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Article 1.

The Economist

The battle for Egypt

Aug 17th 2013 -- BARELY a month and a half into a government dominated by a general who had displaced a Muslim Brother in a coup that was cheered on by most of the people, Egypt is once again plunged into violence. On August 14th armed police, backed by helicopters in the skies and bulldozers on the streets, stormed thousands of the Brothers' supporters encamped beside a mosque and a university in Cairo. Hundreds were killed and nearly 3,000 injured and the violence spread to other cities, including Alexandria and Suez (see article). A score of churches were burned by angry Islamists. The government declared a curfew in some provinces and a month-long state of emergency across the country. The last time

that happened, when Hosni Mubarak took over as president after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, the state of emergency remained in force for 30 years.

The government has pleaded that it used “the utmost degree of self-restraint” this week. In fact, its choice to unleash deadly force against its own people was brutal and reckless. Far from marking the closing chapter in a popular coup, the killing threatens a period of strife that could drag the country towards civil war. At worst, the spectre of Algeria looms: the army there prevented Islamists from taking office after they won the first round of an election in 1991, and as many as 200,000 died in the decade-long bloodbath that ensued.

Thankfully Egypt still has a long way to go before that fate befalls it. But its 85m people are as deeply divided today as at any time since Egypt became a republic in 1953. The question is whether suppression really is now the way to deal with the Muslim Brothers, or whether it simply adds to the mayhem.

Death on the Nile

One view holds that the Muslim Brothers never intended to share power or to relinquish it in an election. There is no doubt that Muhammad Morsi’s performance as president was a disaster. He won about a quarter of the eligible vote and proceeded to flout every sort of democratic norm. His government packed a constitutional committee with Islamists, rushing through electoral and other laws without due consent. It let sectarian hatred against Muslim minorities and Egypt’s 8m-odd Christians rise unchecked. Combined with sheer incompetence in its stewardship of the economy, this destroyed

the standing of Mr Morsi among ordinary Egyptians. More than 20m people—half the adult population—were said to have signed a petition for a referendum on his presidency.

Since his forced removal on July 3rd and subsequent incarceration, he and his fellow Brothers at large have refused any hint of compromise, and have demanded his reinstatement. How much more exhilarating was opposition than the tricky realities of governing. Victimhood, martyrdom even, has seemed a more potent political weapon than policymaking.

But that does not excuse the generals—for either the coup or this bloodshed. The coup was not only wrong, it was also a tactical mistake. The Brothers would probably have lost any election handily; and if they had refused to hold a vote, then the people would have risen up. The army's violence since then has been disastrous. When it shot scores of people on July 8th, it drew a baleful lesson from the tepid Western response: that it could get away with it. In fact violence has served to unite Egypt's various Islamist factions—some of which had previously rejected the Brothers almost as keenly as secular Egyptians did. The Brothers' incompetence and abuse of power is now disappearing under a mantle of injustice and suffering.

The generals' worst mistake, however, is to ignore the chief lesson of the Arab spring. This is that ordinary people yearn for dignity. They hate being bossed around by petty officials and ruled by corrupt autocrats. They reject the apparatus of a police state. Instead they want better lives, decent jobs and some basic freedoms. Egypt's Islamists, in their reduced state, probably still make up 30% or so of the population. The generals cannot suppress them without also depriving millions of other

Egyptians of the freedoms that they crave—and which they have tasted, however briefly, since the overthrow of Mr Mubarak. Henceforth jihadists, in Egypt and beyond, who sympathise with al-Qaeda will find a more willing audience when they preach, as well as a supply of newly radicalised recruits. Likewise, each Islamist challenge will strengthen those in the army arguing for further suppression.

Go back to your barracks

If the generals want a stable Egypt, in which they command the loyalty of ordinary Egyptians, they should therefore draw back from the brink. Given their treatment at the hands of the army, it is hard to imagine the Brothers agreeing now to take part in a new political circus. But General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the power behind the throne, and his interim president, Adly Mansour, can create the conditions for a functioning economy and an inclusive politics. To do so they must set a timetable for parliamentary and presidential elections. The committee they have entrusted with amending the constitution should be widened to include more Islamists. And other Islamist parties, if the Brothers refuse to participate, should be wooed into playing their part in politics—eventually, if not now.

The world must also act. This newspaper warned Western leaders that their lack of response to the July shootings would cause trouble; it has. It should not repeat the same mistake today. America should cancel joint military exercises due in September and withhold its next tranche of military aid (already disbursed for the current year) until a civilian government has been elected and takes office. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries should not write the generals a blank cheque just

because they share a dislike of the Brothers.

