

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
Sent: Wed 10/2/2013 2:30:59 PM
Subject: October 2 update

2 October, 2013

Article 1.	NYT <u>Netanyahu Pushes Back on Iran</u> Editorial
Article 2.	The Washington Institute <u>Trust, but Clarify</u> Dennis Ross and David Makovsky
Article 3.	Center for Strategic and International Studies <u>Negotiating with Iran</u> Anthony H. Cordesman
Article 4.	Agence Global <u>A Critical Moment in Israeli-American Relations</u> Rami G. Khouri
Article 5.	Foreign Affairs <u>Bibi the Bad Cop - Can Israel Prevent a Deal With Iran?</u> Elliott Abrams
Article 6.	Foreign Affairs <u>How Israel Can Help the U.S. Strike a Deal With Iran</u>

	Trita Parsi
Article 7.	TheNational (UAE) <u>Gaza suffers as Hamas fights for survival on several fronts</u> <u>Jonathan Cook</u>
Article 8.	The National Interest <u>The Old Turkey-Israel Relationship Isn't Coming Back</u> <u>Omer Zarpli</u>

Article 1.

NYT

Netanyahu Pushes Back on Iran

Editorial

October 1, 2013 -- During an aggressive speech at the United Nations on Tuesday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel used sarcasm and combative words to portray Iran's new president, Hassan Rouhani, as a smooth-talking charlatan, one who is determined to continue building a nuclear weapons arsenal.

Mr. Netanyahu called Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the previous

Iranian president, “a wolf in wolf’s clothing” and Mr. Rouhani “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.”

Mr. Netanyahu has legitimate reasons to be wary of any Iranian overtures, as do the United States and the four other major powers involved in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. But it could be disastrous if Mr. Netanyahu and his supporters in Congress were so blinded by distrust of Iran that they exaggerate the threat, block President Obama from taking advantage of new diplomatic openings and sabotage the best chance to establish a new relationship since the 1979 Iranian revolution sent American-Iranian relations into the deep freeze.

Mr. Rouhani and the Iranian foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, have insisted repeatedly that Iran wants only to develop nuclear energy and that obtaining a nuclear weapon would harm the country’s security.

Even so, Iran hid its nuclear program from United Nations inspectors for nearly 20 years, and the country is enriching uranium to a level that would make it possible to produce bomb-grade nuclear material more quickly. It has also pursued other activities, like developing high-voltage detonators and building missiles that experts believe could only have nuclear weapons-related uses.

These facts make it hard not to view the upcoming American-brokered negotiations skeptically. But Mr. Netanyahu has hinted so often of taking military action to keep Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon that he seems eager for a fight. He did it again at the United Nations on Tuesday, warning that Israel reserved the right to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities if it deemed that Iran was

close to producing nuclear weapons. “Against such a threat, Israel will have no choice but to defend itself,” he said.

The Iranians were so angered by what they called Mr. Netanyahu’s “inflammatory” speech that they issued a rebuttal and spoke of the need to “sustain the current positive atmosphere” so that diplomacy could be successful.

Similarly, they were not happy that Mr. Obama, meeting Mr. Netanyahu at the White House on Monday, took a harsher tone toward Iran than he did when he spoke by phone with Mr. Rouhani last week.

Both Mr. Obama and Mr. Rouhani have hard-line domestic audiences and allies that they will need to consider and cajole as they undertake this effort to resolve the nuclear dispute and develop a new relationship. For Mr. Obama, that means working closely with Israel and helping Mr. Netanyahu see that sabotaging diplomacy, especially before Iran is tested, only makes having to use force more likely. That would be the worst result of all.

[Article 2.](#)

The Washington Institute

Trust, but Clarify

Dennis Ross and David Makovsky

October 1 - In relations between states, symbols can be a sign of change -- but they can sometimes create false impressions. A handshake between President Barack Obama and Iranian President Hasan Rouhani at the U.N. General Assembly would have fallen into the latter category: those who are ready to anoint Rouhani as an Iranian Gorbachev would have seized on it as a sign of Iranian openness and readiness to break down barriers. Meanwhile, those who are convinced that Rouhani is just a savvier opponent than his in-your-face predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, would have decried our readiness to be played by the Iranians. The phone call that eventually occurred between the two leaders is a significant step, but does not offer the visual image of change. Moreover, the call likely emerged from the private discussion between Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, and each must have felt there was value in having it. Those wary of the Iranians will undoubtedly worry that the United States is effectively endorsing the symbols of change on the Iranian side without demanding requisite demonstrations of a change in policy. However, rather than trying to read too much into the meaning of a symbolic encounter -- whether a phone call or handshake -- Washington should focus instead on the reality of what Rouhani represents and shape its approach accordingly.

Unlike Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, the Iranian president is not the decision-maker in Iran. However, during his campaign, he ran against Iranian policies that produced the Islamic Republic's international isolation and resulted in severe economic sanctions being imposed on it. Most significantly, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the key decision-maker in Iran, allowed Rouhani to win the election and, at least at this point,

appears to be backing his efforts at diplomacy. Now, the Obama administration must clarify for itself and others the concrete policy changes that will be necessary for Rouhani to achieve the detente he apparently seeks -- and what advances in Iran's nuclear program would represent an intolerable threat to the United States.

Rouhani has been clear about the high cost of the international sanctions and the need to get them lifted or relaxed. Upon assuming office, he declared that the economy was in even worse shape than he thought -- a fact that came as no surprise to the Iranian public.

Economic pressures have given Tehran an incentive to resolve the international impasse over its nuclear program. But it cannot gain the economic relief it seeks unless it is willing to take meaningful steps to prove to the international community that its sole aim is the production of civilian nuclear power. Soothing words and smiles will not provide such reassurance; only tangible steps that remove Iran's break-out capability -- a verifiable method that guarantees early detection of any effort to move from reactor-grade to weapons-grade enriched uranium -- can do so. This is almost certainly the position taken by both Obama and Congress.

Rouhani's own speech at the United Nations emphasized Iran's right to enrichment and gave little indication that Iran is prepared to alter its nuclear program. The Iranian president did, however, respond to Obama's remarks by saying that "we can arrive at a framework to manage our differences." There is only one way to know if that is true, of course, and that is to test it.

