria, a benefactor of Hezbollah and a supporter of Palestinian rejectionist groups. It will persist in its repressive tactics at home and continue to deny the people of Iran fundamental human rights. This is a government that will seek to negotiate a settlement of the nuclear issue by testing the limits of the great powers' prohibitions.

Washington need not accede to such Iranian conceptions. The United States and its allies are entering this week's negotiations in a strong position.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/irans-automakers-stalled-by-sanctions/2013/10/14/515725aa-3261-11e3-ad00-ec4c6b31cbed_story.html Iran's economy is withering under the combined pressures of sanctions and its own managerial incompetence. The Iranian populace remains disaffected as the bonds between state and society have been largely severed since the Green Revolution of 2009. The European Union is still highly skeptical of Iran, a distrust that Rouhani's charm offensive has mitigated but not eliminated. Allied diplomats can use as leverage in the forthcoming negotiations the threat of additional sanctions and Israeli military force.

Given the stark realities, it is time for the great powers to have a maximalist approach to diplomacy with Iran. It is too late for more Iranian half-steps and half-measures. Tehran must account for all its illicit nuclear activities and be compelled to make irreversible concessions that permanently degrade its ability to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program at a more convenient time. Anything less would be a lost opportunity.

Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Six reasons why the United States can't force Iran's nuclear hand

Colin H. Kahl, Alirza Nader

October 14, 2013 -- Iranian president Hasan Rouhani's recent charm offensive has raised expectations for a diplomatic breakthrough heading into this week's nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States, Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia (the so-called P5+1) in Geneva. Sanctions have taken a heavy toll on the Iranian economy, and the Islamic Republic may be motivated to take steps to rein in its nuclear program, including appointing chief nuclear negotiator, he convinced Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to accept a temporary suspension of enrichment. But further talks with the international community stalled in early 2005 over a failure to agree on Iran's right to enrich uranium, and Tehran ended its suspension shortly thereafter. Rouhani believes -- as do his critics in the Revolutionary Guard and the supreme leader -- that the West pocketed Iranian concessions and Tehran got nothing in return. The failure of Iran's earlier approach under Rouhani facilitated the rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his hardline policies, including the development of a much more robust uranium enrichment capability. Rouhani is unlikely to make that mistake again. And even if Rouhani were somehow convinced to do so, he would be savaged by his right flank, significantly undercutting his presidency.

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<p class="MsoNormal">2. It's a matter of pride and principle for the regime.

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<p class="MsoNormal">The regime has invested far too much of its domestic legitimacy in defending Iran's "right" (defined as domestic enrichment) to completely capitulate now, regardless of the pressure. The nuclear program and

"resistance to arrogant powers" are firmly imbedded in the Islamic Republic's ideological raison d'etre.

Khamenei, the ultimate decider on the nuclear file, and the Revolutionary Guards will not give up on the program

altogether, for it could be viewed by

their supporters and opponents alike as a total defeat. </p>

<p class="MsoNormal">However, Khamenei may accept a deal that constrains Iran's nuclear program but still allows limited enrichment. Under such an agreement, he could tell the Iranian people "I said we never wanted nuclear weapons

and I have issued a fatwa [religious ruling] against them. I insisted that our rights be respected, and now they are. "But if Khamenei cries uncle

and dismantles the entire program, how will he explain the billions invested and justify the years of sanctions and

isolation to his people? What would it all have been for? Khamenei likely fears such a humiliation more than he fears economic collapse or targeted

military strikes against his nuclear facilities. </p>

<p class="MsoNormal">3. If Iran does want to go nuclear, sanctions aren't going to

stop it in time.

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<p class="MsoNormal">Although hawks believe Tehran is on the ropes and that additional sanctions can force Iran to completely dismantle its nuclear program, economic and nuclear timelines don't align. To be sure, Iran's economy

is in dire straits, and a desire to alleviate the pressure is driving the regime's apparent willingness to negotiate more seriously. But despite the

current pain, Iran is not facing imminent economic collapse. This may be a dark period in Tehran, but Khamenei likely believes that Iran weathered worse times during the Iran-Iraq war. Some analysts have warned that Iran could achieve

a critical "breakout

capability" -- the ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons so fast that it could not be detected or stopped -- sometime in

mid-20. Yet, even if the U.S. Congress goes forward with additional harsh sanctions, the regime is not likely to

implode before it reaches this technical

threshold and, if it did, it might make little difference. Even the imprisoned leadership of the Green Movement and Iranian secularists opposed to the Islamic Republic. But if paired with meaningful

sanctions relief, it has a much better chance of success than insisting on the complete dismantling of Iran's program.

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<p class="MsoNormal">Washington should not accept a bad deal. But if we are to avoid the worst possible outcomes -- unconstrained enrichment leading to an eventual Iranian bomb or another major war in the Middle East -- then a

good-if-imperfect deal is preferable to no deal at all. </p>

<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>

<p class="MsoNormal"><i>Colin H. Kahl is an associate professor in Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New

American Security. In 2009-2011, he was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East. Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

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<p class="MsoNormal">Article 3.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Bloomberg</p>

<p class="MsoNormal"><u>The Rise and Fall of Israel's Settlement Movement</u></p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Jeffrey Goldberg</p>

<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Oct 14, 2013 -- Moments after Hanan Porat and his fellow Israeli paratroopers had crossed the Suez Canal as spearheads of a furious Israeli counterattack in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, he was severely wounded

in an Egyptian mortar bombardment. The Egyptians and Syrians had surprised Israel on Yom Kippur, with an atrocious loss of life, and crushed the country's post-Six Day War belief in its own invincibility. As Porat lay recovering in his hospital bed, his chest

ravaged by shrapnel wounds, he thanked God that he wasn't in the burn unit. And then, as

