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Article 1.

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Al-Monitor

Obama and =rdogan Edge Closer on Syria

Kadri Gursel

Article 2.

<file:///C:/Users/Efrat%20Elron/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Inter=et%20Files/Content.IE5/ONM
AC3M2\18%20May.doc#b>

Ahram

The Muslim=Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia

Hicham Mourad

Article 3.

<file:///C:/Users/Efrat%20Elron/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Inter=et%20Files/Content.IE5/ONM
AC3M2\18%20May.doc#c>

American Thinker=

Qatar, the=New Player in the Middle East

Michael Curt=s <http://www.americanthinker.com/michael_curtis_1/>

Article 4.

<file:///C:/Users/Efrat%20Elron/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Inter=et%20Files/Content.IE5/ONM
AC3M2\18%20May.doc#d>

Al-Monitor

Saudi-Qata= Honeymoon In Lebanon is Over

Nasser Chararah<=span>

Article 5.

<file:///C:/Users/Efrat%20Elron/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Inter=et%20Files/Content.IE5/ONM
AC3M2\18%20May.doc#e>

RAND

How Would = Nuclear-Armed Tehran Behave?

Alireza Nader

Article 6.

<file:///C:/Users/Efrat%20Elron/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Inter=et%20Files/Content.IE5/ONM
AC3M2\18%20May.doc#f>

Foreign Policy</=pan>

How Americ= wll Fight the Next War

Adm. Jonathan Gr=enert, Gen. Mark Welsh

Article 7.

The Washington P=st

Book revie=: 'Beyond War' by David Rohde

Marc Lynch

Article 1.

Al-Monitor

Obama and Erdogan Edge Closer On Syria</=>

Kadri Gursel

May 17 -- Everybody knows the joint objective of Turkish =rime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and US President Barack Obama is "Syr=a without Assad." Where they diverged was not the objective but on how to achieve that objective.

Until their May 16 meeting at the White House, it was pos=ible to speak plainly on how the two leaders differed on ways and means of=reaching the goal of "Syria without Assad." In recent days, their different views appeared as contrasts.<=span>

Their difference was distinct above all in what kind of a solution they supported in Syria. The uprising in Syria first turned to a civil war and could well be tending toward a regional conflict. But the Baathist regime was still standing, with no indication that it would be going away anytime soon.

Ankara was nevertheless persisting on a military solution and continued to advocate creation of "secure zones" that could signify partial occupation of Syria. Washington, on the other hand, had never warmed to the idea of a military intervention—especially one that it would have to lead and had good reasons to avoid. The latest move was Washington's giving priority to a political/diplomatic solution anchored on a joint understanding reached between US Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in their May 7 meeting in Moscow. In Washington's approach, assistance and support for the opposition was to facilitate such a solution.

As a subtext, one has to look to Washington and Ankara's stances against the jihadists. Washington was concerned for the future of Syria and its own security from Ankara's opening of Turkish territory to jihadist elements led by the pro-al-Qaeda Jabhat al-Nusra, and was making this known to Ankara.

The second main divergence was Ankara's insistence on Assad's departure as a precondition to initiating any diplomatic-political solution process.

But Assad is not going anywhere. To insist on his exit as a precondition to a political solution was possibly impeding peace by ruling out an agreed solution that could end up with Assad eventually leaving the stage. That, of course, meant even more destruction and misery for Syria in the meantime.

We know that the US, too, favors a transition government without Assad. But we don't think that the Obama administration was insisting on keeping Assad out of the negotiations aimed at establishing such a transition government. How the two parties would affect each other's stances was a matter of speculation before the White House meeting.

Whose position was more realistic, more resilient and therefore more persuasive given the realities? Whose was obsolete and had lost its credibility?

These questions have to be answered before evaluating the messages that could well show the way for the near future that both leaders gave in their Rose Garden news conference under drizzling rain on May 16.

Everybody knows there is no good solution for Syria. The most appropriate approach would be to choose the least bad option, and end the bloodbath that is destroying that country and threatening the region with war.

When that is the criterion, then it becomes impossible to find anything to defend in Turkey's policy. Erdogan went to Washington as a leader whose military-solution-without-Assad policy had failed. There is more.

Erdogan sat down at Washington's negotiating table as a leader whose misguided Syria policy had endangered his country's security and stability and accumulated excessive negative energy along fragile sectarian fault lines.

The bomb that went off on May 11 in Reyhanli town, Hatay province, where hundreds of thousands of Arab Alevis live, did not only kill more than 50 and wound 150. It also rattled Erdogan's position considerably.

As such, Erdogan went to Washington as a weakened leader open to suggestions that it was time to change his Syrian policy.

Now we can assess who said what at the Rose Garden <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2013/05/16/president-obama-holds-press-conference-prime-minister-erdogan>> and what they meant.

Obama said, "Turkey is going to play an important role as we bring representatives of the regime and opposition together in the coming weeks." He went on: "We both agree that [Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad needs to go. He needs to transfer power to a transitional body. That is the only way that we're going to resolve this crisis. And we're going to keep working for a Syria that is free from Assad's tyranny; that is intact and inclusive of all ethnic and religious groups; and that's a source of stability, not extremism, because it's in the profound interest of all our nations, especially Turkey."

In the questions and answers <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/05/16/president-obama-and-prime-minister-erdogan-turkey-hold-press-conference>, Obama explained that "Geneva 2" did not mean reducing support to the opposition by saying: "There's no magic formula for dealing with an extraordinarily violent and difficult situation like Syria's. If there were, I think the prime minister and I already would have acted on it and it would already be finished. And instead, what we have to do is apply steady international pressure, strengthen the opposition. I do think that the prospect of talks in Geneva involving the Russians and representatives about a serious political transition that all the parties can buy into may yield results." These were the words that best explained Obama's position.

Let's see what Prime Minister Erdogan said:

"Syria was at the top of our agenda. And we have views that overlap, as the president has just said. But let me tell you that ending this bloody process in Syria and meeting the legitimate demands of the people by establishing a new government are two areas where we are in full agreement with the United States. To prevent Syria from becoming an area of operations for terror organizations is among our priorities."