No one could ever have thought that reinventing Egypt was going to be easy. It has never had a proper democracy. Much of its populace is illiterate. Most of its people live in poverty. And the question of how to accommodate Islam has everywhere proved vexed. But the generals should stop and think: in modern history such immense obstacles have never been overcome by violence.

Article 2.

Foreign Policy

Speak Softly and Carry No Stick - Welcome to the Obama Doctrine in Egypt

James Traub

August 15, 2013 -- President Barack Obama, we know, believes in "engagement." He believes that maintaining ties even with the most hateful regimes holds out the possibility of progress. In his Nobel Peace Prize speech he mocked moralists -- implicitly including his predecessor, George W. Bush -- who preferred "the satisfying purity of indignation" to the hard and very impure work of diplomacy. And that, I imagine, is why Obama has reacted so cautiously to the shocking massacres in Egypt, canceling planned military exercises but leaving U.S. military aid intact.

I think this is a serious mistake. But the calculus that may have lead Obama to his decision is one that I would have admired in a different context. It's a calculus that needs to be reckoned with. I'll try to do that here.

Both Obama and many of the people whose advice he has listened to since 2009 are morally driven figures who nevertheless accept that the world is a fallen place which cannot easily be changed, even with all of America's might. Samantha Power, a senior White House official before she became U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, used to say, "We are all consequentialists now." We -- that is, outside advocates and activists like her who had joined the administration -- had an obligation to choose words, and policies, according to their consequences, not according to some abstract moral scale. If praising dictators in Sudan or Burma, as the administration did at times, encouraged them to reconcile with their rivals, then they should be praised. Cutting ties to demonstrate the purity of your indignation, by contrast, is irresponsible.

Obama's consequentialism was a welcome relief from Bush's moralism. Perhaps Obama should have more sharply criticized the grossly fraudulent Iranian election in 2009, but he held his tongue for fear of jeopardizing talks on nuclear enrichment. It's true that the Iranian authorities simply pocketed Washington's silence and remained intractable; but they would have pocketed American outrage with the same nonchalance. The United States has far more to gain from engaging Iran than it does from issuing ultimatums, even if Israel and most of the U.S. Congress don't see it that way.

Doesn't the same logic apply to today's Egypt? After all, even

the Bush administration was unprepared to lower the boom on President Hosni Mubarak when he rigged elections and sent thugs to beat and kill protestors in direct defiance of a promise to Washington. When I was writing The Freedom Agenda, my book about Bush's embrace of democracy promotion, I asked White House and State Department officials why they hadn't even threatened to cut military aid to Egypt. The answer was: Because it wouldn't do any good, and because "we have other fish to fry" with Egypt, which served as a regional counterweight to Iran and a reliable supporter of U.S. policy towards Israel.

Today, of course, those same fish are still frying, especially as Secretary of State John Kerry tries to broker a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. This may explain why Kerry has continued to absurdly insist that a path to a political solution in Egypt "is still open" -- even as Islamists are being hunted down in the street. At the same time, it's just as absurd to imagine that a suspension of the \$1.5 billion a year in U.S. aid, or the threat of it, would have any effect on Egypt's new military rulers. They have waded hip-deep in blood; they won't retrace their steps because Washington is outraged.

In fact, any punitive action would be the purest of moral gestures. First of all, since the new regime's Gulf backers will probably make up for any shortfall in Western assistance, the threat is almost meaningless. Second, no one's listening. In the Mubarak era, threatening aid would have signaled to activists and protestors that Washington stood with them. But yesterday's activists are today's apologists for mass murder; just read the repellent statement of support for the assaults issued by the National Salvation Front, the aptly named civilian façade for

Egypt's new military rulers. There is no one in Egypt to whom to send a signal. A consequentialist would thus ask: Why bother?

The answer is that silence has consequences too. To register nothing more than disappointment in the face of a military coup, the arrest and imminent trial of overthrown leaders, and the killing of hundreds of civilians is to make a very blunt statement about the relative importance the United States gives to democracy and human rights, on the one hand, and national interests, narrowly construed, on the other. It is the message the elder George Bush, a master of consequentialism, gave when he restored regular working relations with China soon after the massacre at Tiananmen Square. The signal was meant for the Chinese leadership, but it was heard loud and clear by both dictators and ordinary citizens the world over. What they understood is that Washington was prepared to overlook any amount of bloodshed in order to resume relations with an important ally.