Yossi Klein Halevi writes in his new book,

"Like

Dreamers," the next phase of Porat's life mission was revealed.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">He read, in his hospital bed, an article in a kibbutz newspaper by a writer named Arnon Lapid, titled, "An Invitation to Weeping." Porat wasn't a member of the secular kibbutz elite; he was a member of a more

marginalized group of religious Zionists, who envied the kibbutznikim, and respected them as well. He was stunned by what Lapid wrote: "I want to send you all an invitation to weeping ... I will weep over my dead, you will weep over yours ... we'll weep ... for

the illusions that were shattered, for the assumptions that were proven to be baseless, the truths that were exposed as lies ... And we will pity ourselves, for we are worthy of pity." Halevi writes that when Porat read this lament he "felt as if his wounds

were being torn open. He would have shouted if he had the voice. Pity the generation privileged to restore Jewish sovereignty to the land of Israel? That small-mindedness, what weakness of character! Where would the Jews be now if, in 1945, they had thought

like this Arnon Lapid? Israelis would do now what Jews always did: Grieve for their dead and go on, with faith and hope." Porat would soon help usher into existence a new movement, a settlement enterprise that would be self-consciously modeled on Israel's

original settler movement, the socialist, Zionist and fiercely anti-religious pioneering formations that built the original kibbutzim. The early kibbutznikim were the men and women who laid the foundations for the reborn Jewish state and led that state through

the first decades of its existence, but by 1973 they appeared to be a spent force, exhausted spiritually, morally and politically. Porat's movement, which would cover the biblical heartland of the Jewish people with settlements -- a heartland the secular

world referred to as the West Bank, but which Jews knew by the ancient names of Judea and Samaria -- would be driven by devotion to God and his demands, not by a secular vision of Jews liberated from the ghettos and freed from the fetters of capitalism.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">This movement, which coalesced around Porat's Gush Emunim -- the "Bloc of the Faithful" -- has defined Israel's political agenda for the past 40 years, just as the kibbutz movement and its leaders shaped Israel

and its priorities through the early period of its existence. What is so fascinating about these two movements is that, for all their transformative success, they have both failed to complete their missions. The kibbutzim didn't turn Israel into a socialist paradise, and the hubris and shortsightedness of the Labor elite, which sprung from the kibbutz movement, brought Israel low in October 1973.

And the religious-nationalist settlement movement has succeeded in moving hundreds of thousands of Israelis into the biblical heartland, but it has never been able to convince the majority of Israelis that the absorption of the West Bank into a "Greater Israel" represents the country's salvation, rather than a threat to its existence. The thwarted utopianism of these two movements is the subject of "Like Dreamers," which is a magnificent book, one of the two or three finest books about Israel I have ever read. Halevi tells the story of seven men -- paratroopers who participated in the liberation of Jerusalem in 1967 -- who became leaders and archetypes of Israeli's competing utopian movements.

When I met Halevi in New York recently, I was filled with questions about what this history augured for Israel's future. The first one to cross my mind: How did the Orthodox settlers so easily supplant the leftist kibbutz elite as the nation's pioneering vanguard?

"The left lost its vigor at precisely the moment that religious Zionism discovered its own vigor," Halevi told me. "The key here is 1973. After 1967, not much happened. There were a couple of settlements, but the Labor government kept everyone on a tight leash, and the religious Zionists were intensely frustrated. The empowering moment for religious Zionists was due to Labor's failures in the Yom Kippur War. A generation of young kibbutznikim came out of 1973 deeply demoralized. People like Porat realized that the left had lost the lot."

Halevi went on, "In Israel, you never naturally evolve from one state of thinking to another. We careen. So we careened toward religious Zionism and the settlement movement."

But in your book, I said, you suggest that the settlers have failed to gain legitimacy for their movement among the mass of Israelis. How did they fail? "The settlement movement failed during the first Palestinian uprising. Israelis realized then the price of the occupation, that there was no such thing, as settler leaders promised, as a benign occupation. That kind of illusion went in the late 1980s."

Halevi noted one small irony here: If the first Palestinian uprising dispelled the idea that Israel could occupy the Palestinians cost-free and in perpetuity, the second Palestinian uprising - which began after the peace process failed in 2000, dispelled the left-wing argument that territorial compromise with the Palestinians would be easily achieved once Israel opened itself to the possibility of peace.

"The second uprising was the end of the dream of the Peace Now movement, because the worst terrorism in Israel's history happened after we made the offer for real territorial compromise at Camp David, and after the Clinton proposals, and after we offered to redivide Jerusalem, becoming the first country in history to voluntarily offer shared sovereignty in its capital city."

So, reality has discredited both the right and left. What comes next? The next great ideological movement in Israeli history is centrism, Halevi said. "The Israeli centrist believes two things: A. the Arab world refuses to recognize our legitimacy and our existence; and B. we can't continue occupying them. I believe passionately that the left is correct about the occupation, and I believe the right is correct in its understanding of the intentions of the Middle East toward the Jewish state."

I argued that “centrism” possesses neither the magnetic power of socialist transformation nor the messianic qualities implicit in the settlement enterprise. Halevi disagreed. “Centrism is taking a people that hasn’t functioned as a people, hasn’t functioned as a nation, for 2,000 years -- that is in some ways an anti-people, who have so many different ideologies and ways of being -- and learning how to function as a working nation. That’s a large cause.”

Will centrism overcome the power of the right? And what is its program? In a coming post, I’ll look at the ideological and practical challenges to the solutions centrism puts forward to the Israeli-Arab crisis. In the meantime, go out and read Halevi’s book; nothing explains more eloquently why Israel, more than most any other country, lives or dies based on the power and justice of its animating ideas.

[Article 4](#)

[The Guardian](http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian)

As the Middle East’s power blocs fracture, so do hopes of stability

[Wadah Khanfar](http://www.theguardian.com/profile/wadah-hanfar)

14 October 2013 -- In the Middle East, long-established alliances are shifting dramatically. As one political leader in the region said to me recently: “The ground is shaking under our feet and we must keep all our options open.” Three major events over the past three months have destabilised the old order: a military coup against Mohamed Morsi’s government in Egypt; the Russian-American agreement to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons; and a phone call between Obama and the new Iranian president Hassan Rouhani.