Once talks get under way -- whether in the P5+1 format or in a bilateral setting -- the United States will be able to probe to see if Iran is prepared for tangible or cosmetic change. The Obama administration should not rule out the possibility that there may be a potential convergence between its interest in stopping the Iranian nuclear program and Tehran's sense of urgency in lifting the most hard-hitting economic sanctions. If so, this argues for an end-game nuclear deal, not a more limited agreement.

Rouhani clearly needs to have the sanctions removed as quickly as possible, and a limited deal won't accomplish that. In his meeting with the P5+1 ministers, Zarif spoke about an agreement that would be fully implemented within one year, meaning he clearly wants the sanctions to be lifted in that time. Only a more comprehensive understanding could lead to major sanctions relief and provide the administration with what it requires -- a roll back of the Iranian nuclear program that provides the United States with a high degree of confidence that the Iranians cannot cheat and produce a break-out capability at a time of their choosing. To produce such a deal, the United States will need to be clearer with the Iranians about the threshold that it will not let their nuclear program cross. Obama has repeatedly said that an Iranian nuclear weapon threatens vital U.S. interests, as it could spur a regional nuclear arms race in the Middle East and threaten the fabric of the international non-proliferation regime. But he needs to make sure that his repeated public commitment to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb does not lose its meaning. The pace and scope of Iran's nuclear program -- with the installation of a new generation of centrifuges and ever more accumulated enriched uranium -- creates precisely such a risk in the coming months. It is not

enough for the United States to say that this line is an Iranian nuclear weapon, since this would enable Iran to develop a threshold nuclear capability that is just a few turns-of-the-screw away from a weapon. Providing greater clarity of the point at which Iran's nuclear infrastructure would begin to threaten America's ability to fulfill its objective of prevention is important in ensuring that neither Iran nor others misjudge what would trigger an American strike.

Interestingly, Iran has already shown it is not oblivious to thresholds. It has avoided surpassing the threshold of 240 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explicitly drew in his U.N. General Assembly speech last year.

That said, the American threshold does not need to be defined publicly. The United States should not needlessly back the Iranians or itself into a corner. However, the Iranians, the Israelis, and the other members of the P5+1 should know with greater specificity the limits of what the Obama administration will tolerate with Iran's nuclear program. As Obama just said at the United Nations in the context of the Syrian crisis, only the credible threat of force has given diplomacy a chance for success.

Moreover, the Iran issue is being viewed through the lens of the ongoing Syria crisis. Amid doubts that the U.S.-Russian deal will truly lead Damascus to completely turn over its chemical weapon stockpiles, observers in Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East have interpreted the initiative as evidence that the American public is too war-fatigued to be counted on to back a U.S. strike against Iran's nuclear program should diplomacy fail.

And as long as confidence in the United States is flagging and Israel feels it is on its own, the chances of an Israeli strike increase.

Clearly, everyone should prefer a diplomatic solution with Iran. Obama's best chance to obtain that diplomatic breakthrough is through clarity -- by demonstrating to Rouhani what he can live with and what he cannot abide. Clarity will also help dispel misconceptions in the Middle East about America's resolve. The United States should not be afraid to lift the requisite economic sanctions, if Iran comes through with its part of the bargain. The Iranian position in the talks will make it clear soon enough whether it is sincere about reaching a deal, or whether Iran is only willing to make cosmetic adjustments. But in the bid to divine Rouhani's mind, we first have to know our own.

Ambassador Dennis Ross is counselor at The Washington Institute and former special assistant to President Obama. David Makovsky is the Ziegler Distinguished Fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at the Institute.

[Article 3.](#)

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Negotiating with Iran: Meeting the Necessary Requirements

Anthony H. Cordesman

October 1 - Those who oppose U.S. and Iranian negotiations need to realize that this is almost certainly the last chance for a real solution before Iran moves to the point of no return both politically and in terms of nuclear capability. Iranian politics virtually ensure that if this President's first attempt to negotiate fails, there will not be a second. They also virtually ensure Iran's Supreme Leader will not show the same tentative flexibility. It is the last chance before Israel must choose between preventive attacks and upgrading its nuclear strike capability to ensure it can achieve decisive nuclear superiority or at least mutually assured destruction. It is the last chance for the United States to choose between far larger preventive strikes and a far stronger form of containment, making good on Secretary Clinton's offer of "extended deterrence." It is the last chance between the Arab Gulf states not only to work with the United States to ensure containment but to consider their own nuclear options. Anyone who opposes such talks or negotiations needs to consider both the timing and the consequences of not pursuing this last option. The alternatives are either a war of preventive strikes that may prove all too difficult to control, or a nuclear arms race in the Gulf that is almost certain to go far beyond a limited Iranian breakout capability. At the same time, there is no more room for good intentions, open-ended negotiations, and letting rhetoric take the place of reality.

The First Requirement: Dealing with Our Allies and the World

The first requirement has nothing to do with Iran. The initial

U.S. steps in talking to Iran have fueled virtually every fear and conspiracy theory in the region at a time when U.S. credibility had been severely weakened by the way the United States has dealt with Egypt, Syria, and Bahrain. It also has all too clearly reopened all of the Israeli concerns over U.S. actions, and potentially created a climate that could undermine European, Russian, Chinese, and UN support for a strong stand on sanctions and efforts to put pressure on Iran long before it takes real steps to limit its nuclear programs.

The United States needs to act immediately to restore trust in the region. It needs to make it clear to Israel, the Arab states, and Turkey that the United States is not letting hope triumph over experience, turning away from its security partnerships in the region, or making some kind of strange devil's bargain to replace its current allies with Iran. The United States needs to make it absolutely clear to everyone – including Iran – that it will only ease its own sanctions if progress is real and that it will work closely with the 5+1, EU, and regional states and demand that they be equally realistic. The need to make it clear that its military options are still being kept active and the threat of preventive strikes continues. It must make it clear that it will continue to work with regional powers to improve their capability to contain every aspect of Iran's military forces and that if Iran does not act it will face both the silent threat of steadily improving Israeli nuclear strike capability and a United States willing to make good on guarantees of extended deterrence; actions that will confront Iran with the reality that any Iranian nuclear program will face far more severe retaliatory capability regardless of whether preventive strikes take place or are effective.