Statesmen, of course, must make painful choices that look ugly from the outside. The United States does not criticize Saudi Arabia's appallingly repressive regime for the same reason it used to pull its punches on Mubarak's Egypt: It wouldn't help, and there are other fish to fry. But Saudi oppression is a steady state, and Egypt has just engaged in an orgy of brutality that has riveted the world's attention. The United States cannot look away and pivot to Asia on this one. On the other side of the balance, if the U.S. were to withdraw its support, Egypt would still be very unlikely to change its pro-Western regional posture -- which is a matter of national self-interest. Thus if there is little to be gained by the moral gesture, neither is there much to be lost by it. Even a cool-headed calculating consequentialist might

then pull the plug.

If that's so, why does Obama continue to behave as if he has the wisdom and maturity to deny himself a cheap thrill? Perhaps because the experience of the last four-plus years has so thoroughly imbued him with a sense of the intransigence of the world, and the limits of American power, that he now automatically defaults to the more modest option. Bush-the-elder was born a realist; Obama is a convert. He has explained his reluctance to intervene forcefully in Syria by asking why he should act there and not in the Congo, where even more people have been killed -- a strangely rhetorical question from a man who has embraced the principle that states have a responsibility to protect citizens from mass atrocities. And this, too, is a signal -- and not one the Barack Obama of 2008 would ever have expected to send.

I would like to say that suspending aid to Egypt is now in America's national interest. Maybe it's not; maybe it's a wash. So I will say instead that it has become a matter of national self-respect. Democracies have to be able to look at themselves in the mirror, and to accept, if not like, what they see. That is why the message we send to Egypt is not an indulgence, but a necessity.

James Traub is a fellow of the Center on International Cooperation. "Terms of Engagement,"

Article 3.

The Washington Post

Obama's dangerous passivity on Egypt and Syria on display

Jackson Diehl

August 15 -- There was hope a few months ago that mounting chaos in the Middle East, and a revamping of President Obama's national security team, would prompt the president to snap out of what looked like a deepening torpor in foreign policy.

Instead, this president's extraordinary passivity in the face of crisis may have achieved its apotheosis this week. On Wednesday, as Egyptian security forces gunned down hundreds of civilians in the streets of Cairo, an unperturbed Obama shot another round of golf at Martha's Vineyard. His deputy press secretary was left to explain to reporters that the administration remained firmly committed to not deciding whether what had happened in Egypt was a coup.

When the president finally deigned to address the crisis himself, on Thursday morning, the result was measured rhetoric — “deplorable” — accompanied by a classic half-measure: A biennial military exercise scheduled for next month will be canceled, sparing the White House some unseemly photo ops. But the deeper relationship with the Egyptian military, including \$1.3 billion in annual aid, remains in place.

The crisis in Egypt has been distracting attention from the civil war in Syria, where Obama's stubborn refusal to act has

facilitated the emergence of the largest and potentially most dangerous incarnation of al-Qaeda since pre-2001 Afghanistan. Between them, Egypt and Syria prevent most people from thinking much about Yemen — except when an al-Qaeda plot to take over much of the country prompts the closure of the U.S. Embassy and a frantic-looking burst of drone strikes. And never mind Bahrain, another close U.S. ally where another autocratic regime is brutally suppressing protests this week without a peep of objection from Washington.

Obama looks like a president in full flight from a world that looks nothing like what he imagined when he took office. The president saw himself soothing U.S. relations with Muslim nations while gently extracting U.S. troops from Iraq and focusing his energy on other regions and issues: Asia; nuclear arms control; Israeli-Palestinian peace. What he got was an epochal upheaval in the very place from which he had hoped to disengage.

All presidents face the challenge of adapting to the problems they are presented with rather than those they expect. It could be argued that George W. Bush reacted to the attacks of Sept. 11 with a too-radical reshaping of his worldview and international ambitions. Obama's response to the Arab revolutions has veered to the opposite extreme: a clinging to his overtaken priorities, coupled with a stubborn refusal to recognize that the Arab crises must be a top priority of his foreign policy.

In the last year, U.S. allies in the Middle East and Europe have marveled as Obama doggedly pursued a patently futile attempt to engage Russian strongman Vladi-mir Putin in another round of nuclear arms reduction talks even while tolerating toxic

Russian intervention in Syria and rejecting his own national security team's proposal for U.S. action. They have scratched their heads as Secretary of State John F. Kerry, with Obama's blessing, has made the renewal of moribund Israeli-Palestinian talks his central focus while keeping a safe distance from Egypt.