But first: what did the old order look like? Before Hosni Mubarak’s regime was overthrown in Egypt, the Middle East was split into two main axes. The so-called axis of moderation – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE and Kuwait – was aligned with the west, supported the Palestinian National Authority and encouraged a political settlement with Israel.

The axis of resistance – Iran, Syria and the political movements of Hamas and Hezbollah – had a strained relationship with the west and considered a political settlement with Israel as a surrender. Qatar and Turkey stood close to this axis, maintaining good relations with the axis of moderation.

The fall of Mubarak’s regime in January 2011 removed Egypt from the axis of moderation and triggered the current regional turmoil. The Syrian uprising against the Bashar al-Assad regime drove the Hamas leadership out of Syria, and out of the axis of resistance. Turkey and Qatar also moved further away after both expressing public support for the Syrian rebels.

In this way, the axis of resistance was transformed into an axis of Iranian-Shia power, extending from Tehran to Nouri al-Maliki's government in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon – a resilient axis united by support

for the Assad regime.

After Morsi's election, Turkey and Qatar lent Egypt financial and political support, forming a new strategic alliance. Thus the coup that overthrew Morsi in July was a strategic earthquake. But it was welcomed

by what was left of the axis of moderation: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan. The Saudi king congratulated the interim president of Egypt and, with Kuwait and the UAE, offered him a package of aid exceeding \$12bn, and King Abdullah II of Jordan was the first Arab leader to visit Cairo after the coup. However, Qatar and Turkey condemned the coup. Iran, though not sorry to see Morsi go given his support for the Syrian revolution, was concerned to see Egypt strongly aligned once more with Iran's enemies.

The aftershocks of the coup continue to affect the region. The countries supporting it had hoped the military would enforce its rule in a matter of weeks, but they miscalculated: three months on the Egyptian

scene hasn't settled down. There are still constant marches and protests, as well as an imposed evening curfew. Military and security measures have been taken against the Sinai and several cities and villages opposing the coup, and are driving the country

into a state of economic paralysis.

On a regional level there were other miscalculations, too. The new axis of moderation tried to topple the Islamist movements in Tunisia and Libya, while the Egyptian army began destroying the tunnels linking

Gaza and Sinai as well as launching an extensive campaign against Hamas with the hope of ending its control of the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the new axis of moderation also strained its relationship with Turkey, one of the most strategically important

countries in the region.

However, the greatest miscalculation the new axis made was its evaluation of the Russian and American position on Syria. This axis hoped Bashar al-Assad's regime would be quickly eliminated and replaced with

a regime aligned with the axis of moderation, while also excluding jihadists from the scene. Saudi and UAE diplomacy supported an American military strike against Assad. They communicated with Russia to give assurances and incentives to ensure that the Russians

would refrain from effective rejection of any strikes. However, the Russia-American deal to disarm Syria's chemical weapons was a surprise. This was then followed by the developing

[clashes between Iran and both the US and Britain](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/02/obama-rouhan-phone-call-us-iran), which further complicated

the situation and derailed the aims of the axis of moderation.

The restructuring of regional alliances is still ongoing. The two countries that would benefit most from being politically close would be Turkey and Iran. Iran, burdened by an economic blockade and on the

verge of [talks with the west](http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-iran-nuclear-talks-20131014,0,2879074.story), has an interest in the Iraqi

and Syrian crises being resolved in a manner that would guarantee the preservation of its power while bringing stability to the region.

Meanwhile, Turkey also has an interest in putting an end to the bloodshed in Syria and Iraq because of the detrimental impact the conflicts are having on Turkey's own stability and economic development. In

addition, Turkey's relationship with the axis of moderation has deteriorated since the coup in Egypt, and it needs to make diplomatic moves to revive its regional influence.

However, the transformations in the region are expected not only to affect the position of countries, but that of the Islamist movements as well. In particular it will be interesting to see how Hamas re-evaluates its regional relations and whether the targeting of the movement in Gaza will drive it to restore close relations with Iran.

The region as a whole has suffered from conflict between the two axes for years, and this has led to civil wars and sectarian conflict. It is now clear that the struggle in Syria has reached a critical point for both sides, and there will be no solution unless Iranians, Turks and Arabs can work together. As for Iraq, its legislative elections will be held in a few months. Sectarian polarisation in the country is claiming hundreds of lives on a monthly basis. Without reconciling Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, Iraq too is heading for more violence.

Conflicting axes cannot achieve stability in the region; only cooperative efforts of all the parties and countries involved can hope to do that. Today this all seems a distant hope, and the region may have to experience more turmoil and chaos before this fact is accepted.

Wadah Khanfar is a former director general of the al-Jazeera television network.

Article 5.

NYT

The Middle East Pendulum

[Roger Cohen](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/columns/rogercohen/ "More Articles by ROGER COHEN")

October 14, 2013 -- The Middle Eastern strongmen are back. The counterrevolution is in full swing. Islamists and secular liberals do battle. The Shiite and Sunni worlds confront each other. A two-state Israeli-Palestinian peace looks impossible. Freedom is equated with chaos. For this region there is no future, only endless rehearsals of the past.

Poisoned by colonialism, stymied by Islam's battle with modernity, inebriated by oil, blocked by the absence of institutions that can mediate the fury of tribe and ethnicity, Middle Eastern states turn in circles. Syria is now the regional emblem, a vacuum in which only the violent nihilism of the jihadi thrives.

Just two and a half years after the Arab Spring, talk of the future — any future — seems preposterous. Countries build futures on the basis of things that do not exist here: consensus as to the nature of the state, the rule of law, a concept of citizenship that overrides sectarian allegiance, and the ability to place the next generation's prosperity above the settling of past scores.