The Need for Carefully Phased Incentives Tied to Clearly Defined Iranian Actions

At the same time, the United States needs to make it clear to Iran that there will be major incentives as well. The United States should not seek to “win” the negotiations, but rather to create a structure of negotiations where Iran sees the United States and its allies give it a matching incentive for every action it takes, and that the nuclear negotiations can be the prelude to a much broader pattern of security.

The United States will have to make it clear that it will continue to seek Iranian reform, but not regime change. It must make it clear to Iran that its military presence in the region will guarantee the security of its allies, but not pose a threat to an Iran that seeks stable and friendly relations with its neighbors. The United States will need to define what level of Iranian enrichment activity it can accept and set real world conditions that Iran can live with. At the same time, the United States is going to have to work with the 5+1 and UN to negotiate a verifiable schedule for Iranian actions that achieve real results. It is going to need to build EU, 5+1, and UN support for a program that is based on reality and not hope or good intentions.

Changes to Iran’s Nuclear Programs

Iran will have to give up the most provocative short-term aspects of its nuclear program, and make it clear it will not use nuclear technology to create a far more advanced breakout capability in the future.

Short Term Goals

This does not have to mean a total end to Iran's enrichment activities – or nuclear power programs regardless of their dubious safety and cost-effectiveness – but it does mean at least some mix of the following Iranian actions:

Closing Fordow under international inspection so there is no active Iranian nuclear site whose sole purpose is to provide enrichment that can ride out any mix of preventive strikes. Either dismantling or making major changes in the 40 megawatt heavy water reactor Iran is building at Arak so it cannot be used to produce weapons grade Plutonium, demonstrating it is not creating any hot cell facilities for Plutonium production, and demonstrating there is no Plutonium production related technology at the heavy water production facility at Khondab. Full UN inspection of the reactor at Bushehr and arrangements for specially tailored inspection of the fuel cycle to ensure no material is used for weapons design.

Similar International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of all activity at Natanz under an agreement to limit its output and level of enrichment to a verified nuclear power plant demand cycle.

Clearly verified storage and handling of all existing enriched material, limits to all production to match the demand of existing power reactors, and disposal of all stocks of 20% enriched material.

Immediate IAEA access to challenge inspections of declared and suspect facilities and activities.

Detailed quarterly UN/IAEA progress reports.

Longer Term Goals

Arms control experts rightly focus on Iran's progress in creating its first nuclear device. This, however, is only the beginning. Iran must make it clear it will not continue to move forward in dual use technology and does not have covert programs that are far easier to conceal and can still advance its way towards nuclear weapons.

This will be far more difficult than it sounds. Iran can always find a reason to seek dual-use technology and imports that it can use for a weapons program. There are many areas of research that it can support as civil programs where being sure they have no impact on weapons design capability is difficult or nearly impossible. Missile and bomb programs can test non-fissile uranium weapons designs. Every advance in centrifuge design – in terms of efficiency, power requirements, or reducing the requirements for imports of material and technology – gives Iran the ability to produce new dispersed nuclear production sites and another kind of break out capability.

There are no perfect ways to avoid these risks but some key steps are:

Either halting centrifuge development or creating a mixture of declared Iranian plans and inspection efforts that clearly show centrifuge development and production is limited to activities where every aspect of Iranian activity is declared and subject to inspection.

A broadly based Iranian declaration of nuclear research activity subject to IAEA review and challenge inspection.

Full Iranian disclosure of the activity at the now destroyed facility at Parchin, and controls on any research and development that would carry explosive tests that could simulate a non-weapons grade test of a weapons design, including challenge inspection of weapons sites and reported explosions. Iranian willingness to provide enough telemetry and other data on missile warhead tests to show they were conventional and not simulated nuclear warhead tests. These are areas where the U.S. nuclear labs need to be involved with the expertise of real weapons designers rather than relying on arms control experts and design data and concepts that were declassified for arms control planning in the past.

Incentives to Iran

Iran should get compensation. This could include a return to the cheap fuel, processing, and Russian offers of the past. It could also include collaborative nuclear research and development in areas clearly unrelated to nuclear weapons that would give Iran a serious role in nuclear research and the access to technology and prestige that a truly peaceful program can offer. While any effort involving Israel would require years of effort to show Iran had ceased to be a potential threat, creating a broad Middle East inspection and control effort where other regional Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states made it clear that they would accept many of the same constraints and IAEA inspection efforts as Iran would give Iran guarantees against any local power acquiring nuclear weapons. In the real world, Iran could benefit further in two ways. First, this would remove any Israeli incentive to increase its nuclear strike capabilities against Iran, plans for preventive strikes or launch on warning, and efforts to single out Iran as a threat.

Second, it would allow Iran to quietly move away from the problem it created by singling out Israel as a threat or target of Iranian action – activities which stemmed at least as much from Iranian efforts to cover up its real intentions in acquiring leverage over its Arab neighbors and the ability to deter the United States from any military action against Iran – as any real concern with Israel.

The United States could also make it clear that it would not offer its regional allies any form of extended deterrence if Iran put an end to its weapons –related activities.

Moving Towards Regional Security

Finally, if progress can be made on the nuclear issue, the United States and Iran should expand their dialogue to determine the steps to that would allow them to create a climate of mutual trust that would ease the other divisions between them – and between Iran and most of the other states in the region. These issues include the build up of Iran’s asymmetric forces in the Gulf; Iran’s role in Iraq’ Syria, and Lebanon; and the role Iran’s Al Quds Force and other elements of Iran’s security forces play in threatening or destabilizing other regional states. The United States – and especially Israel – needs to remember that any U.S. negotiations and rapprochement with Iran involves far more than any future nuclear threat to Israel. It must tie the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programs to easing the overall tensions and risks that exist because of the confrontation between Iran and the United States and its Arab allies. These efforts also require transparency. A negotiation that the Arab states, Turkey, or Afghanistan see as a threat is not going to bring stability and security to the other countries in the region, will further

undercut eroding confidence in the United States as a security partner, and do nothing to ease the confrontations in the region that threaten the flow of world oil exports and the growing confrontation between Sunni and Shi'ite.