Incredibly, some officials close to Kerry were arguing in recent weeks that one reason not to designate Egypt's coup a coup was to avoid dampening the Mideast "peace process" — whose prospects for success are invisible to all outside the administration, including the Israelis and Palestinians themselves. Never mind the burning city, goes the logic; we've got our hands full building this Potemkin village.

The Arab revolutions demand bold initiatives from the United States and any other outside power seeking to influence their outcome. Airstrikes to break the Syrian military would have been one; a cutoff of military aid to Egypt would have been another. But in foreign policy, Obama is a president of half-measures, of endless internal debates followed by split-the-difference presidential decisions that serve no one's strategy. Instead of an intervention in Syria that might make a difference, token shipments of arms are being sent to the rebels; instead of a decisive break with Egypt's out-of-control generals, a pointless exercise is called off.

If there is any virtue to this record, it is that the reaction to it is reviving an internationalist wing of the Democratic Party that, by the end of the Bush administration, appeared nearly dead. Not just the usual neocons but Democratic senators such as Carl Levin and Robert Menendez are faulting Obama's failure to act more forcefully in Syria. Not just Republicans John McCain and

Lindsey Graham but the New York Times editorial board are demanding a suspension of military aid to Egypt.

Obama may have meant to retire the doctrine of the United States as the world's "indispensable nation." Instead, the disastrous results of his persistent passivity may lead to its revival.

Article 4.

The Financial Times

Barack Obama declines to correct his Egyptian mistake

Ian Bremmer

August 15, 2013 -- President Barack Obama has decided not to bring his influence to bear on Egypt. In a statement on Thursday, he spoke out against this week's violence in the country and cancelled forthcoming joint military exercises, declaring that "our traditional co-operation cannot continue as usual." But in effect, business as usual was what he championed. These were largely symbolic gestures that did not undermine implicit US support for the Egyptian military.

America's link to the generals is longstanding. That is the backdrop for the decision to acquiesce in July's military coup against the Egyptian president, the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi. It was a significant foreign policy misstep,

compounded by the Obama administration's subsequent statements and decisions. In early August John Kerry, secretary of state, described the military as "restoring democracy". At the time it was incorrect. This week, it has become a stain on the White House.

On Wednesday the Egyptian authorities moved against the Brotherhood, who had organised protests against the coup. The violence escalated; some of the opposition were armed. More than 500 people have died. The Islamists have attacked churches and police stations across the country. The pro-military and pro-Brotherhood factions are now too polarised for any compromise to take shape. How can you broker a deal when the two sides are digging in deeper?

The issue is less about whether or not there was a military coup in July but rather why the revolution in 2011 failed to take root. Depending on how you look at it, the revolution was incomplete, unsuccessful, or, more cynically, it never got rolling to begin with. That's not a narrative that people like to hear. The military wasn't "restoring democracy" in July because democracy never managed to take root in the first place; the military didn't give up power. There was change – some generals were replaced – and there was hope for more. But to say the military ever reported to the new administration and then overthrew it is fiction. The military retained enormous political and budgetary authority, and the Brotherhood-written constitution codified its power.

Still, there was a real possibility that things would improve, albeit incrementally, as happened in Turkey in the 1990s. An elected government could have come in, beholden to the

military, but over time, it could have stripped the military of its vested powers and the country could have lurched towards true democracy. This is the Egypt spring scenario: a trajectory that was plausible had Mr Morsi built out a broad governing coalition capable of addressing Egypt's underlying power structure. But in November 2012 Mr Morsi declared himself above the law and served as the mouthpiece for an organisation that was (and is) in many ways anti-democratic, with attacks on churches and intimidation of its critics.

After the military's actions in the past few weeks, there is no going back. For the US government, for Mohamed ElBaradei, for the Saudis and Emiratis, for everyone who was on board with the interim government, the chance for a settlement between the post-coup regime and the Brotherhood has evaporated. The majority either backs the military or the Brotherhood. Excluded from politics, the Brotherhood and its supporters will become more radicalised.

The military is playing to its base, which views the Brotherhood as a threat. The few who hoped to bridge the gap between the two sides can no longer play a role. The best that can be said is that Egypt is not Syria – civil war is unlikely. The military retains sufficient power to ensure the country stays together. It can put a floor under potential instability.

While Washington has had virtually no influence on developments in Egypt over the past six weeks, it does have leverage. If it wants to push the government to end the crackdowns and commit to free, fair elections and real transition by a near-term date, it could threaten to rescind aid or suspend military co-operation. Today, army commander General Abdel

Fattah al-Sisi is far too distracted to be concerned with or influenced by the US. But it will eventually matter to Egypt – and it would immediately send a signal to other powers.