Syria's Bashar al-Assad has gassed his own people. Iraq is again engulfed in Sunni-Shiite violence. The U.S.-trained Egyptian Army has slaughtered members of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is hard to recall the heady season of 2011 when despots fell and Arabs spoke with passion of freedom and personal empowerment. The Arab security state has shown its resilience; it breeds extremism. As the political theorist Benjamin Barber has noted, "Fundamentalism is religion under siege."

A scenario of endless conflict is plausible. Yet there are glimmerings. Repressive systems have survived but mind-sets have changed. The young people of the region (the median age in Egypt, where nearly one quarter of all Arabs live, is 25) will not return to a state of submission. They have tasted what it is to bring change through protest. As in Iran, where the deep reformist current was crushed in 2009 only to resurface in 2013, these currents run deep and will reemerge.

Here in Turkey, the closest approximation to a liberal order in a Middle Eastern Muslim state exists. That is the region's core challenge: finding a model that reconciles Islam and modernity, religion with

nonsectarian statehood. So it is worth recalling that Turkey's democracy is the fruit of 90 years of violent back-and-forth since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the Republic in 1923, and imposed a Western culture.

Only over the past decade, with the arrival in power of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has the idea taken hold that Islam is compatible with a liberal order. For many secular Turks the swing of the pendulum has been

excessive. The protests at Gezi Park this summer were about Erdogan's intrusion in the name of Islam of Turks' personal lives. This was democratic pushback from Turkey's secular coast against the conservative Anatolian heartland.

If in Turkey it has taken 90 years for a democracy to evolve that is not anti-Islamic, then the 30 months since the Arab Spring are a mere speck in time. Moreover, as Mustafa Akyol points out in his book "Islam

Without Extremes," Turkey, unlike most other Muslim countries, was never colonized, with the result that political Islam did not take on a virulent anti-Western character. It was not a violent reaction against being the West's lackey, as in Iran.

Now Iran, under its new president, Hassan Rouhani, is trying again to build moderation into its theocracy and repair relations with the West. Such attempts have failed in the past. But the Middle Eastern future

will look very different if the U.S. Embassy in Tehran — symbol of the violent entry into the American consciousness of the Islamic radical — reopens and the Islamic Republic becomes a freer polity.

Nothing inherent to Islam makes it anti-Western. History has. The Islamic revolution was an assertion of ideological independence from the West. As power in the world shifts away from the West, this idea has

run its course. Iranians are drawn to America.

The United States can have cordial relations with Iran just as it does with China, while disagreeing with it on most things. A breakthrough would demonstrate that the vicious circles of the Middle East can

be broken.

I believe the U.S. Embassy in Tehran will reopen within five years because the current impasse has become senseless. With Iran inside the tent rather than outside, anything would be possible, even an Israeli-Palestinian peace.

If Arabs could see in Israel not a Zionist oppressor but the region's most successful economy, a modern state built in 65 years, they would pose themselves the right questions about openness, innovation and

progress. Israel, in turn, by getting out of the business of occupation and oppression, could ensure its future as a Jewish and democratic state.

There is another future for the Middle East, one glimpsed during the Arab Spring, but first it must be dragged from the insistent clutches of the past.

Article 6.

Foreign Affairs

The Arab Suns: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

Christopher Davidso

October 10, 2013 -- Since their modern formation in the mid-twentieth century, Saudi Arabia and the five smaller Gulf monarchies -- Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- have

been governed by highly autocratic and seemingly anachronistic regimes. Nevertheless, their rulers have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of bloody conflicts on their doorsteps, fast-growing populations at home, and modernizing forces from abroad.

One of the monarchies' most visible survival strategies has been to strengthen security ties with Western powers, in part by allowing the United States, France, and Britain to build massive bases on their

soil and by spending lavishly on Western arms. In turn, this expensive militarization has aided a new generation of rulers that appears more prone than ever to antagonizing Iran and even other Gulf states. In some cases, grievances among them have grown strong

enough to cause diplomatic crises, incite violence, or prompt one monarchy to interfere in the domestic politics of another.

It would thus be a mistake to think that the Gulf monarchies are somehow invincible. Notwithstanding existing internal threats, these regimes are also facing mounting external ones -- from Western governments,

from Iran, and each other. And these are only exacerbating their longstanding conflicts and inherent contradictions.

HOME BASES

The existence of substantial Western military bases on the Arabian Peninsula has always been problematic for the Gulf monarchies. To their critics, the hosting of non-Arab, non-Muslim armies is an affront

to Islam and to national sovereignty. Their proliferation will likely draw further criticism, and perhaps serve as yet another flashpoint for the region's opposition movements.

Among the largest Western installations in the Gulf is al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which owes its existence to the country's former ruler, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani. In 1999, al-Thani told the United

States that he would like to see 10,000 American servicemen permanently based in the emirate, and over the next few years, the United States duly began shifting personnel there from Saudi Arabia. Today, al-Udeid houses several thousand U.S. servicemen at a

time and has also served as a forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), a U.S. Air Force expeditionary air wing, a CIA base, and an array of U.S. Special Forces teams. Nearby Bahrain

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18flee.html?_r=0 hosts [2] the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the entire U.S. Fifth Fleet, which

includes some 6,000 U.S. personnel. The United States recently downsized its force in Kuwait, but four U.S. infantry bases remain, including Camp Patriot, which is believed to house about 3,000 U.S. soldiers and two air bases.

The United States plans to further expand its regional military presence in the near future. As CENTCOM recently announced, the country will be sending the latest U.S. missile systems to at least four

Gulf states. These are new versions of the Patriot anti-missile batteries that the United States already sent to the region and are meant to assuage the Gulf rulers' fears of Iranian missile attacks. Tellingly, the announcement did not reveal exactly which

states had agreed to take the U.S. weapons. Yet analysts widely assume that the unnamed states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.

Equally, if not more, problematic than hosting so many foreign military bases has been the Gulf monarchies' ever-rising spending on Western arms. Although much of the equipment is inappropriate for bolstering

defensive capabilities or is superfluous to peacekeeping operations -- the kinds of missions Gulf soldiers are likely to find themselves undertaking -- Gulf leaders regarded the trade as necessary for their protection.