In contrast, any negotiations that ease tensions in the Gulf and the region reduce the tensions between Iran and moderate Sunni regimes, that allow all states to cooperate in reducing the threat of religious hatred and extremism, and free resources to aid civil development serve the common interest.

Any such efforts must probably follow successful nuclear negotiations and require a far more open and realistic dialogue between Iran and its neighbors – as well as with the United States over its presence in the region. They also may well take at least half a decade of cautious effort before major progress can occur. The fact remains, however, that the threat of extremism, tensions between states and problems in development are ultimately at least as threatening to both Iran and its neighbors as the present confrontation over Iran's nuclear programs.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C

Article 4.

Agence Global

A Critical Moment in Israeli-American Relations

Rami G. Khouri

02 October 2013 -- The visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu this week to the United States and the United Nations General Assembly signals a critical moment in diplomatic developments in the Middle East, including potentially a decisive reckoning in Israeli-American relations. This is because on the important issue of how the United States and the West deal with Iran's nuclear industry, the trends of both public opinion and leadership sentiments in Israel and the United States are moving in opposite directions. This occurs at a decisive moment in the region when many countries are in turmoil (Syria, Iraq), some are severely pressured by the turmoil (Lebanon, Jordan), others are in the process of reconfiguring their political systems (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya), Iran is redefining its relations with local and foreign powers, Russia is seeking a larger role in the area, and the United States seeks a lower profile and footprint in the region. Rarely have so many assumptions about how countries and regimes behave across the Middle East been subjected simultaneously to new doubts and great uncertainties.

The policies of Iran and Israel vis-à-vis the United States have been two anchors of these assumptions for decades -- the United States-Israel bond seemingly made of steel, and American-Iranian hostility seemingly embedded permanently in each country's political chromosomes. Those two critical

relationships may be changing, largely due to the Iran factor, and the initial indicators are that this may be putting American-Israeli relations to their most serious test in many decades.

Approximately three-quarters of Americans support President Barack Obama's diplomatic overtures to Iran that aim to find a peaceful political resolution to the issues that divide the two countries. These include, from the American perspective, Iran's nuclear capabilities and its intentions in the Middle East, and, from Tehran's perspective, American- and Israeli-led sanctions that aim to cripple Iran, double standards in applying existing international regulations on the peaceful use of nuclear power, and alleged plans to change the regime in Tehran.

Approximately the same percentage of Israelis doubt the sincerity of the overtures and statements by newly elected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to the effect that Iran does not want to make a nuclear bomb and is willing to have its nuclear industry placed under strict international supervision. In return, Iran expects sanctions to be lifted, along with an end to foreign attempts to remove the regime from power. Rarely have American and Israeli public opinion diverged so significantly on such critical issues to both people. On other issues in recent years when the two countries disagreed -- such as Israeli settlements or the pre-1967 borders forming the basis for negotiations -- the Israeli view almost always prevailed, as American officials proved unwilling or unable to budge a determined Israeli leadership. One reason for that is that American public opinion tended to view the American-Israeli dynamics as spectator sport that they watched on television but did not get involved with personally or emotionally. This time the situation is different, as a large majority of Americans understands that a negotiated and fair agreement with Iran on

the issues that matter to both countries is a win-win situation. Such agreement would help the United States avoid getting into another war or unleashing major attacks on Syria or Iran, and would allow Iran to play a stabilizing role in the region. Israelis mostly do not share this view and mistrust Iranian statements as a ruse to remove sanctions and provide Tehran with new opportunities to dominate the region.

It is hard to know ahead of time how Obama will behave, knowing that he has strong public support for his overtures to Iran. The strategic advantages to the United States of a fair deal with Iran are so immense that Obama may well oppose and stare down Netanyahu in a manner that he would not have attempted in other situations, given Netanyahu's proven ability to manipulate so many members of Congress against the American president. The Israeli prime minister presumably understands that he is dealing with an American president who enjoys a much stronger hand than was the case when these two men disagreed several times in recent years. The American public also seems in no mood to have a foreign zealot manipulate the domestic political system in Washington at a time when that system is in serious disarray over the dysfunctional relationship between the president and the Congress. This is a rare moment when the issue at hand is not only the fate of Iranian nuclear technology or the strategic interests of the United States. We are perhaps witnessing in the coming months a recalibration of power relationships between the United States and Israel, with Washington for a change pursuing policies in the Middle East that are determined by the national interest of the United States, rather than by the dictates and fears of Israel and its many apologists and lobbyists in Washington, D.C. That would be the

kind of birth of a new Middle East that should be welcomed by all, including Israelis.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Article 5.

Foreign Affairs

Bibi the Bad Cop - Can Israel Prevent a Deal With Iran?

Elliott Abrams

October 1, 2013 -- Most of the world is applauding the thaw between the United States and Iran. Then there are the Arabs and Israelis. Their reaction is dread, and with good reason: neither trusts U.S. President Barack Obama to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon or from at least acquiring the capability to produce one. Israel, which has a wide base of political support in the United States, will try to stymie any nuclear deal it sees as too lenient -- but that won't be easy.

In his speech to the UN General Assembly on Tuesday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered messages that few wanted to hear. He reminded the world that the Iranians

have lied before, warned that they may well be lying still, and claimed that they have done nothing to earn credibility. He said that Iran should first be made to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency and UN resolutions, which it has defied for decades -- most notably by developing clandestine, unsafeguarded sites and by continuing the enrichment of uranium. Netanyahu is setting forth standards for a nuclear agreement that are far tougher than the Obama administration believes can be negotiated and, as a result, are not even being sought.

The hard part for Israel comes next, when the world's leaders have returned home. The recent debate over Syria -- when the administration backed away from using force, Congress seemed on the verge of voting against the use of force, and opinion polls showed the public against any military involvement -- has seriously undermined the credibility of the U.S. military option. What will Israel's approach be in the coming months, when Washington's position -- whatever its rhetoric -- has moved from "all options are on the table" to a blind pursuit of diplomacy?