In the Q&A, Erdogan outright referred to the Geneva process. He said: "As I said before, our views do overlap, and with our discussions this evening, we will continue to explore what we can do together, what we can consider as parts of a roadmap looking at Geneva and beyond. Russia and China being part of this process is very important, and this is important in the context of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Their participation in this process will certainly add greater impetus."

It is possible to conclude from Erdogan's remarks that he is committed to the Geneva process. This also shows that the validity of Ankara's understanding of a military solution is no more.

Political logic requires us to think that the Americans asked Ankara to persuade the opposition groups (that Ankara is in close contact with) to engage in the Geneva process. Furthermore, we will have to accept that from now on any military assistance to the opposition will serve not as a military solution but to keep the pressure on the regime that has been lately gaining militarily in the field.

It is interesting that Erdogan declares that he is "against terrorist organizations using Syria." Of course, what is important here is what Erdogan understands of "terror organizations." Until now, we have not heard him or his government say a word about considering Syria's al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-cia-qatar-and-the-creation-of-syrias-jabhat-al-nusra/5335453> as a terror organization. He probably was referring to the PYD, the PKK's Syrian extension. If so, there is nothing interesting in what he says. But if he meant Jabhat al-Nusra, we will see.

Another important development was his announcing for the first time that he will also be visiting the West Bank alongside Gaza in June. It was known that the Obama administration was not delighted with Erdogan visiting only Gaza. It is understood that Erdogan responded favorably to suggestions from the White House.

The result is: The Ankara government that until yesterday was pursuing an extremist, illusionary and ideological Syria policy as of May 16 has come close to a moderate and rational mainstream policies.

Kadri Gursel <<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/au=hors/kadr-gursel.html>> is a contributing writer for Al-Monitor's Turkey Pulse and has written a column for the Turkish daily Milliyet <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Haber/>> since 2007. He focuses primarily on Turkish foreign policy, international affairs and Turkey's Kurdish question, as well as Turkey's evolving political Islam.

Article 2.

Ahram

The Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia

Hicham Mourad

15 May 2013 -- Although the new Egyptian regime immediately displayed its willingness to continue the alliance forged between Cairo and Riyadh in the Mubarak era, Saudi leaders, despite the economic aid offered and the diplomatic formulas used, remain at least cautious vis-à-vis the new masters of Egypt.

The Egyptian head of state reserved his first foreign visit for Saudi Arabia, in July. He used the occasion to emphasise that his country is not seeking to "export" its revolution beyond its borders. The message was twofold: Egypt will not attempt to encourage opposition in neighbouring countries to overthrow political regimes, or provide support for the installation of Islamist regimes, from the Muslim Brotherhood. These assurances were clearly not enough to allay the concerns of the Saudi royal family, however, about the intentions of the Brotherhood, nor on the political situation in Egypt.

The position of Riyadh was somewhat surprising, given the support offered by the ruling Al-Saud family to the Muslim Brotherhood, and Arab Islamist movements in general, since the time of former President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 60s, where Nasser tried through an active foreign policy to export socialism and Arab nationalism — hostile to the West — to the Arab world. The assistance of Saudi Arabia to the Brotherhood took various forms, including political asylum granted to members of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt and other nationalities, such as Syrians and Jordanians, as well as funding the creation of Islamic charities in which the Muslim Brotherhood played a major role, as with the Muslim World League, founded in Mecca in 1962, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, created in Jeddah in 1972. Both organisations were used to proselytise in favor of Wahhabism, the religious doctrine of Saudi Arabia, but at the same time served the propaganda of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Although Saudi Arabia adopted Wahhabism — a form of Salafism, purified, austere, puritanical, and rigorous as a religious doctrine — it supported the Muslim Brotherhood movement, whose doctrine, more flexible, seeks to reconcile Islamic tradition and Western political experience, to counter socialism and Nasserism in the Arab world.

The same goal was followed by President Anwar El-Sadat in the 1970s to remove Nasser's legacy and support the change of Egypt's external alliances towards the West and the Gulf oil monarchies. Saudi Arabia continued as well after the death of Nasser to lend its support to the Muslim Brotherhood, as long as it served its interest to fight liberal and secular forces and support the role of religion in politics. It was perceived and used as a tool of its foreign policy.

This alliance of circumstance does not rule out that the Al-Saud family was sceptical about the Brotherhood and its doctrine. This cautious Saudi approach began early, in the late '40s, when the Muslim Brotherhood began to expand outside of Egypt in several Arab countries. The Al-Saud family saw the activist and "republican" formula of Islam promoted by the Brotherhood as a threat to the absolute monarchy formula established in Saudi Arabia, which advocates popular obedience and prohibits revolt against the political regime.

At the time, the Brotherhood movement's founder, Hassan Al-Banna, asked King Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud permission to open a branch of the Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia, but the founder of the Saudi monarchy, which prohibits any kind of

political party or movement, politely declined. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to spread its doctrine in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly through immigration of members of the movement who fled the Nasser regime. The first real shock that hit the relationship between Riyadh and the Brotherhood took place following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. While Saudi Arabia relied on the US to liberate the occupied emirate and to ensure its own security against the threat of Saddam Hussein, the Muslim Brotherhood opposed Western intervention. This position was interpreted as a sign of ingratitude. Following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Saudi Arabia witnessed the appearance of the first opposition movement, Al-Sahwa (Awakening), which challenged throughout the 90s the absolute monarchy of Al-Saud and called for political reforms. Some Saudi leaders accused the Brotherhood of being Al-Sahwa's inspiration. The second shock, more violent, that hit the relationship between the Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia came following the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. Some 15 of the 19 alleged attackers were Saudis. Part of Saudi rulers threw the blame for this "deviation" of some young Saudis on the doctrinal activism advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly their most famous ideologue, Sayed Qutb, hanged by the Nasser regime in 1966. The Saudi interior minister at the time, and the crown prince from October 2011 until his death on 16 June 2012, Nayef Bin Abdel-Aziz, accused the Muslim Brotherhood in 2002 of being the origin of most problems in the Arab world.