By most measures, such spending has gotten out of hand. As a proportion of GDP, the Gulf monarchies' purchases make them the biggest arms buyers in the world. Even the poorer Gulf states, which are grappling

with declining resources and serious socioeconomic pressures, spend far beyond their means.

Of all of the monarchies' purchases, Saudi and UAE procurements have attracted the most attention. In 2009 alone, the UAE purchased nearly \$8 billion in U.S. military equipment, making it the United States'

biggest arms customer that year. Saudi Arabia, for its part, purchased about \$3.3 billion in hardware. In December 2011, the United States announced that it had finalized a \$30 billion sale of Boeing-manufactured F-15 fighter jets to the Saudi Royal Air Force.

And a UAE firm has reportedly partnered with a U.S. company, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, to bring predator drones to the UAE. This venture makes the UAE the first foreign buyer to acquire U.S. drone technology.

In the West, the sales have not been without criticism. The pro-Israel lobby, for example, has repeatedly argued that the sale of such high-grade equipment to the Gulf monarchies will erode Israel's "qualitative

edge" in the region. The programs will also prove troublesome inside the Arab kingdoms, as the region's ruling families will find it increasingly difficult to justify such massive transactions to their beleaguered national populations. Given existing regional

tensions, they are likely to continue increasing spending anyway -- be it tanks, warplanes, or naval vessels.

COMMON CAUSE

The monarchies are also under pressure to deal with Iran, and some of them see posturing against Tehran as a convenient mechanism for containing domestic opposition, distracting from growing socio-economic

pressures, and manipulating sectarian tensions. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Gulf monarchs have gone to great lengths to highlight Shi'ite membership in opposition movements, a tactic that has allowed them to delegitimize critics -- falsely --

as Iranian agents.

Thus far, the strategy has enjoyed some limited success; members of the Gulf's Sunni populations have been quick to accuse Shia activists of being traitors. Many Western authorities continue to lend support

to the monarchies on the grounds that the alternative would be Iran-style theocratic, revolutionary, and anti-Western governments.

Still, the risks of such rabid anti-Iran sentiments are serious and possibly existential. By acting on such attitudes, Gulf monarchs have undermined their longstanding position as neutral peace brokers and

distributors of regional development aid, and made themselves into legitimate targets in any conflict in the Persian Gulf. It is unlikely that the fathers of today's Gulf rulers would have allowed that to happen, no matter how deeply they distrusted their

neighbor across the Gulf. This previous generation sidelined most confrontations with Iran -- including even the 1971 seizure of three UAE islands by the Shah -- in recognition of shared economic interests and the substantial Iranian expatriate populations

that reside in many of the monarchies.

All that is now ancient history in states like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Saudi officials have taken a particularly aggressive stance. According to a leaked U.S. diplomatic cable from 2008, the Saudi king has "repeatedly exhorted the United States to cut off the head of the snake" -- Iran's nuclear weapons program. Another cable from the same year quoted a veteran Saudi minister for foreign affairs suggesting a U.S. or NATO offensive in southern Lebanon to end Iran-backed Hezbollah's grip on power there. And a former Saudi intelligence chief has said publicly that Saudi Arabia should "consider acquiring nuclear weapons to counter Iran."

In early 2011, Bahrain's rulers took full advantage of anti-Iranian sentiments to act against domestic opponents, announcing that they would deport all Shia residents who had "links to Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard." In practice, that meant expelling hundreds of Bahrain's Lebanese residents, suspending all flights between the capital Manama and Beirut, and warning Bahraini nationals not to travel to Lebanon due to "threats and interference by terrorists."

Abu Dhabi's attitude toward Iran originally appeared to have been more hesitant, perhaps because of its previous ruler's more moderate policies. According to a 2006 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, the UAE government told U.S. officials that "the threat from al-Qaeda would be minor compared to if Iran had nukes...but that it was reluctant to take any action that might provoke its neighbor." Nevertheless, as Abu Dhabi's forceful Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan and his five full brothers gained control over most of the country's foreign policy, the emirate's views have fallen in line with those of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Since 2007, the crown prince's circle has pushed Western officials to put more troops in the region to counter Iranian hegemony. In 2009, the crown prince forcefully warned the United States of appeasing Iran [3], reportedly saying that "Ahmadinejad is Hitler."

Qatar, which has sought a role as regional peace broker, has been more careful with its public statements on Iran. Even so, in a private meeting in 2009, Qatar's then prime minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani, characterized Qatar's relationship with Iran as one in which "they lie to us and we lie to them." Qatar's calculated diplomacy perhaps owes to its precarious balancing act: the country hosts major U.S. military facilities while sharing its largest gas resource -- the offshore North Field -- with Iran.

THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY

Perhaps even riskier than their hawkishness toward Iran is the Gulf monarchies' dovishness toward Israel. Since independence, the Gulf monarchies have upheld laws requiring government personnel, businesses, and even individual residents to boycott Israel. In the UAE, the federal government has always housed an Israel boycott office. One federal law, passed in 1971, stipulates that "any natural or legal person shall be prohibited from directly or indirectly concluding an agreement with organizations or persons either resident in Israel, connected therewith by virtue of their nationality of working on its behalf."

For many years, however, the boycott extended well beyond such restrictions. The state-owned telecommunications company has barred telephone calls to Israel and blocked web sites with an Israeli suffix. The government has not permitted Israeli nationals to enter the UAE, nor -- in theory -- any visitors that possess Israeli visa stamps in their passports. Yet trade opportunities have occasionally prompted the UAE to ignore its own boycott. After joining the World Trade Organization in 1996, UAE authorities were clearly under pressure to drop or at least relax their stance. When Dubai agreed to host the WTO's annual meeting in 2003, delegations from all of the organization's member states had to be invited; there was

no way to prevent the arrival of an Israeli delegation or the flying of an Israeli flag on top of the Dubai World Trade Centre tower.