The first thing the Israelis will do is repeat, over and over again, their arguments against trusting Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. They will remind U.S. and EU officials, journalists, and anyone who will listen that he is not a reformer but a regime stalwart who, as secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, had the job of buying time for the nuclear weapons program.

Second, they will make the case that any deal should have very tough standards. In this sense, Israel will be forced to be the bad

cop, and to enlist other bad cops in Europe and in the U.S. Congress. If Israel had its way, Iran would have to fully account for its past (secret) work on a warhead, stop its centrifuges, stop enriching uranium and ship its existing stockpiles out of the country, prove it has no alternate route to nuclear weapons through plutonium work at the Arak facility, dismantle the underground site at Fordow, and cease the conversion of first-generation centrifuges to more efficient second-generation ones. It seems very unlikely that the United States and the other P5+1 countries will, for one thing, demand an end to all enrichment inside Iran; on all these conditions, in fact, compromise is more likely than the fulfillment of Israel's demand that all nuclear activities stop. If a full stop to the Iranian program is judged by Washington to be unattainable, Netanyahu will argue that Iran should be held to its own claim that it needs nuclear technology for nuclear power; in that case, it would need only uranium enriched to about 3.5 percent, very few centrifuges (and those in one location that is declared and inspected), and only a tiny stock of enriched uranium.

Third, Israel will ask that sanctions be strengthened, and that the Obama administration not be allowed so many waivers to permit other countries to flout the sanctions regime, until Iran actually changes its conduct -- not just promises to change it. That is, sanctions should be reduced in the coming months only in exchange for Iran's exporting enriched uranium, warehousing centrifuges, and providing truthful information about the military aspects of its nuclear program.

Finally, Netanyahu will ask that the military option be strengthened, not weakened. Here, Washington's rhetoric matters, but it could do far more to bolster the now-diminished

credibility of its threat to use force by carefully leaking information about U.S. military preparations or by positioning forces so that they could strike Iran should it be necessary. But the Israelis may guess that they won't get much here, so a more promising line may be to ask Washington to help them enhance their own capabilities -- by providing more bunker-buster bombs and more air refueling tankers. The idea would be to demonstrate that, at least for Israel, all options are in fact on the table, and that the Americans like it that way.

The first three steps could be taken without the approval of the Obama administration -- in fact, they are steps meant to limit U.S. flexibility. The fourth step would require the Obama administration's approval and action. If Israel plays its cards right, it might be able to convince Washington to help with the fourth step by promising to refrain from the first three. That is, Israel could say it can live with the possibility of Iranian cheating and moving closer to a bomb only if its own military option grows stronger.

Israel does retain one option for stymying the negotiations if they appear to be heading for what Israelis would view as a bad deal, one that would allow Iran to escape sanctions and creep closer to a bomb. That is for Israel to attack Iranian nuclear sites. Its ability to do so is already being narrowed considerably by the diplomatic thaw, because it is one thing to bomb Iran when it appears hopelessly recalcitrant and isolated and quite another to bomb it when much of the world -- especially the United States -- is optimistic about the prospect of talks. A window for an Israeli attack might open up if the talks bogged down and Western negotiators suggested that the Iranians were refusing to compromise, perhaps speculating that the Supreme Leader and

the Revolutionary Guards did not want a deal after all. But Rouhani and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, are probably too smart to allow such pessimism to creep into Western ranks.

In short, the Israelis find themselves in a far worse position now than they have been for several years. There was no way for them to avoid this situation other than attacking last year; bombing Iran when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was president would have been more defensible in the court of global public opinion. Now they must fix bleak smiles to their lips and say that they hope for the best -- all the while wringing their hands about the likely terms of the deal. Given that Israel may have little ability to persuade the Western negotiators to be tough, its best path for now is to appeal to Americans, especially in Congress, to refuse to lift sanctions until Iran makes significant concessions.

Here, the Syria episode might actually help Israel, since it increased mistrust about the Obama administration's handling of foreign policy, even among Democrats. Refusing to lift sanctions and adopting tougher rhetoric toward Iran would not be partisan issues. Plenty of Democrats think that those actions are both good politics and good policy.

The Israelis have a difficult task ahead. They do not wish to play the bad cop role in an American game with Iran -- and, in fact, the metaphor is misleading. In the good cop/bad cop routine, both officers are on the same team and are carefully coordinating their approaches. In this case, the Israelis fear, the bad cop wants to see the criminals jailed, and the good cop is open to a sweet plea bargain. If that's what the Iranians get, they will sit back

and smile while the United States and Israel end up in a bitter argument.

ELLIOTT ABRAMS is Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser.

Article 6.

Foreign Affairs

How Israel Can Help the United States Strike a Deal With Iran -- And Why It Should

Trita Parsi

October 1, 2013 -- The moment that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hoped he could avoid is fast approaching: high-level negotiations between the United States and Iran that could lead to a deal that ends the decade-long standoff over Tehran's nuclear program. As Obama has welcomed the new approach of Iran's new president, Hassan Rouhani, and taken concrete steps to test Tehran's sincerity, Netanyahu has been quick to dismiss Rouhani and call for more sanctions. It is increasingly clear that Netanyahu ultimately fears the success of diplomacy, not its failure. But Israel, and its national security establishment, should not see a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear standoff as a threat.

Contrary to Israel's public line, Netanyahu's worry is not that the Iranians would cheat on any agreement, or that Rouhani would prove to be a "wolf in sheep's clothing." Rather, Netanyahu and much of Israel's security establishment view the status quo -- ever-increasing sanctions that cripple Iran's economy, combined with the ever-present threat of war -- as preferable to any realistic diplomatic deal.

As Israelis well know, a compromise would probably allow for limited enrichment on Iranian soil under strict verification, and the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions. Although Iran would technically remain a non-nuclear weapons state, it would be considered a virtual nuclear power. And that, Netanyahu calculates, is sufficient to shift the balance of power in the region to Israel's detriment, reducing the Jewish state's maneuverability and the usefulness of its own deterrent. There is reason to believe, then, that Israel's insistence on zero enrichment is aimed to ensure that no deal is struck at all.