"The Brotherhood has done great damage to Saudi Arabia ... All our problems come from the Muslim Brotherhood ... The Muslim Brotherhood has destroyed the Arab world," he said firmly.

However, the danger perceived by Al-Saud family from the Muslim Brotherhood remained remote, as the movement was in opposition. Its coming to power in Egypt and Tunisia — and perhaps tomorrow in Syria — thanks to unexpected popular uprisings, completely changed the situation. Hence the attitude of the less reserved Saudi authorities vis-à-vis the new regime in Egypt. Riyadh fears that the rise to power of the Brotherhood encourages Islamist opposition inspired by that movement to resume activities within the kingdom.

The arrest in the United Arab Emirates in late 2012 of 11 Egyptians accused of forming a Brotherhood cell to help overthrow the UAE regime only reinforced these fears.

But far from the alleged plots against the Gulf States, the Saudi ruling family perceives the Brotherhood and its doctrine as an ideological rival to Wahhabism, which may spread and sow discord in the kingdom or threaten the monarchy. It is not surprising in this context that several reports underlined Saudi financial support for the Egyptian Salafist current in the last parliamentary elections in late 2011.

The perception of danger also has a regional dimension, as some Saudi leaders feared the rise of an alliance between Egypt, Turkey and Qatar — the only Gulf state to maintain close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood — which may reduce the dominant regional influence Saudi Arabia had exercised through its alliance with Mubarak's Egypt and Syria's Bashar Al-Assad.

In France, Qatar owns the popular soccer team Paris Saint-Germain and the accompanying PSG handball team. In addition it has holdings in Louis Vuitton as well as in French heavy industry, in the French oil company Total, in the media, and in real estate on the French Riviera. Through its Al Jazeera Sports, it launched the French TV channel beIN Sport. With its investment fund, Divine Investments SA, it is preparing to buy Printemps, the department store chain, a transaction worth \$2 billion. It outbid Galeries Lafayette, the other great French store, which was interested in buying its rival.

In Italy, Qatar controls the fashion house Valentino. It has holdings in Tiffany's, in Crédit Suisse, in the Banco Santander-Brasil, and in the Agricultural Bank of China. In March 2013, the emir of Qatar, who already had investments in Greece, bought six Greek islands in the Echinades, in the Ionian Sea, for about \$10 million; he intends to build palaces there for his three wives and 24 children. In Germany, the Qatar holdings include high-end real estate property in Berlin, including the five-star Grand Hyatt hotel in Potsdamer Platz, as well as holdings in Porsche, Volkswagen, Siemens, and the construction group Hochtief.

The emir, as well as his son, was educated partly in Britain, where he has been purchasing significant pieces of property and shares—particularly in enterprises in London, where he is almost at home. The most striking of these are the prestigious London store Harrods, previously owned by Mohamed Al Fayed; part of the United States Embassy building in London; the five-star Park Lane Intercontinental Hotel; the 72-story skyscraper Shard, the tallest building in the European Union; parts of Canary Wharf Group; the very expensive One Hyde Park, an apartment block estimated to be worth more than \$1.5 billion; about 20 percent of the London Stock Exchange—and shares in various companies, including Sainsbury's, the third largest chain of supermarkets in Britain; Barclays Bank; Royal Dutch Shell; the Anglo-Swiss Xstrata, a major producer of coal; and Heathrow Airport, among others. Qatar has also tried to purchase the art auction house Christie's and the retailer outlets of the House of Fraser.

The United States became familiar with the activity of Qatar when its TV station Al Jazeera, the most important media outlet in the Middle East, bought Current TV, founded by Al Gore, who received \$70 million for his 20-percent share of the station. Among the other properties Qatar has acquired or is acquiring in the United States are liquid natural gas assets in the anticipation that they will be developed as liquefaction facilities like those in Qatar, thus becoming companies that will export gas from the U.S. Other holdings include the investment group Finmyard Holdings, which bought Miramax from Disney.

The country has bought a number of the advanced Boeing 787 Dreamliners, and a team of Boeing mechanics is expected to arrive shortly in Doha, the capital of Qatar, to modify the batteries of the planes, and thus rectify the electronic problems that have plagued the new aircraft. Qatar already has a large fleet of planes that fly to over 125 cities in the world: in the U.S., they serve New York; Chicago; Washington, D.C.; and Houston. Qatar has now ordered more than 250 aircraft from Boeing as well as the European Airbus, including the latter's A380 and A330 jet airliners, Europe's challenge to the Dreamliner.

In this buying spree, Qatar has been acquiring strategic shares in major companies throughout the world, claiming that these are good investments. It also claims that it has no mission to conquer the world. Perhaps this is the case, yet it is reasonable to expect that its large investments will begin to influence economic and political decisions in the countries in which they are made. The immediate question is the character of the political agenda that results from Qatar's great wealth.

In fact, Qatar is now playing an increasingly political international role. It has become a member of important organizations: OPEC; the Gulf Cooperation Council, which it helped found; and the Arab League. It has made a show of friendship to the U.S. by allowing the use of its air bases to supply American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet Qatar also allowed the Taliban, which America sees as a terrorist organization, to open a bureau on its soil. Thus, the direction of Qatar policy remains unclear.

Qatar has intervened in Middle Eastern affairs, especially since the downfall of Egyptian President Mubarak, playing a role in Libya—in Syria, and in Egypt. Its activity in Libya in helping to bring down the Gaddafi regime was said to have been on behalf of the rebel group associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

In Syria, it is supporting and arming the Islamic Nusra Front, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda and is part of the opposition to the regime of President Assad. In this Qatar appears to be competing with Saudi Arabia, which is supporting a different opposition group. Again, it has good ties with Shiite Iran, but it also gave \$5 billion in aid to Egypt after the overthrow of Mubarak and is giving it another \$3 billion, thus aiding the survival of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood.

Qatar has become involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, appearing willing to play a constructive role in that conflict's resolution. In October 2012 the emir himself, accompanied by one of his wives, paid a visit to Gaza, where he was officially greeted by the Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniya. His visit led to a \$254-million Qatar project to rebuild in the Gaza Strip. With additional allocations, the gift totaled \$400 million.