Whether the US would really be willing to make good on these threats – moves that could leave Egypt’s military less equipped to maintain stability – is another story. Based on Mr Obama’s comments on Thursday, he will cling to the status quo as long as it remains acceptable. In Syria, the US has dragged its feet in providing support to the opposition. In Egypt it will drag its feet in unwinding its support of the military. In Syria, central authority has eroded into chaos, with neither side able to take firm control of the country. In Egypt, the recent chaos has exposed that a central authority has had firm control all along.

The Egypt spring was always a lofty goal, requiring the military, the Muslim Brotherhood and Mr Morsi not to drop the baton. All three did. And by being too passive, the US didn’t do them any favours. After this week, any flicker of hope that the Egypt spring is within reach has been extinguished.

The writer is president of Eurasia Group.

[Article 5.](#)

NYT

Egypt’s Blood, America’s Complicity

Amr Darrag

August 15, 2013 -- Cairo — For millions of Egyptians still reeling from the shock of Wednesday’s state-led massacre, which killed at least 600 peaceful protesters and possibly many more, the questions are now very basic: How do you reconcile with people who are prepared to kill you, and how do you stop them from killing again?

I represent an alliance of Egyptians who oppose the military coup that overthrew President Mohamed Morsi in July. Over the last two weeks, we have met with foreign diplomats, including Bernardino León, the European Union envoy, and William J. Burns, the American deputy secretary of state, who were invited by the coup’s leaders to mediate. We respectfully listened, honestly communicated our assessment of the situation and emphasized our desire to find a peaceful solution.

But those efforts were doomed by the bad faith of Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, Egypt’s military ruler. It was he, not the alliance, who rejected the mediators’ proposals.

The mediation efforts have been problematic. Diplomats and journalists continue to speak about negotiating only with the Muslim Brotherhood, even though the protesters come from all over the political spectrum; 69 percent of the country opposed the coup, one Egyptian poll showed.

Worse, shocking and irresponsible rhetoric from the State Department in Washington and from other Western diplomats — calling on the Brotherhood and demonstrators to “renounce” or “avoid” violence (even when also condemning the state’s violence) — has given the junta cover to perpetrate

heinous crimes in the name of “confronting” violence. The protest sites have been teeming with foreign correspondents for the last several weeks, and there has not been a shred of evidence suggesting the presence of weapons, or of violence initiated by protesters.

The mediators’ most disastrous error was their choice to put pressure on the victims. In their eyes, we were the cause of the crisis, not the illegal putsch that suspended the Constitution and kidnapped the president.

Secretary of State John Kerry’s astonishing remark on Aug. 1 that the coup was “restoring democracy,” despite a disavowal from the White House, did not leave the impression that America was on the side of the peaceful protesters.

If only we could accept the coup as a *fait accompli*, we were told, all would be well. There would be “good will gestures” from the military, and there would be an “inclusive” democracy.

We have heard all those promises before. The military and so-called liberal elites have shown time and again that they believe they are entitled to a veto over Egyptians’ choices. But the general who betrayed his oath and held the only elected president in the history of Egypt in extralegal detention cannot be trusted to let an opposition movement survive, let alone thrive.

For those seriously interested in a way out of this crisis, some hard facts must be acknowledged.

First, this is a battle between those who envision a democratic, pluralistic Egypt in which the individual has dignity and power

changes hands at the ballot box and those who support a militarized state in which government is imposed on the people by force.

Second, this coup has already sent Egypt back into the dark ages of dictatorship — with tight military control over both state-owned and private media, attacks on peaceful protesters and journalists, and detention of opposition leaders without criminal charges or due process.

Third, there is no promise that General Sisi can make that he hasn't already betrayed. He took an oath to uphold the Constitution; he suspended the Constitution. He took an oath to loyally serve in the government; he toppled that government. And in the classic doublespeak of military juntas, he loudly condemned the opposition for dealing with foreign powers, while he was actively seeking the help of Western diplomats as well as the Persian Gulf sheikdoms that largely financed his coup.

Through all this, the United States government has pleaded impotence. Hardly a day goes by without some press officer, analyst or public official pushing the idea that Washington's influence really isn't that decisive with the Egyptian generals. This cop-out simply won't do. America had influence and still does. It was an American official, not an Egyptian one, who informed President Morsi's staff of the finality of the coup decision.

There is only one way forward in Egypt today. The legitimate government must be restored. Only then can we hold talks for a national reconciliation with every option on the table.

The reinstatement of Mr. Morsi is not about ideology or ego. It is not political grandstanding. It is not a negotiating tactic. It is a pragmatic necessity.