Israel also understands that a resolution to the nuclear standoff would significantly reduce U.S.-Iranian tensions and open up opportunities for collaboration between the two former allies. Since U.S.-Iranian fellow feeling will not be accompanied by a proportionate reduction in Iranian-Israeli hostilities, Israel will be left in a relatively worse position. This is what Israelis refer to as the fear of abandonment -- that, once the nuclear issue is resolved or contained, Washington will shift its focus to other matters while Israel will be stuck in the region facing a hostile Iran, without the United States by its side.

These fears have been the basis of Israel's uncompromising position for the past several years. But Netanyahu has been

particularly inflexible, breaking even past precedents of nimbleness. Israel generally opposes and seeks to prevent U.S.-Iranian talks whenever possible, but swiftly shifts to a neutral position once talks are deemed unstoppable. That way, it can still influence the agenda.

For instance, in 1999, the Clinton administration was intrigued -- according to some Israelis, "infatuated" -- with the election of reformist President Mohammad Khatami, who spoke of his desire to break the "wall of mistrust" with the United States. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak wanted neither to be locked out of a potential dialogue nor to come across as beating the war drum when the Clinton administration seemed intent on dialogue. To signal his government's shift, Barak altered the status of Iran from enemy to threat, indicating, as Israeli diplomats argued, that the current Israeli position holds that Israel does not have a conflict with the Iranian people, the state of Iran, or with Islam [1]. Moreover, Israel unofficially condemned a terrorist attack targeting a member of Khatami's government.

Barak enjoyed this flexibility because he had consistently rejected the idea -- and continues to do so today -- that Iran constitutes an existential threat to Israel. Netanyahu, on the other hand, has come to personify the argument that he made in a 2006 address to delegates at the United Jewish Communities General Assembly: "It's 1938 and Iran is Germany." Netanyahu has painted himself -- and Israel -- into a corner. And rather than trying to get out, he has, at every turn, doubled down on the strategy of intransigence.

Israel needs to show nimbleness now more than ever. With

Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria all in various states of chaos, Iran appears to be the most resolvable challenge that the United States faces in the Middle East, and Obama seems to know it. By personally taking ownership of reaching out to Iran by seeking a meeting with Rouhani and later calling him, he has demonstrated the political will to move things forward. And Rouhani seems ready to meet the challenge. By contrast, Netanyahu's knee-jerk rejection feeds the perception that Israel -- not Iran -- is the chief stumbling block. Ultimately, even short of a nuclear agreement, that impression can help Iran break out of its isolation and delegitimize the sanctions regime suffocating its economy.

Beyond the perception of it, Israel has much to gain from shifting its stance on negotiations. In private conversations last year after the successful round of talks in Istanbul, Israeli strategists revealed that Israel's central concern was not enrichment but, rather, that any U.S. deal with Iran entail a "sweeping attitude change" in Tehran vis-à-vis Israel. In short, Israel did not want Washington to resolve its issues with Iran unless Iran was forced to address Israel's concerns as well -- first and foremost, an Iranian de facto acceptance of Israel's right to exist.

This is precisely why diplomacy serves Israel better than Netanyahu's naysaying: Iran's position on Israel is far more likely to change in the direction Israel desires if U.S.-Iranian relations improve and the first tangible steps are taken to rehabilitate Iran into the region's political and economic structures.

Since its inception, the Iranian theocracy has adopted harsh and

venomous rhetoric about Israel to boost Tehran's credibility on the Arab street and to bridge the region's Arab-Persian and Sunni-Shia divide. But Tehran's ideological impulses have not always driven policy. When ideology and geostrategic goals don't match up, Iran favors the latter. During the Iraq-Iran War, Iran and Israel quietly collaborated behind the scenes for this very reason.

Over the last two decades, Tehran's ideological and strategic imperatives have been in harmony. Strategically, Iran opposes Israel's efforts to permanently isolate it. Ideologically, the anti-Israeli card has often been helpful to create common cause with the Arab masses and to help overcome Iran's own tensions with its Sunni and Arab neighbors. When sectarian strife rises in the region, so does the utility of the anti-Israeli card for Tehran.

Improved U.S.-Iranian relations, with tangible steps to end Iran's isolation on the condition that it shifts its behavior, could divorce Iran's ideological and strategic impulses. If that happens, Iran would have compelling incentives to disentangle itself from anti-Israeli hostilities.

The Rouhani government -- and its team of foreign policy practitioners, including Javad Zarif, the foreign minister -- have long been inclined toward negotiations. It was this same team that in 2003 prepared the so-called grand bargain proposal, which the Bush administration chose to ignore. As part of that grand bargain, Iran said that it was willing to significantly restrain Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, and even sign on to the 2002 Saudi peace plan, which offered the recognition of Israel by every country in the Muslim world in return for an Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state. That would indeed have

been a “sweeping attitude change” for Iran.

Similarly, Rouhani is believed to support the concept of adopting a “Malaysian profile,” which gained support during the Khatami era. The idea was that Tehran would, in return for an end to Israeli and American efforts to isolate Iran, assume a position on Israel similar to that of Malaysia: Iran would not recognize Israel but would limit its criticism of Israel to the plight of the Palestinian population, and would avoid getting itself entangled in activities against the Jewish state. The two rivals would also recognize each other’s respective spheres and disengage from further hostilities. This would have an immediate impact on Israel’s tensions with Hezbollah.

That plan is not perfect -- nor is it Israel’s ideal relationship with Iran. But neutralizing Iran’s interest in fanning anti-Israeli sentiment would be no small gain and would significantly enhance Israel’s security and political position. Recognizing that, Israel should moderate its rhetoric and stop encouraging Congress to undermine diplomacy through additional sanctions. By doing so, Israel can both help diplomacy and ensure that the final outcome of the talks addresses key Israeli security concerns.

Although there is no guarantee that diplomacy will succeed, all other options suffer from the same uncertainty, particularly a military option. If anything, the risks facing Israel, especially the risk of its being “abandoned” by the United States, only increase the more Netanyahu portrays himself as unappeasable.

TRITA PARSI is the founder and current president of the

National Iranian American Council, and author, most recently, of Treacherous Alliance.

Article 7.