This action, however, seems incompatible with the views expressed by Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, Qatar's prime minister and foreign minister in Washington, on April 29, 2013. He then not only spoke of general support for the 2002 Saudi Arabian peace proposal and negotiations between the two parties but also suggested compromises "comparable and mutually agreed minor exchanges" of land. This was a position not espoused by the Palestinians. Noticeably, Al-Thani specifically did not mention Jerusalem or the Palestinian refugee issue. By taking this viewpoint, Qatar is implicitly assuming that the 1967 armistice lines, with minor changes, will be the borders of a new Palestinian state. While the particular way in which the proposal has been framed may not be completely acceptable to the Israelis, it is contradictory to the position of the Palestinians who insist, as a minimum, on Israel's return to the 1948 lines. In addition to the differences over Al-Thani's statement, Qatar's relationship with Hamas and its policy towards the feud between Fatah and Hamas is also not defined.

What is clear is that Qatar's influence is being taken seriously. That Qatar is now regarded as an important player was noticeable when Afghan president Hamid Karzai visited the emir to discuss prospects of peace in Afghanistan, and to seek the emir's help in dealing with the Taliban. The question for the United States and for Israel is how in their own policy-making to reconcile the various and seemingly incompatible policies of Qatar. On the one hand, Qatar is a supporter of Islamist beliefs and parties, as a country with a seemingly cordial relationship with Hamas in Gaza and a more ambiguous but generally friendly one with Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, it has established ties with the U.S. and European countries through involvement in the economies of the West. It also appears willing to encourage the Arabs to strive for peace with Israel. As a small but wealthy emirate in the turbulent Middle East, perhaps Qatar is seeking to secure a safe position by assuming a role in the economy and politics of the world.

The Western countries are confronted with the question of whether they are capable of dealing with the uncertainties, mysteries, and doubts about Arab policies. Whatever the answer, Qatar is now to be taken seriously by the United States and Israel.

March 8 alliance backed by Damascus and Iran, while Saudi Arabia stood with the March 14 coalition <http://middleeast.about.com/od/lebanon/g/me09047a.htm>, whose main Sunni constituent (the Future Movement) is a Saudi protégé. The reasons that drove Qatar to espouse its aforementioned position remain unknown to this day; but some in Hezbollah <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/articles/politics/2013/04/saudi-arabia-ambassador-lebanon.html> think that Doha's bias toward the Iranian-Syrian axis in Lebanon was not genuine, but was merely a political role assigned by Washington on Qatar in 1997 the location of the largest American military base in the Arab Gulf. The Saudis, on the other hand, thought at the time that Qatar suffered from an "inferiority complex" that drove it to try and emulate the role and influence of Saudi Arabia in the region and the world.

During that period, the Qataris often reiterated that the smaller Arab nations had a problem with their larger neighbors who tried to limit their political aspirations. The proponents of this view long expressed pride that small nations — such as Lebanon, Kuwait and Qatar — succeeded in creating political, economic, media and democratic models that made up for their small geographic and demographic sizes, while proving they were worthy of overcoming their subservience to larger Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria, and playing a prominent role in leading the region.

<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/03/qatar-appoint-coalition-head-syria.html> target="_blank">During the Syrian crisis and before, even when Hezbollah and its allies ousted Saad Hariri http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopic/people/h/saad_hariri/index.html from the Lebanese premiership, the political divergence between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon lost its raison d'être, and they both re-adopted the traditional Gulf policy of concentrating on weakening Iranian influence in the Orient. Doha and Riyadh therefore switched to an offensive policy, through publicly supporting the Syrian opposition bent on toppling Bashar al-Assad's Iranian-allied regime, and by extension, weakening Iran's Lebanese allies, led by Hezbollah [8](http://www.al-</p></div><div data-bbox=)

monitor.com/pul=e/originals/2013/05/hezbollah-nasrallah-speech-involvement-syria.html> =span style="font-size:18.0pt; color:black">.

In its internal discussions, Hezbollah affirms that Qatar= funding stands behind the rise of Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir, who came to prom=nence in the last two years by challenging and criticizing Hezbollah from his Bilal bin Rabah mosque in Sidon. Hezbol=ah's information also indicates that Saudi Arabia is funding Salafist fa=tions in Lebanon that profess animosity towards the party.

Yet, it's been obvious lately that the honeymoon betwee= Riyadh and Doha in Lebanon is ending. The main point of contention betwee= them this time is the issue of support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. While Qatar and Turkey are planning t= make the Brotherhood the spearhead of their future influence in Syria fol=owing Assad's ouster, Riyadh, on the other hand, backs the advent to pow=r of moderate Sunni factions, most of which are comprised of Syrian Army defectors and other figures who don=92t belong to Islamist movements. From Riyadh's perspective, its disagre=ment with Qatar about the Brotherhood is a strategic one. For Saudi Arabia=is wary of the ties between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia, which today represents the main internal opposit=on to the Saudi ruling family. Riyadh wants Qatar to abandon its plan to b=ck the Muslim Brotherhood because it would become a source of strength for=the Saudi Sahwa movement if it were to attain power in Syria.</=>

Riyadh is therefore developing a new policy in Lebanon, a=d has begun opening up to all Lebanese political powers, including Iran'= ally Hezbollah and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, which belongs to the Iranian-Syrian axis of resistance= Saudi Arabia is also bolstering its influence on Sunni Lebanese factions,=in order to minimize Qatari influence over them. There are indications tha= Riyadh has succeeded in dispelling Qatar's role in Lebanon, as evidenced by the lack of visits by Lebanese =fficials to Doha recently, and the resurgence of visits to Saudi Arabia in=tead. Furthermore, Sheikh Assir's vitriolic Qatari-influenced verbal att=cks on Hezbollah have ceased lately.

Qatar's role in the region is the subject of behind-the=scenes attacks by factions close to Article 5. <<http://www.al-monitor.com/pul=e/originals/2013/04/saudi-arabia-intentions-lebanon.html>>

RAND

How Would a Nuclear Tehran Behave?