Without this crucial step, without accountability for those responsible for the bloodshed and chaos facing Egypt today, none of the promises of inclusion, democracy, liberty or life can be guaranteed.

What the United States ultimately decides to do with its diplomatic relations or foreign aid is President Obama's decision. But Americans need to recognize that every passing day solidifies the perception among Egyptians that American rhetoric on democracy is empty; that American politicians won't hesitate to flout their own laws or subvert their declared values for short-term political gains; and that when it comes to freedom, justice and human dignity, Muslims need not apply.

The regime we are facing in Egypt is not new. It is one with which we are intimately familiar. Its leaders are selling torture, repression and stagnation. We are not buying. And America shouldn't either.

Amr Darrag is a member of the executive board of the Freedom and Justice Party, which is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. He was Egypt's minister of planning and international cooperation under President Mohamed Morsi.

Bloomberg

What Obama Misunderstands About Egypt

Jeffrey Goldberg

Aug 15, 2013 -- This morning, President Barack Obama condemned the Egyptian military's slaughter of Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers, and canceled joint military exercises scheduled for next month. He said that the violence should stop and that "a process of national reconciliation should begin."

What the White House fails to understand is that the Egyptian military has very different ideas about what "reconciliation" should look like. Its goal is to destroy the Muslim Brotherhood, its traditional adversary, by killing as many Brothers as possible and by jailing or otherwise hounding the others. As for the surprise registered in the White House that Egypt's military rulers didn't listen to repeated American pleas for reconciliation and compromise: How hard is it to believe that Middle Eastern potentates promised one thing to the U.S., and then did something else entirely?

The generals in Cairo have made cold calculations. One of them is that brutality pays dividends. Yes, there may be short-term consequences to the brutal crackdown: There's still a decent chance that the U.S. will suspend aid to the Egyptian military. But the generals understood that a suspension of aid might be

possible in the aftermath of the sort of crackdown we're seeing now. Which means that they have come to think that wiping out the Brotherhood is worth the risk. (They also know that there are plenty of wealthy sheiks in the Persian Gulf who viscerally oppose the Brotherhood and who would be happy to supplement Egypt's defense budget.)

It's important to note that the Egyptian military isn't yet all in -- for an example of an all-in, maximum-violence Middle East eradication campaign, please see Syria. But I don't much doubt that the bloody crackdown on the Brotherhood will continue, despite the heartfelt pleas from the White House and the near daily phone calls from Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel. And one reason is Syria: Egyptian generals can't help but notice that the world has stood idly by as Bashar al-Assad has presided over the deaths of some 100,000 Syrian citizens. In the Middle East, you can, in fact, get away with murder.

The Egyptian military will ultimately fail in its campaign to uproot the Brotherhood, because the group is quite popular in many sectors of Egyptian society and its members are expert at underground living. And the Egyptian military has given the Brotherhood something it seeks: mass martyrdom, which is the most potent motivational tool a theocratic movement has in its arsenal. Egypt is falling into ruin because the Brotherhood is anti-democratic, revanchist, anti-Christian and power-mad, and because the Egyptian military couldn't conceive of a way to marginalize it without resorting to mass violence.

This leaves the U.S. in the difficult position of having no one to support. There is, at this point, no good reason to continue funding the Egyptian armed forces. The aid obviously hasn't

provided the White House with sufficient leverage, and it makes the U.S. complicit in what just happened and what will undoubtedly continue to happen. One argument for continued aid is that it encourages the military to maintain Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. But the military will do so whether or not the U.S. provides money and weapons, because it has decided that Islamist extremism, and not Israel, is Egypt's main enemy. And it will be too busy persecuting Egyptians.

Jeffrey Goldberg is a Bloomberg View columnist.

[Article 7.](#)

Asharq Al-Awsat

Iran faces six sets of sanctions

Amir Taheri

August 16, 2013 -- Is Iran's new president, Hassan Rouhani, boxing himself into a difficult situation? The question arises because Rouhani is telling Iranians he will ensure the sanctions are lifted without making concessions on the nuclear issue.

Rouhani faces a diplomatic Gordian knot.

On the one hand, he must prove that Iran is not trying to build a

nuclear arsenal. But how does one prove a negative? Should he promise a total shutdown of Iran's nuclear program which, if the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the yardstick, appears perfectly legal? Ten years ago, he negotiated a suspension of uranium enrichment in a show of goodwill. Today, he cannot even do that, because uranium enrichment has been transformed into a symbol of Khomeinism's fight against the American "Great Satan."