Concerns over Iran have further thawed relations between some of the Gulf monarchies and Israel. An open channel of communication now exists between Qatar and the Israeli security services. In late 2010, Qatar

hosted a large delegation of senior Israeli policemen, among them the head of the Israeli police's investigations and intelligence branch, ostensibly as part of an Interpol meeting. Thus far, there is little firm evidence of growing security ties between Saudi

Arabia and Israel, or at least there have been no blatant admissions of them (as has been the case with Bahrain and Qatar). Nevertheless, rumors of significant Saudi-Israeli cooperation, prompted by the existence of a mutual enemy, have circulated in diplomatic

circles for years.

The monarchies' new policies toward Israel are particularly dangerous given domestic political realities. The Gulf's national populations are, for the most part, anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian. Gulf nationals

grew up watching the Palestinian intifada on television, and the liberation of Palestine remains a shared ideal among the region's youth. There are also substantial communities of Palestinians in every monarchy; naturalized Gulf nationals who were born in

Palestinian refugee camps are even known to hold powerful official posts in some rulers' courts.

SUCCESSION STRUGGLE

The pressures facing the Gulf states make for a very tense region, one in which disagreements over the United States, Iran, and Israel threaten to boil over. Quarrels between the kingdoms have at times grown

so bitter that one monarchy has tried to alter the course of dynastic succession in another. Following the death of a ruler or a petty internal dispute in one monarchy, it is now commonplace for neighboring monarchs to interfere, either by discreetly backing

a preferred candidate, or, in the more extreme cases, by sponsoring a coup d'état. The resulting power vacuums have often allowed foreign powers to interfere as well.

The best example of a modern-day coup and subsequent foreign interference took place in the UAE's northernmost emirate of Ras al-Khaimah. In 2003, after allegedly burning an American flag at an anti-Iraq war

demonstration, Prince Sheikh Khalid bin Saqr al-Qasimi, the emirate's long-serving crown prince, was replaced in the order of succession by a younger half-brother, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr al-Qasimi. Their very elderly father, Sheikh Saqr bin Mohammed al-Qasimi,

later signed a decree in support of this change, but many analysts questioned the ruler's decision-making abilities, given his advanced age and poor health. The new crown prince had the apparent backing of Abu Dhabi, which sent military tanks to take positions

on the streets of Ras al-Khaimah. The ousted crown prince's supporters still took the streets to show their support; security forces with water cannons disbursed them. The crown prince was then duly exiled, crossing the border to Oman before leaving for the

United States.

As the emirate's Dubai-like development program began to flounder in 2008, the new crown prince Saud became increasingly vulnerable to criticism, including widespread allegations that he accepted kickbacks

from the construction industry. The deposed prince, who was still in exile, enlisted a U.S. public relations firm and a British lawyer to conduct an international media campaign to persuade Abu Dhabi and the international community that the incumbent crown

prince was a liability.

The campaign focused on Saud's apparent connections to Tehran, claiming that his effective deputy -- a Shia Lebanese businessman -- had major commercial interests, including factories, in the Islamic Republic.

In 2009, the campaign even claimed that Iranian customs officers had been visiting Ras al-Khaimah's port and that the emirate was serving as a conduit for nuclear materials destined for Iran. Local media alleged that recent terror plots there, including a

2009 attempt to blow up Dubai's incomplete Burj Khalifa skyscraper, had originated in Ras al-Khaimah. The exiled crown prince even courted Israeli support, reportedly meeting with Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, who said that he was "working with

certain people from his side" and "promised that the matter will be solved in his [the former crown prince's] favor."

In late 2010, the campaign appeared to be gaining traction. Abu Dhabi's ruling family allowed Khalid to return from exile to visit his father Sheikh Saqr, who still headed the throne but was undergoing treatment

in an Abu Dhabi hospital. When Saqr died in October, Khalid quickly returned to Ras al-Khaimah and installed himself in his former palace with some 150 heavily armed guards and even more loyal tribesmen. He seemed confident that, having received Abu Dhabi's

blessing to attend his father's funeral, he would be officially installed as ruler of Ras Khaimah later that day. But in the early evening, the UAE Ministry for Presidential Affairs in Abu Dhabi announced that his younger brother Saud had been named the new

ruler of Ras al-Khaimah.

Abu Dhabi, which holds the presidency of the Emirates, deployed UAE tanks on the outskirts of the emirate and all of the deposed crown prince's retainers -- including two of his cousins, several Omani citizens,

and a Canadian military adviser -- were arrested and detained for questioning. Two months later, the emirate's new ruler was invited to a banquet in Abu Dhabi held in his honor, where the ruler of Abu Dhabi congratulated him on his success.

The Gulf's immediate future is likely to be marked by many more such coup and countercoup attempts. Several current monarchs are very old, and powerful factions in growing royal families have coalesced around

rival successors. In each of these cases, internecine contests will develop, and, given the high stakes involved, the involvement of foreign powers is all but inevitable.

In the end, however, the monarchies may all suffer from such meddling, for these regimes are only as strong as the weakest links in their chain. An especially brittle monarchy succumbing to pressure over Western

involvement, Iran, or Israel could easily be the first domino to fall, undoing the illusion of invincibility that the Gulf monarchies have so painstakingly built to distinguish themselves from the floundering Arab republics' door.

CHRISTOPHER DAVIDSON is a reader in Middle East politics at Durham University and the author of *After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse*

of the Gulf Monarchies [1], from which this article is adapted.

{Reprinted from *After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies* [1], by Christopher M. Davidson, with the permission of Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2013.}

[After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies](#)

Article 7.

Foreign Policy

Do American Jews think peace with Palestine is possible?