(Summary)

Alireza Nader</=>

May 2013 -- Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is no= a foregone conclusion. The U.S. policy of imposing sanctions on Iran whil= pursuing diplomatic engagement may still dissuade the Islamic Republic from developing a nuclear weapons capability= However, that policy is not guaranteed to resolve the Iranian nuclear cri=is. Even an Israeli and/or U.S. military attack against Iran's nuclear f=cilities could not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons; it could only delay such development. Therefor=, it is prudent to examine Iran's potential foreign policy, military doc=trine, and support for terrorism after it has obtained nuclear weapons. Thi= report seeks to explore how a nuclear-armed Iran would behave, if it would act aggressively, and what this would entai= for the United States and its main regional allies, including the Gulf Co=peration Council (GCC) and Israel.

The key findings of the study are the following:

- The Islamic Republic is a revisionist state that seeks to undermine what it perceives to be the American-dominated order in the Middle East. However, it does not have territorial ambitions and does not seek to invade, conquer, or occupy other nations. Its chief military

aim is to deter a U.S. and/or Israeli military attack while it undermines American allies in the Middle East.

- Nuclear arms are unlikely to change Iran's fundamental interests and strategies. Rather, nuclear weapons would probably reinforce Iran's traditional national security objectives, including deterring a U.S. and/or Israeli military attack.

- Iran may feel more confident and gain a sense of prestige from a nuclear capability, but other factors, such as the regional geopolitical environment and Iran's political, military, and economic capabilities, will have a greater bearing on Iranian calculations.

- Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will lead to greater tension between the Shi'a theocracy and the conservative Sunni monarchies. However, Iran is unlikely to use nuclear weapons against other Muslim countries. Moreover, Iran's ability to undermine the GCC

is quite limited, especially given Tehran's diminishing influence resulting from the Arab Spring and Iranian support for the Syria government.

- Nuclear weapons may provide Iran with the ultimate deterrent, but they are unlikely to be useful in coercing the GCC states, particularly in view of Iran's deteriorating economy.

- The Islamic Republic views Israel in ideological terms. However, it is very unlikely that Iran would use nuclear weapons against Israel, given the latter's overwhelming conventional and nuclear military superiority.

- The Iranian government does not use terrorism for ideological reasons. Instead, Iran's support for terrorism is motivated by cost and benefit calculations, with the aims of maintaining deterrence and preserving or expanding its influence in the Middle East.

- A nuclear-armed Iran is unlikely to extend its nuclear deterrent to groups such as Hizballah or Hamas. So-called Iranian "proxy" groups have divergent interests from those of Tehran, especially Sunni Arab groups such as Hamas. Tehran is also unlikely to provide

nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to non-Iranian groups.

- Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will create greater instability in the Middle East. An inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran is a dangerous possibility.

However, there is not much evidence to suggest that rogue elements could have easy access to Iranian nuclear weapons, even if the Islamic Republic were to collapse. Elements of the political elite, including Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, may be fervent

or millenarians, but their beliefs are not directly related to nuclear weapons and will not shape Iran's nuclear decisionmaking.

Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and the lead co-author of *Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran* (2011). His research has focused on Iran's political dynamics, elite decisionmaking, and Iranian foreign policy.

Article 6.

Foreign Policy

How America will Fight the Next War

Adm. Jonathan Greenert, Gen. Mark Welsh

May 16, 2013 -- Our military services and national security leaders are consumed right now with reductions to defense budgets. Whether from years of continuing resolutions, sequestration, or just less funding in general, our military will have to adjust to getting fewer dollars to protect our nation's security interests. At the same time, the world continues to present challenges to U.S. interests, including instability in North Africa and the Middle East, regular provocations from Iran and North Korea and territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. Our military will need an affordable and effective approach to counter coercion and assure access to places where conflict is most likely and consequential.

The caps established in 2011 by the Budget Control Act place defense spending at the same level as the early 2000s. This level of funding was sufficient to organize, train, and equip a force able to defeat Saddam Hussein's military, deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan, and occupy Iraq and Afghanistan. But our fiscal situation is different today. Personnel and infrastructure maintenance costs have risen by double-digit percentages since 2003 as our services took on new missions, such as defending allies from ballistic missiles and countering piracy and illicit trafficking. Meanwhile, our competitors are more capable than a decade ago thanks to proliferation of weapons and other military technology. Less funding will compel us to reprioritize our efforts and make some hard choices with respect to the size and shape of our forces. This does not mean we will be unable to address our nation's security needs, but we will need to focus our investments and operations on our most important interests.

The Defense Strategic Guidance <http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf> issued in January 2012 assessed our security environment and fiscal circumstances following the first set of BCA-imposed budget reductions. Although we are reevaluating that strategy in light of potential additional cuts imposed by sequestration,

One of the most significant challenges the strategy identified remains a concern: the dedicated effort by some nations and groups to prevent access to parts of the "global commons" -- those areas of the air, sea, cyberspace, and space that no one "owns," but upon which we all depend. These "anti-access" strategies employ military capabilities, geography, diplomatic pressure, and international law to impede the free use of ungoverned spaces. The Air-Sea Battle concept -- which disrupts the so-called "kill chains" of our potential adversaries -- is our services' approach to negate these efforts.

A new form of coercion

Nations seeking to intimidate their neighbors are turning to anti-access strategies because they are cost-effective. Merely threatening to close key maritime crossroads such as the Strait of Hormuz or demonstrating the ability to cut off a country from cyberspace or international airspace can be an effective tool for regional and international coercion. Similarly, these capabilities can be applied to prevent or slow U.S. or allied assistance from arriving in time to stop or repel an attack -- providing an aggressor much greater leverage over neighbors who depend on allies for security.

Three well-known developments made this shift in our competitors' strategy possible. One, the world economy has become more interconnected, so impediments at air or maritime chokepoints have a much faster global impact. Two, technological advances in sensing and precision have spurred the development of more lethal air defenses and anti-ship cruise missiles; cheaper, more integrated surveillance systems; and new weapons, such as anti-ship ballistic missiles. Improvements in automation have made these systems easier to use while proliferation has put them in the hands of a range of potential new adversaries. And three, the American way of projecting force changed from placing bases and garrisons close to potential battlefields to a more expeditionary strategy whereby a smaller overseas presence is supported by forces that can surge into the area from hundreds or thousands of miles away.