Now, imagine that rubbing a magic wand produces agreement on Iran's nuclear program. However, even then the lifting of sanctions would not be automatic.

Iran is subject to six different types of sanctions imposed since 1979.

The first set of sanctions is related to the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran and the holding of its diplomats hostage. Under the Algiers Accord of 1980, a mechanism was to be created to lift those sanctions. That did not happen because the two signatories, Iran and the US, did not achieve the degree of mutual trust necessary. Things became even more complicated when Tehran used Hezbollah elements to kidnap and hold hostage dozens of Western citizens, including some 20 Americans, in Lebanon.

The second set of sanctions was related to the Iran-Iraq War and mainly aimed at stopping the two belligerents from obtaining military hardware. The war ended in 1988 when Iran accepted Resolution 598 of the UN Security Council.

However, the sanctions imposed remained in place. The reason is that Iran and Iraq failed to agree on a full implementation of

the resolution's provisions. Even today, the two neighbors have no mechanism for negotiating implementation.

The third set of sanctions was imposed by European nations in response to hostage-taking and terrorist activities in their respective territories. Between 1979 and 1993, a total of 127 Iranian dissidents were murdered in 11 European countries and Turkey. At the same time, terrorist operations linked to Iran claimed the lives of over 50 people in Spain, Italy, France, Belgium and Germany. In due course, the US joined some of the sanctions imposed by the Europeans.

Under President Mohammad Khatami, Iran's terrorist operations in the West came to an end. However, most sanctions remained in place.

The fourth set of sanctions was imposed by the European Union in relation to sentences passed in 1992 on four Iranian officials by a criminal court in Berlin. The court applied for international arrest warrants against Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, then-president Hashemi Rafsanjani, then-foreign minister Ali-Akbar Velayati and then-intelligence and security minister Ali Fallahian. This is why the four have not been able to travel outside Iran for a quarter of a century. Theoretically, those sanctions could be lifted only when the individuals accused of complicity in the murder of Iranian Kurdish dissidents in Berlin are brought to justice in Germany.

The fifth set of sanctions is related to Iran's nuclear program. These are imposed on behalf of the international community through five unanimous resolutions of the UN Security Council. All UN members are required to impose those sanctions against

Iran. Lifting those sanctions requires a new resolution abrogating the previous ones. Such a resolution could be tabled only when Iran has virtually shut down its nuclear program.

The sixth set of sanctions consists of those unilaterally imposed by the United States. These are built around the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 passed through the US Congress by the Clinton Administration. In 2006, it was re-named Iran Sanctions Act after Libya agreed to US demands. Over time, the US has enforced a system of supposedly voluntary cooperation by non-US companies. This gives foreign firms a choice of doing business either with Iran or the United States. Those doing business with Iran are shut out of the American market and prevented from raising capital in the US. Not surprisingly, most companies choose the USD 16 trillion American market over the USD 1 trillion Iranian one.

Though imposing sanctions is easy, lifting them is often difficult.

Some of the restrictions imposed on Germany, Italy and Japan during the Second World War still remain in their constitutions, especially in relation to the manufacture and deployment of weapons. Although the Soviet Union collapsed two decades ago, some of the sanctions imposed on it, mostly related to dual-use technology and equipment, affected Russia for many years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. China is still subject to sanctions imposed in the 1950s. Many of the sanctions imposed on Iraq between 1988 and 2003 still remain in effect. Afghanistan's Taliban was the subject of extensive sanctions imposed after it seized control of the country, many of which are still in place.

Imposing sanctions against a real or imagined enemy or adversary creates a mental block that is not easily removed. Once destroyed, trust between nations takes a long time to rebuild. Today, six decades after World War II, the US does not extend the same degree of trust to Germany that it does to Great Britain, for example. Even if Iran replaces the present regime, the sanctions imposed by the UN, EU and the US could take decades to lift. In fact, some may never be lifted.

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Article 8.

Global-Post

Let us count all the ways the Middle East peace process has failed before

James Miller and Gordon Earle

August 15, 2011 -- The re-invigorated peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians seems doomed to fail.

After decades of broken promises and warfare, such cynicism has become synonymous with the peace process.

The last round of negotiations in 2010 ended on particularly bad terms. The Israelis refused to acquiesce to certain preconditions, including the cessation of all settlement building in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, enraging Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

Negotiations this time around will likely pick up where the 2010 conference left off, and are buttressed by the Israeli government's decision to release 104 prisoners of war in waves over the next few months. Of course, that is still contingent on the pace of negotiations, which many expect to be painfully slow.

Ahead of the latest batch of negotiations, GlobalPost takes a look at the failures of the past.