TheNational (UAE)

Gaza suffers as Hamas fights for survival on several fronts

Jonathan Cook

October 1, 2013 -- The furor over the recent chemical weapons attack in Syria has overshadowed disturbing events to the south. Palestinians in Gaza find themselves caught in the middle of a growing row between their Hamas rulers and the new Egyptian military regime.

Hamas has become increasingly isolated, politically and geographically, since the Egyptian army helped oust the Muslim Brotherhood government in early July.

Since the military intervention, much of the Brotherhood's leadership has been jailed and last week its activities were outlawed and its assets frozen. Inevitably Hamas, which has close ties to the Brotherhood, has also come under severe suspicion from Egypt's generals.

The Egyptian army blames Hamas for the rise of militant Islamic

groups in the Sinai, many drawn from disgruntled local Bedouin tribes, which have been attacking soldiers, government institutions and shipping through the Suez Canal. According to the army, a third of the Islamists it has killed in operations originated from Gaza.

At a recent army press conference, several Palestinians confessed to smuggling arms from Gaza into Sinai. An Egyptian commander, Ahmed Mohammed Ali, also accused Hamas of “working on targeting the Egyptian army through ambushes”. Additionally, the Egyptian media blamed Hamas for a car bombing in Cairo this month which nearly claimed the life of the new interior minister, Mohammed Ibrahim.

Lurking in the shadows is the army’s fear that, should the suppressed Muslim Brotherhood turn to terrorism, its most useful ally will be a strong Hamas. The result has been a growing crackdown on the Palestinian Islamic movement that has also harmed the lives of ordinary Palestinians.

The Egyptian army has intensified the blockade along Egypt’s single short border with Gaza. Over the past weeks, the army has destroyed hundreds of tunnels through which Palestinians smuggle fuel and other necessities in short supply because of Israel’s siege. Egypt has established a “buffer zone”, as Israel did inside Gaza a decade ago when it was still occupying the enclave directly, to prevent more tunnels being dug.

That has plunged Gaza’s population into hardship and dealt a severe blow to the tax revenues Hamas raises on the tunnel trade. Unemployment is rocketing and severe fuel shortages mean even longer power cuts.

Similarly, Gaza's border crossing with Egypt at Rafah – the only access to the outside for most students, medical patients and business people – is now rarely opened.

And the Egyptian navy has been enforcing tight limits on Palestinian boats fishing off Gaza's coast, in a zone already tightly delimited by Israel. Boats have come under fire and crews been arrested for coming too close to Egypt's territorial waters.

Palestinians' fears about the future were encapsulated in a recent newspaper cartoon showing Gaza squeezed between pincers – one arm Israel, the other Egypt.

Hamas is short of regional allies. Its leader Khaled Meshal fled his Syrian base early in the civil war, alienating Iran in the process. Other regional supporters are also keeping their distance.

Hamas fears mounting discontent in Gaza, and particularly a demonstration planned for November modelled on this summer's mass protests in Egypt that helped to bring down the Egyptian president, Mohammed Morsi, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Hamas' political rival, Fatah – and the Palestinian Authority (PA), based in the West Bank – are reported to be behind the new protest movement.

The prolonged efforts by Fatah and Hamas to strike a unity deal are now a distant memory. Late last month, the PA announced it would be taking “painful decisions” towards Hamas, assumed to be a reference to declaring it a “rogue entity” and thereby cutting

off funding.

The PA sees in Hamas' isolation and its own renewed ties to the Egyptian leadership a chance to take back Gaza.

As ever, Israel is far from an innocent bystander.

After the unsettling period of the Brotherhood rule, the Egyptian and Israeli armies have restored security cooperation. According to media reports, Israel even lobbied Washington following the July coup to ensure Egypt continued to receive generous US aid handouts – as with Israel, mostly in the form of military assistance.

Israel has turned a blind eye to Egypt pouring troops, as well as tanks and helicopters, into Sinai in breach of the 1979 peace treaty. Israel would rather Egypt mop up the Islamist threat on their shared doorstep.

The destruction of the tunnels, meanwhile, has sealed off the main conduit by which Hamas armed itself.

Israel is also delighted to see Fatah and Hamas sapping their energies in manoeuvring against each other. Political unity would have strengthened the Palestinians' case with the international community; divided, they can be easily played off against the other.

That cynical game is in full swing. A week ago, Israel agreed for the first time in six years to allow building materials into Gaza for private construction, and to let in more fuel. A newly approved pipe will double the water supply to Gaza.

These measures are designed to bolster the PA's image in Gaza,

as payback for returning to negotiations, and undermine support for Hamas.

With Egypt joining the blockade, Israel now has much firmer control over what goes in and out, allowing it to punish Hamas while improving its image abroad by being generous with “humanitarian” items for the wider population.

Gaza is dependent again on Israel’s good favour. But even Israeli analysts admit the situation is far from stable. Sooner or later, something must give. And Hamas may not be the only ones caught in the storm.

Jonathan Cook is an independent journalist based in Nazareth.

Article 8.

The National Interest

The Old Turkey-Israel Relationship Isn't Coming Back

Omer Zarpli

October 2, 2013 -- Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s recent criticisms of Israel for not fulfilling Turkey’s conditions for normalizing relations—which were severed over the 2010 Gaza flotilla incident—shows the limits on U.S. influence in

Turkish-Israeli relations.

Since the Obama-brokered Israeli apology in March 2013, the reconciliation process has moved at a snail's pace. With no tangible breakthrough in negotiations on compensation for the families of the ship attack victims, relations continued to suffer throughout Turkey's turbulent summer. Erdogan and his aides' remarks blaming the "Jewish diaspora" for the internal turmoil, and Israel for the Egyptian coup, further undermined Obama's efforts to revitalize relations.

Fixing Turkish-Israeli relations has become something of a Sisyphean task for U.S. policymakers, who have gone to great lengths in their attempts to revive the 1990s—the glorious era in bilateral Israeli-Turkish relations. But the love affair of the 1990s was an anomaly, not the norm. And right now Washington can do little to change that. It may be time to lower expectations, and simply work to prevent problems in Turkish-Israeli relations from affecting Turkish-U.S. ties.