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<p class="MsoNormal">Bruce Stokes=</p>

<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>

<p class="MsoNormal">October 14, 2013 --=</p><p class="MsoNormal">Whatever your thoughts on the viability -- or futility -- of a peace deal =etwe</p>

early =ctober, prodded by America's top diplomat Secretary of State John Kerry, Israeli and Palestinian negot=ators engaged in a new round of peace

talks in an attempt to breathe new life into their on-again, off-again eff=orts to bring lasting stability to their relationship. To prove successful =nd sustainable, the outcome of these talks must ultimately gain the suppor= of both the Israeli and Palestinian

people. But given the catalytic role Washington has played in this effort =o revive the Middle East peace process, there is a third party whose judgm=nt of the outcome may prove crucial: American Jews.

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<p class="MsoNormal">A new Pew Research Center=survey is a reminder that t=e view widely held in some parts of the world

-- that American Jews uniformly back a hardline stance on the Israeli-Pale=stinian issue -- is simply not true. The 5.3 million-member American Jewish=community is far from monolithic in its emotional attachment to Israel, on=a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict, or on many of the other issues that bedevil the peace process. I= fact, there are wide differences between Orthodox, Conservative, and Refo=m Jews on many of these concerns.

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<p class="MsoNormal">To be sure, more th=n two-thirds (69 percent) of American Jews feel some attachment to Israel.=But just 30 percent of Jews feel very attached, and this ranges from 61 pe=cent of the Orthodox to 24 percent

of Reform Jews. Asked whether they trust Israel to make a sincere effort t= achieve peace, though, and things start to get more complicated.

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<p class="MsoNormal">As for the peace pr=cess, only about four-in-ten American Jews (38 percent) think the current =sraeli government is making a sincere effort in negotiations with the Pale=stinians, while 48 percent say the Israeli

effort is lacking. But such numbers mask divisions within the American Jew=sh community. Most Orthodox Jews (61 percent) believe the Israeli governme=t is working to bring about peace with the Palestinians, as do 52 percent =f Conservative Jews. But fewer

Reform Jews (36 percent) agree. </p>

<p class="MsoNormal">That said, there's =reater consensus among American Jews when looking at the other side of the=negotiating table. Three-quarters of respondents think the Palestinian lea=ership's efforts to bring about a peace

settlement with Israel are not sincere. </p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Clearly, Jewish set=lements in the West Bank are a major point of contention in the negotiatio=s. A plurality of American Jews (44 percent) say the continued building of=such settlements hurts the security

of Israel. Just 17 percent say it helps, while 29 percent say it does not =ake a difference. Notably, 50 percent of Reform Jews think the settlements=harm the peace process, but only 16 percent of the Orthodox agree. By comp=rison, a 2013 Pew Re=earch Center survey in Isra=l found that Israeli Jews have more mixed views: 35 percent say the contin=ed building of Jewish settlements hurts

the security of Israel, 31 percent say it helps, and 27 percent say it doe= not make a difference.

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Land exchanges between Israel and the Palestinian territories are likely to be part of any final peace settlement, an outcome that could be complicated by views held by Americans. While only four-in-ten American Jews (40 percent) believe the land that is now Israel was given to the Jewish people by God, this sentiment is held by an overwhelming majority of Orthodox Jews (84 percent). Fewer Reform Jews (35 percent) share this sentiment. Notably, other Pew surveys show that more American Christians than Jews actually believe God gave Israel to the Jews: 55 percent of U.S. Christians, including 82 percent of white evangelical Protestants.

As the peace talks progress, the role played by the United States may become ever more of an issue. Today, more than half of American Jews say U.S. support for Israel is about right (54 percent), although a substantial minority believes that Washington is not supportive enough of the Jewish state (31 percent). Just 11 percent think the United States is too supportive of Israel. By comparison, 41 percent of the general public thinks support for Israel is about right, while the rest are nearly evenly divided between those who say America is not supportive enough and those who say it is too supportive of the Jewish state.

Opinions about U.S. support for Israel vary considerably across denominations, with Orthodox Jews (53 percent) particularly likely to say Washington is not supportive enough, while only 30 percent of Reform Jews think America is not backing Jerusalem sufficiently. Interestingly, more white evangelical Protestants than Jews think the U.S. currently is not sufficiently supportive of Israel (46 percent vs. 31 percent).

But there is reason for hope. Indeed, looking into the future, American Jews are more optimistic than the U.S. general public that a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully: 61 percent of American Jews say this is possible, compared with 50 percent of the public overall. But, again, all Jews do not agree. Majorities of Reform (58 percent) and Conservative (62 percent) Jews think peaceful coexistence is possible. But most Orthodox Jews (61 percent) do not believe a two-state solution will work.

So, as Washington ramps up its efforts to get the Israelis and Palestinians to fashion a lasting settlement of their differences, there is no uniform American Jewish viewpoint on the peace process. American Jews are hopeful about the objective, but divided on the details. And the view held by many foreigners, that Jewish Americans are knee-jerk supporters of the Israeli position on the Palestinian territories, is just wrong.

Bruce Stokes is director of global economic attitudes at the Pew Research Center.

[Article 8](#)

Chatham House

The 3D printer is threatening to change the world in ways we can barely imagine

Roger Highfield

October 2013 -- Visitors to the Science Museum this autumn will catch a glimpse of a future in which engineers can make lighter and more efficient parts for aircraft and space probes, where patients will one day be able to mint their own drugs and doctors print replacement body organs.

The idea of 3D printing is not new: it has been available commercially for around three decades. Back in the 1990s, I speculated about the potential of 'printing' Christmas presents. In 2004, I became aware of the potential of what was then called 'rapid prototyping' when I visited the Renault F1 team works in Oxfordshire.

What has changed in recent years is that 3D printers are becoming cheaper, smarter, better and more ubiquitous. When in May a self-proclaimed crypto-anarchist in Texas made a handgun using a £5,000 3D printer, the international press cottoned on that something was changing in the world of manufacturing.