In history there are numerous examples of anti-access capabilities and strategies. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the "Desert Fox," used aircraft, gun emplacements, and mines during World War II to disrupt access to France during the D-Day landings at Normandy. Mines were used in the Arabian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq "tanker war" of the 1980s to hinder the passage of both countries' oil. Serbian forces and Saddam Hussein each employed Cold War-era air defenses in an attempt to deter intervention by NATO and a U.S.-led coalition respectively. Anti-access strategies have always been employed to increase the cost of intervention beyond an acceptable level and show potential victims of aggression that help is not likely to come. Today, however, anti-access capabilities have much greater range and lethality. And they are typically employed as part of an overall strategy in peacetime alongside legal, diplomatic, and geographic means to deny access even before a conflict occurs.

Anti-access strategies also undermine our ability to stabilize crises. Suppose an aggressor threatens to attack a country within range of its anti-access military capabilities. If we cannot reliably defeat the aggressor's array of cruise and ballistic missiles, submarines, aircraft, etc. and project power, U.S. forces will be less able to move into the area to interdict attacks, reassure our allies, and defuse potential hostilities.

The Air-Sea Battle concept

The Air-Sea Battle concept, approved by the secretary of defense in 2011, is designed to assure access, defeat anti-access capabilities, and provide more options to national leaders and military commanders. Air-Sea Battle is one of the operational concepts nested within the overarching Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) -- the Joint Force's approach to defeating threats to access. Air-Sea Battle is not focused on one specific adversary, since the anti-access capabilities it is intended to defeat are proliferating and, with automation, becoming easier to use. U.S. forces need a credible means to assure access when needed to help deter aggression by a range of potential adversaries, to assure allies, and to provide escalation control and crisis stability.

Some examples of where Air-Sea Battle may apply include the Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, where a favorable location provides Iran the ability to threaten the production and passage of almost 20 percent of the world's oil. If Iran can demonstrate or credibly assert that it can prevent or slow a U.S. response to its aggression, it is more able to coerce

its neighbors or the international community. In the eastern Mediterranean, the government of Syria has deployed an array of modern anti-air missile systems to raise the costs of outside intervention in its ongoing civil war. And in the Pacific, North Korea has already demonstrated its willingness to employ anti-access capabilities with the sinking in 2010 of the South Korean ship, Cheonan.

Air-Sea Battle is not a military strategy; it isn't about countering an invasion; it isn't a plan for U.S. forces to conduct an assault. Air-Sea Battle is a concept for defeating threats to access and enabling follow-on operations, which could include military activities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. For example, in the last several years, improved integration between naval and air forces helped us respond to floods in Pakistan and to the earthquake and tsunami in Japan.

Normally, operational concepts are developed by commanders to carry out a specific set of actions in their area of responsibility. In contrast, the military services are using JOAC and Air-Sea Battle to guide their efforts to organize, train, and equip forces provided to operational commanders. Further, we are integrating these concepts into the tactics and procedures we develop to operate with our allies. This is similar to the effort in the 1980s to implement the "Air-Land" Battle concept and associated NATO concepts to defeat Soviet aggression in Central Europe. That effort resulted in programs such as the JSTARS radar aircraft that we still use to track targets on land. And while Air-Land Battle was focused on a singular threat and region, the idea of using a specific operational concept to guide investment is the same approach we are taking with Air-Sea Battle.

Breaking the "kill chain"

Air-Sea Battle defeats threats to access by, first, disrupting an adversary's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying adversary weapons launchers (including aircraft, ships, and missile sites); and finally, defeating the weapons an adversary launches.

This approach exploits the fact that, to attack our forces, an adversary must complete a sequence of actions, commonly referred to as a "kill chain." For example, surveillance systems locate U.S. forces, communications networks relay targeting information to weapons launchers, weapons are launched, and then they must hone in on U.S. forces. Each of these steps is vulnerable to interdiction or disruption, and because each step must work, our forces can focus on the weakest links in the chain, not each and every one. For example, strikes against installations deep inland are not necessarily required in Air-Sea Battle because adversary C4ISR may be vulnerable to disruption, weapons can be deceived or interdicted, and adversary ships and aircraft can be destroyed.

U.S. forces need not employ "symmetrical" approaches to counter each threat -- shooting missiles down with missiles, sinking submarines with other submarines, etc. Instead, as described in the JOAC and Air-Sea Battle, we will operate across domains. For example, we will defeat missiles with electronic warfare, disrupt surveillance systems with electromagnetic or cyberattacks, and defeat air threats with submarines. This is "networked, integrated attack" and it will require a force that is designed for -- and that regularly practices -- these kinds of operations.

Building a truly "joint" force

Conducting operations across domains requires rapid and tight coordination between air, ground, and naval forces -- a level of integration well beyond today's efforts to merely pre-plan and deconflict actions between services. This integration can't be achieved effectively and efficiently on an ad hoc basis. Forces must be "pre-integrated" -- before the fight begins. This compels us to work more closely as we develop and prepare our forces.

Today, for example, instructors from the Navy's "TopGun" school routinely train with their counterparts at the Air Force Weapons School. As part of Air-Sea Battle we are pursuing this type of inter-service cooperation between all the services, as well as within each branch of each service. Just as in tactical aviation we are expanding our doctrine integration to include additional areas of collaboration -- such as Army air-defense forces and Marine reconnaissance units. With the doctrine, procedures, investment, and training included in Air-Sea Battle's initiatives, we are moving from

cooperation toward integration across domains. To foster integration we are directing an intensified approach to building common procedures, complementary budgets, combined exercises, and joint war games.

An essential prerequisite for cross-domain operations is communication and data links that connect sensors, decision-makers, and shooters armed with kinetic, electromagnetic, and cyber weapons. Our investments, guided by the Air-Sea Battle concept, are building increasingly robust networks able to communicate between each service's platforms, even in a contested electromagnetic environment. Part of this effort is focused on the systems and procedures for Joint Tactical Networking to connect today's aircraft and ships with new 5th generation aircraft, such as the F-35 and F-22.