Easier said than done. Israel is a central consideration in American foreign policy in the Middle East, and Ankara's relations with Tel Aviv affect its relations with Washington. Most importantly, Erdogan's close ties with Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, are a serious irritant. After Hamas cut its umbilical cord with Iran and Syria, Ankara has emerged as one of its most notable patrons, something that cannot easily be overlooked in Washington or by Jewish groups. But Turkey is one of the few countries the U.S. can work with in the region, and it should not let relations fall victim to the woes in Turkish-Israeli ties.

The rise and fall of an alliance

Until the 1990s, ties between Turkey and Israel were informal and distant, despite being part of the same camp during the Cold War. Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel in 1949, mostly to please the U.S. and further its NATO aspirations. But this did not lead to a burgeoning relationship. Throughout this period, Ankara mostly maintained a pro-Arab tilt, not allowing the U.S. to use its bases in Turkey to support Israel during the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars, and joining other Arab countries in calling for return to pre-1967 borders.

Fast forward to the 1990s. Relations grew strong. In 1991, Ankara upgraded relations with Israel to the ambassadorial level. This was followed by agreements on tourism, economic cooperation, and free trade, but the center of bilateral ties came to be extensive military cooperation. Both countries began joint air-force training, naval visits, military personnel exchanges, military technology transfers, and joint military research. Ankara granted Israel access to Turkish airspace and Israel agreed to upgrade Turkey's ground and air forces. The two countries also conducted naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The factors that drove Turkey to Israel included enlisting the support of the powerful Israel lobby to improve ties with Washington, which suffered under heavy influence of the Greek and Armenian lobbies, and growing frustration with the lack of Arab support for the Turkish Cypriots who had been internationally isolated since proclaiming independence from Greek Cyprus in 1983. The Oslo peace process and Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation also created an environment conducive to warmer ties with Israel.

Most importantly, Ankara was driven by its insecurities in the

region. In the 1990s, Turkey's relations with its neighbors were fraught with problems. Ties with Syria were severed because of the latter's support of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), whose exiled leader was sheltered in Damascus. Furthermore, Ankara eyed with suspicion the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq formed in the aftermath of the Gulf War, which it feared would embolden its own restive Kurdish population. Turkish elites also saw Tehran as a threat, not least because of its efforts to export its revolution and its ties with the PKK.

All was not quiet on the western front either. Hostile relations with Greece over maritime disputes in the Aegean drove both countries to the brink of war several times. Close ties with Israel helped break this growing isolation, and improved relations with the United States. In cozying up to Israel, Turkey's military also wanted to undermine the Islamist prime minister Erbakan—a staunch anti-Westernist who saw Turkey's future with the Islamic world. For the Turkish military, the alliance was a bulwark against “theocratic extremism.”

While both nations' militaries continued to cooperate in areas like intelligence, the Turkish-Israeli alliance started to steadily fall apart under Erdogan, who made no secret of his distaste for Israel. Relations were seriously strained in late 2008 after the Israeli offensive into Gaza that ended Turkey's mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. The turning point came in 2009, when Erdogan and Israeli president Shimon Peres engaged in a public argument at Davos. The 2010 flotilla incident, in which Israel intercepted a Gaza-bound relief ship and killed nine Turkish nationals, was the final blow.

Apology and Failed Reconciliation

Many in Washington predicted that Prime Minister Netanyahu's apology would lead to the restoration of ties. The fact that bilateral trade flourished even at the worst of the times lent credence to such predictions. But lack of progress despite the U.S. efforts is somewhat indicative of how the importance of improved relations has diminished, especially for Turkey.

While Turkey and Israel continue to share certain interests in the region, such as the prevention of the proliferation of WMDs, factors that enabled robust ties have dissipated over time. Most importantly, the political role of the Turkish military, the main driver of the relations in the 1990s, declined under the continuing efforts of the AKP and was neutered by 2008. Further, the regional scene began to change. With the new zero problems policy, Ankara started to reach out to its neighbors, making friends of old enemies, and shook off its sense of insecurity and encirclement that was dominant in the 1990s. Turkey emerged as a confident actor as it buried the hatchet with Greece, Syria, Iran, and Iraqi Kurds, and even made openings in relations with Armenia. It also viewed the Palestinian issue as a key to winning over the "Arab street" and boosting its position. The flotilla incident, which occurred with a wink from the Turkish government, which allowed the ships to sail to Gaza, came to reflect how Israel became expendable for Turkey. Ankara no longer saw Tel Aviv as a pillar of strength in an increasingly hostile neighborhood.

While the zero-problems policy has been unraveling since 2011, leaving Ankara with few friends and an unending civil war on its doorstep, it has been replaced with a new sectarian policy in which Turkey has started to play the Sunni overlord. With Turkey taking on a new role as the guardian and sponsor of the

Muslim Brotherhood and its ilk, cozy relations with Israel seemed no longer convenient. That's why the severing of ties with Damascus and increasing tensions with Tehran over Syria and NATO missile-defense systems have not reversed the worsening trajectory of Turkish-Israeli relations. Erdogan's Israel-bashing, intended to shore up his nationalist-conservative constituency to preserve his domestic standing, also took its toll.

The future of relations

Today, despite the historical affinities between the Turks and Jews, neither the Turkish government nor the public puts much store on reviving the warm ties with Israel, and the regional dynamics that had driven the alliance are no longer in force. Both sides may ultimately come to agreement on compensation, followed by exchange of ambassadors. Erdogan may well take some steps to deescalate tensions, as Turkey did in late August when Turkish president Abdullah Gul invited an Israeli envoy to Turkish Victory Day celebrations. Undoubtedly, Erdogan does not want his problems with Israel to damage relations with the United States—especially when he needs America's hand in meeting the challenges posed by Syria. But he will likely not go much further than that. He will do as little as possible, and even that unwillingly.

In this light, the U.S. should revisit its expectations on how far Turkish-Israeli ties can go, and to what extent it can shape these relations. It is past time for the U.S. to realize that there is no affection between the two publics and that the golden age of the nineties was an aberration. Washington should work to compartmentalize Turkish-Israeli relations from cooperation with Turkey in other areas that are central to shared interests in

the region.

Omer Zarpli is a research associate at the Century Foundation.