One object in particular seems to sum up the potential of this technology: a mechanical hand designed and printed by Richard Van As, a South African carpenter, following a circular saw accident in which he lost four fingers. Van As was able to collaborate with a British prop-maker over a distance of 10,000 miles to create the 'Robohand' and has made the plans freely available online so that anyone can use them. At the time of writing, these have been downloaded more than 30,000 times.

The first industrial revolution reshaped society and boosted the incomes of the poor as manual labour was displaced by machine-based manufacturing. Factories produced items in their thousands, profiting from vast economies of scale. Now, thanks to the 3D printing revolution, bespoke craftsmanship is making a comeback.

The formal label given to this craft is 'additive manufacturing' – the object is built up layer by layer in a 3D printer. The traditional approach to manufacturing is 'subtractive' and relies on milling, grinding and cutting to remove material, wasting much of it in the process.

Additive manufacturing is an organic blend of craft and hi-tech that is the opposite of the production line assembly methods pioneered by Henry Ford. It heralds a new world of consumer choice as almost anything can be customized and then printed – even the 3D printer itself.

One of the milestones in the field came when Adrian Bowyer, who was then at the University of Bath, devised RepRap, which stands for 'replicating rapid-prototyper', which works like a printer but, rather than squirting ink on to paper, lays down thin layers of molten biodegradable plastic which solidify to make objects.

This machine was the first to copy all of its own 3D-printed parts, which could then be assembled into a new RepRap machine. Now similar machines are available in kit form, marking a dramatic rise in the use of this technology analogous to when the mainframe computer gave way to the desktop PC.

Nimble start-up companies are now entering the market and being absorbed into industrial giants. All the while, the software and other ingredients of 3D printers are getting cheaper, while hackers adapt and improve them. Hobbyists now play with them. Communal 3D printing facilities for local people are springing up in the United States.

These 3D printers come in various kinds. Some spray 'inks', such as liquid polymers that solidify when exposed to ultra violet light. Others use layers of sticky paper, or extrude filaments of molten plastic.

There are those that use powdered metal or plastic that is made solid with a laser or an electron beam. As the technology mutates and evolves, the quality of the objects they can make gets better.

Joshua Pearce, associate professor at Michigan Technological University, says: '3D printing is ready for showtime.' He has carried out an economic analysis of 3D printing in an average American household, published recently in the journal *Mechatronics*.

His team selected 20 relatively inexpensive items for their study: mobile phone accessories, a garlic press, a showerhead, a spoon holder, and the like, and then calculated the cost of making them with 3D printers. The conclusion: it would cost the typical consumer from \$312 to \$1,944 – depending on brand and quality – to buy those 20 things, compared to \$18 to make them in a weekend. If the family made only 20 items a year, Pearce's group calculated that the printers would pay for themselves within a few months to a few years.

When these printers become as common as the microwave, they will have a profound effect on everyday life. DIY will take on a new meaning. Why order parts from a warehouse or visit a shop when entire designs can be stored in virtual computer warehouses, waiting to be printed locally, and on demand?

You will be able to make everything from door handles to mobile phones in your garage, or at a neighbourhood 3D print shop. And if you have an actual kitchen garden as well, you can grow the plastic – polylactic acid is made from fermented plant starch, usually corn. You will have a self-replicating 3D printing machine making useful goods from a self-replicating material supply.

'3D printing enables engineers and designers to manufacture things they couldn't make with traditional methods,' says Suzy Antoniw, exhibition leader at the Science Museum.

No country will want to be left behind as 3D printing evolves, least of all China, once the global source of low-cost manufacturing and now rapidly moving up the technological ladder.

To make sure that Britain stays at the forefront of this rapidly evolving technology, the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council has set up the Centre for Innovative Manufacturing in Additive Manufacturing at the University of Nottingham. The aerospace company EADS can print complex geometries rapidly from computer-aided design information, without the need for dies, form tools or moulds.

The company 3T RPD, of Greenham Common, Berkshire, working in partnership with the University of Southampton, created the world's first 3D-printed aircraft, a small drone. It has also printed the titanium lattice of the Queen's Baton for the 2014 Commonwealth Games. The baton will tour all the competing nations and territories before the games.

Bespoke items such as the baton will not just be small scale. At Loughborough University, Richard Buswell is developing a vast, three-storey rig to create buildings by 'concrete printing' elaborate components with far greater complexity than currently possible, opening up almost limitless possibilities for architects.

As a result there has been an explosion of creativity. The Urbee is a hybrid car with a 3D-printed body. Its successor will use additive manufacturing to make both exterior and interior.

Enrico Dini, the Italian inventor, has created a device that uses a magnesium-based material to bind sand particles together; creating sedimentary stone, a process that normally takes hundreds of years, in a matter of minutes. Dini's machine, known as the D-Shape, can print any feature that will fit into a cube that is 6x6 metres, from artistic staircase to kiosks, benches and statues.

In space, other opportunities beckon. Imagine landing on the Moon or Mars, putting lunar rock dust through a 3D printer and making something useful – like a wrench or a replacement part.

<p class="MsoNormal">And, taking us a st=p closer to every Trekkie’s dream of a food replicator, Nasa has awarded=a contract to a research consultancy in Austin, Texas, to study the feasib=lity of printing pizzas. The aim is to
find ways to satisfy the appetite of astronauts on deep space missions, wh=re the shelf life of ingredients needs to be a few decades rather than a f=w days.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">At this stage the p=ssibilities seem endless. Do I believe the hype? I do – but I am not so =ure when the revolution will come.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There was a lag of =any years between the first feverish headlines about the personal computer=revolution and the arrival of truly useful domestic computers. The same we=t for the internet, which was billed
as transformative in the primitive dial-up era of the 1990s and is only no= delivering that promise thanks to broadband, tablets and 4G.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">As for the 3D revol=tion, I am confident that the technology will spread beyond industry and g=eks in the 2020s to change the way we do things, and in more fascinating w=ys than we can possibly imagine.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i>Roger Highfield,=director of external affairs at the Science Museum.</i></p>
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