Two recent tests advanced our efforts to promote Joint Tactical Networking. In the first, an Air Force F-22 provided updated targeting information to a Navy submarine-launched Tomahawk missile. Similarly, in September 2012 an Army Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) ashore successfully guided a U.S. Navy SM-6 surface-to-air missile to intercept an incoming cruise missile, demonstrating the ability to extend the range of an Aegis-equipped ship to well beyond the horizon and over land. These examples show how integrating capabilities from multiple services and domains combine to provide greater range and more options for commanders.

We cannot forget, however, that the enemy gets a vote. Electromagnetic jammers and decoys are becoming less expensive and easier to obtain, and they can emit more complex signals. Our communication networks will need to be resilient and redundant. We are investing together in new waveforms that are resistant to jamming while also building systems that can back up traditional satellite communications. Through the FY 2013 Air-Sea Battle Implementation Master Plan, our services will continue to pursue communication network improvements through technology development, war games, and the operational alignment of our Air and Maritime Operations Centers around the world.

By improving our integration, we improve our combined capability to assure access without expensive new investments. A more efficient and effective force will provide a starting point for evaluating how and where we should address potential reductions in future defense budgets.

Keeping up the momentum

We continue to implement the Air-Sea Battle concept in three main ways: compelling institutional change, fostering conceptual alignment, and promoting programmatic collaboration.

Compelling institutional change. The Air-Sea Battle concept establishes a "new normal" for integration between services so they are able to conduct successful cross-domain operations. This approach will require breaking down traditional service and community paradigms. Each of our services and each of the communities (e.g., fighters, bombers, submarines, surface ships, satellites, cyber operators, patrol aircraft, etc.) within our services have decades of established tactics, procedures, and traditions that may not align with each other. We will have to eliminate some of these differences to become a more integrated force able to operate across domains. For example, fighter aircraft may be used as surveillance platforms to support submarines attacking air defenses, or submarines may operate remotely-piloted aircraft to support Marine special forces attacking a radar.

This change will take sustained effort. We established a Joint Air-Sea Battle Office (ASBO) with representatives from each service to lead day-to-day implementation of the concept. The ASBO sponsors war games and simulations, assists with service-level doctrinal changes, and advises on budget decisions. Most recently, in December, the ASBO hosted 150 personnel from all four services for the 2012 Air-Sea Battle Implementation Working Group. Representatives from U.S. Central and Pacific Commands, as well as their supporting components, played prominent roles during the discussions. The working group made significant progress in solidifying the habitual relationships Air-Sea Battle will require between the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

Fostering conceptual alignment. The ASBO promotes incorporation of Air-Sea Battle concept elements in service concepts and assures the Air-Sea Battle effort stays consistent with and supports the overarching Joint Operational Access Concept. For example, Air-Sea Battle was incorporated into each of the services' war games during 2012. The

Marine Corps' Expeditionary Warrior (March), Army's Unified Quest (June), Navy's Global (August), and Air Force's Unified Engagement (December) included objectives that explored Air-Sea Battle as a way to meet anti-access challenges. The Air-Sea Battle focus increased with each successive game, culminating with Unified Engagement 12, a "table-top" wargame including about 300 participants from a dozen nations. This was the first Air-Sea Battle war game to include participation by our treaty allies. Allied participation will remain a priority going forward, with the intent of influencing multinational military concepts, tactics, and doctrine.

Promoting programmatic collaboration. The ASBO assesses service programs and budgets and recommends specific solutions to address Joint Force shortfalls against anti-access challenges. To most efficiently deliver solutions, the ASBO's specific programmatic recommendations are coordinated between the services. Starting with the FY 2010 budget, application of the Air-Sea Battle concept has resulted in tangible investments to deliver the integrated, cross-domain capabilities required to defeat modern threats to access. Over the past two years these investments included the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile; Navy electronic warfare systems, such as Ship Signal Exploitation Equipment; and new data links for our fighters.

As part of its assessments, the ASBO is identifying redundancies across the services that can be eliminated. These efforts will be important as our resources become more constrained. For example, in the FY 2013 budget our services proposed reductions in Global Hawk unmanned vehicles, Air Force strike fighters, and Navy surface combatants. We will use the Air-Sea Battle concept to help integrate our force further and maintain our capability in the face of smaller budgets.

A challenge we can't ignore

Some will argue the United States can afford to retrench and "reset" following more than a decade of war, with decreasing resources and without an existential threat such as the Soviet Union. We don't have that luxury. Anti-access threats erode confidence in the freedom of the global commons that underpins our global economy. Nations are fielding and directly threatening their neighbors with anti-access systems. And potential aggressors are using these capabilities to assert that they can slow or prevent a U.S. response in order to undermine confidence in U.S. security guarantees.

The United States must sustain its capability to assure access when needed to counter these trends. Our services will continue to increase the integration of our training and improve our coordination in developing doctrine, operating concepts, new capabilities, and investment plans. We will need, however, the support of our partners in Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure this integration is implemented in our budgets and strategies. Through our combined efforts, Air-Sea Battle will assure continued U.S. freedom of action and with it our ability to deter aggression, maintain regional stability, dampen crisis, and assure our allies and partners.

Admiral Jonathan Greenert is the chief of naval operations, and General Mark Welsh is the chief of staff of the Air Force.

Article 7.

The Washington Post

Book review: 'Beyond War' by David Rohde

Marc Lynch

BEYOND WAR

Reimagining American Influence in a New Middle East

By David Rohde

Viking. 221 pp. \$29.95

May 17 -- In "Beyond War," David Rohde sets out to find a new path for the United States in the Middle East after a decade of war and much longer support for unpopular dictatorial regimes. Surveying a region in turmoil and looking back to American follies in Iraq and Afghanistan, Rohde calls for the United States to scale back its military ambitions and focus instead on supporting moderate and an impatient rising generation of Arabs and Muslims eager to engage with the world.