1. Lausanne Conference (1949)

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War began the day after Israel declared independence; the Lausanne Conference was the first attempt to create peace. Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria signed agreements with Israel demarcating cease-fire lines. The boundaries held until the 1967 Six-Day War, but tensions remained high.

2. UN Resolution 242 (1967)

The 6-Day War was a major tactical victory for Israel. It captured the Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and all of Jerusalem. At this stage Israel had bargaining chips and sought to leverage them. UN Resolution

242 was the first to recommend the peace plan nearly all subsequent talks have adopted: land for peace. The resolution was mired in ambiguity advising Israel only to withdraw “from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” Overall the resolution produced little substantial peace accords and did not address Palestinian concerns.

3. Camp David/Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (1978/1979)

After years of fighting and escalating tensions, Egypt finally had enough. In 1977 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem in a gesture of peace. Seeing positive developments, US President Jimmy Carter invited Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Camp David in 1978 to negotiate peace. One agreement, A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, addressed the possible process to solving the “Palestinian Problem” through self-government in the West Bank and Gaza and recommended every Arab state adopt a peace treaty with Israel. In 1979, Israel and Egypt signed a mutual peace accord. Egypt became the first Arab state to recognize Israel and it regained control of the Sinai Peninsula. While these talks were the most successful, the 1981 assassination of Sadat by terrorists in response to peace made it clear that tensions remained unsolved.

4. Madrid (1991-93)

Just after the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union invited Jordan, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt and the Palestinians to a peace conference in Spain. The talks were the first time the governments of these nations met face to face to discuss the “Palestinian Problem.”

While little positive developments came of the process, in 1994 Jordan and Israel managed to sign a peace treaty.

5. Oslo (1993)

The Oslo Conference had what all others lacked: face-to-face peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis. At the start, the talks appeared to give promising signs of lasting peace as Israel agreed to remove troops from the West Bank and Gaza while the Palestinians recognized Israel's right to exist. Unfortunately, after the agreements were signed, Hamas began ramping up suicide attacks in Israel and Israel continued growing settlements in the West Bank.

6. Wye Agreements (1998)

Since the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, frequent suicide bombings and growing Israeli settlement building proved neither side was actively implementing the peace agreements. In 1998, US President Bill Clinton invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to sign an agreement to implement the procedures outlined in the Oslo Accords. After days of intense debate, the agreement was signed. However, like all previous talks, both sides became suspicious of each other and hostilities remained with agreements in a stalemate.

7. Camp David (2000)

The Oslo Accords and Wye Agreements sought only to solve the question of Israeli's occupation of disputed lands. The 2000 Camp David summit looked to solve the question of refugees, borders and the status of Jerusalem. No agreement was signed as

the Palestinians refused anything less than a return to the 1967 borders, while Israel only offered the Gaza Strip, much of the West Bank and parts of the Negev Desert. The failure of the meetings ushered in a new Palestinian uprising, known as the Second Intifada.

8. Road Map to Peace and Geneva Accords (2003)

In 2002, George W. Bush became the first US president to overtly call for the creation of a Palestinian state, following on Clinton's suggestions that peace was impossible without the creation of a Palestinian state. A year later, the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations worked together to create a three-step plan for lasting peace between Israelis and the Palestinians. First, both sides would end violence and issue statements supporting a two-state solution. Second, the borders of a Palestinian state would be discussed at an international conference. Finally, the final peace agreement would be signed. Some weeks after the roadmap was proposed, Yossi Beilin, one of the Israeli negotiators of the Oslo accords and former Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo agreed upon an unofficial plan in Oslo that would flip the roadmap, whereby borders would be discussed before peace. Neither plan was implemented and violence continued.

9. Annapolis (2007)

The Second Intifada left the implementation of the “roadmap” stalled. In 2007, during the last few months of his presidency, George W. Bush invited Israel and the Palestinian Authority, among a backdrop of other Arab nations, to a peace conference in Maryland. Hamas, which had just taken control of the Gaza

strip, was not represented. Despite signing a “joint understanding,” no agreement was signed and talks abruptly ended as Israel launched a new offensive in Gaza.

10. Direct Washington Talks (2010)

Just months after taking office, US President Barack Obama tried his hand at brokering peace between the Palestinians and Israelis. In 2009, after meeting with Obama, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to suspend settlement construction in the West Bank for 10 months. The settlement freeze lasted, but Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas refused to accept growing settlements in East Jerusalem. When the two parties finally met in Washington in September 2010, the 10-month freeze was up and settlement construction began again. The talks ended shortly thereafter.