Rohde characterizes his book as "an effort to describe a new, more pragmatic, and more effective American approach to the Islamic world." Such an approach is sorely needed. But he struggles to carve out a unique set of recommendations on how to do so. Few would disagree in principle with his call to peacefully support moderates and like-minded allies across the region. But the book falters when it comes to identifying those moderates or crafting useful ways to help them.

As a veteran, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, Rohde should have been well-placed to write a panoramic account of a region in turmoil. He helped break the story of the massacres at Srebrenica during the Bosnian war, and his book "Endgame" presented a riveting, authoritative account of its horrors. About four years ago, he was kidnapped by the Taliban during a reporting trip to Afghanistan and held for seven months before escaping. "A Rope and a Prayer," his book-length account of that ordeal co-authored with his wife, Kristen Mulvihill, revealed him again as a master of the sharply reported essay from war zones.

That experience haunts his new book. After his escape, Rohde explains, he promised his family that he would put a limit on trips to potentially dangerous arenas. It seems churlish to criticize him for this praiseworthy commitment. Yet his absence from the scene in key countries clearly takes a toll. Rohde's instincts are to report, to offer eyewitness accounts of people in turbulent conditions. But for too much of this book, he's not there. Instead he hires several journalists to report for him, including the excellent Lauren Bohn and Elmira Bayrasli, and gives them full credit for their work. But while these journalists bring energy and keen eyes for detail, they cannot substitute for Rohde's well-trained reporter's voice.

What results is an odd pastiche of disjointed vignettes, often observed from a distance, which struggle to add up to a coherent picture of the region. Short chapters jump from country to country: One moment we are condemning contractors in Iraq, then we have a few pages on Turkish soap operas, and then we're off to Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. The journey would seem to follow that of America's 90s wars and then the Arab Spring, but the book offers nothing from pivotal Gulf states such as Bahrain, Kuwait and Yemen, the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or the non-Gulf monarchies of Jordan and Morocco.

Inevitably, some of the arguments have a stale air about them. The sections on contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq seem to have been intended for one book, the chapters on the Arab transitions for another. A well-crafted chapter on Afghanistan diplomacy, adapted from material he contributed to a volume on Richard Holbrooke, has a very different tone from the rest of the book. (His channeling of Holbrooke's frustration with the White House over Afghan policy echoes the more deeply argued revelations in Vali Nasr's new book, "The Dispensable Nation.") His well-crafted reporting on the pathologies of USAID, contractors and the broader U.S. mission in Afghanistan and Iraq will already be

familiar, particularly to readers of journalism and books by The Washington Post's Rajiv Chandrasekaran. Rohde's discussion of Islamist movements in Egypt, in particular, fails to keep pace with the rapid developments of the past year.

His overarching theme is that "the most potent long-term weapon against jihadists is moderate Arabs and South Asians, not American soldiers." He suggests that Washington "quietly, consistently and effectively strengthen those groups" that are "our true allies in the region." As a guide to battling al-Qaeda, this is almost certainly correct and reflects a change in American thinking about the struggle against al-Qaeda that has taken root since the middle of the last decade. It is not a significant departure from current practice, though. The Obama administration's willingness to work with the Muslim Brotherhood's elected president of Egypt demonstrates how far we have come since the feverish days following 2001 when American commentators lumped together all Islamists into a single, undifferentiated, existential menace.

If most now agree on the importance of backing the region's moderates, no such consensus exists on who they might be. The Muslim Brotherhood and similar organizations present the crucial test case for efforts to define the moderates with whom we should align. Rohde views such movements as "not ideal," but "our true enemies — and theirs — are violent Salafist militants." In Tunisia, he writes, the United States "needs to engage more with Tunisia's Islamists, not less." As a strategy for marginalizing the genuine extremists in al-Qaeda and its affiliated movements, this makes good sense. And his arguments rang true before the Arab Spring, when liberal liberals had to support peaceful Islamists against the practices of repressive regimes.

A good case can be made for Islamist inclusion, since banning major political movements from participating in politics is inherently anti-democratic. But is it equally appropriate today, when such Islamists uneasily rule Egypt and Tunisia and much of the region has become badly polarized over their intentions and behavior? Do the same rules apply for identifying which moderates to support? Tougher choices must be confronted when Islamists win, and can use their power to promote an Islamist agenda and frighten their liberal opponents.

This conceptual challenge cuts to the heart of Rohde's policy advice. Are the moderates to be supported found in the now-dominant Islamist trends, or among the smaller but more ideologically liberal, entrepreneurial and cosmopolitan new generation? In today's deeply polarized environment, few Egyptian liberals view the Brotherhood as moderate. President Mohamed Morsi has proved disastrous in power, failing to govern effectively or to build an inclusive process. His decision to force through a divisive constitution last November poisoned an already bitterly divided public. Many Egyptian and Tunisian liberals who once fiercely defended the Brotherhood against regime repression no longer view its members as democrats, as moderates or as legitimate participants in the political sphere. They would naturally prefer that the United States support their own struggles against their Islamist rivals.

So, again, which moderates is America to support? Should Washington back the democratic process in countries such as Egypt even when the deck seems stacked in favor of Islamists with a seemingly illiberal agenda? Who is the moderate when Islamists call for elections and some liberal icons urge a military coup and electoral boycott while denouncing the United States? Are young, cosmopolitan English-speaking secularists moderate when they battle police, boycott elections and decry America? What about U.S. alliances with the region's repressive, conservative monarchies — are these deeply religious autocracies to be counted among the moderates at a time when they are escalating crackdowns on free speech and political dissent? There are no easy answers to these complex, tortured questions, but Rohde largely avoids them.

What about the other major part of his case, moving "beyond war"? Rohde urges "a more economic and less military-oriented effort [that] will achieve more than the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan did." Amen. But he may have already had second thoughts. Over the past year, he has savaged the Obama administration's strategy as a failure in Syria and has demanded that it do more to arm rebels against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and seize a "strategic opportunity to weaken Iran and Hezbollah." The temptations of military action in support of liberal values are not so easily cast aside, it seems, even in a book that explicitly sets out to get the United States "beyond war" in the Middle East.

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