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3 December, 2013

<a href="#">Article 1.</a>	The Wall Street Journal <b><u>What a Final Iran Deal Must Do</u></b> Henry A. Kissinger And George P. Shultz
<a href="#">Article 2.</a>	The Daily Beast <b><u>Memo to Netanyahu: It's Time to Build an Arsenal of Awe</u></b> Lloyd Green
<a href="#">Article 3.</a>	Washington Post <b><u>Ousting Assad may be only the beginning</u></b> <a href="#">David Ignatius</a>
<a href="#">Article 4.</a>	Al-Monitor <b><u>Allen mission key to Israeli-Palestinian security talks</u></b> <a href="#">Geoffrey Aronson</a>
<a href="#">Article 5.</a>	Bloomberg <b><u>Middle East Mess Isn't About Settlements</u></b> Jeffrey Goldberg
<a href="#">Article 6.</a>	NYT <b><u>Gaza Need Not Be a Sewer</u></b> Alon Tal and Yousef Abu-Mayla
Article 7.	Spiegel <b><u>China Escalates Tensions with Neighbors</u></b> Hans Hoyng, Wieland Wagner and <a href="#">Bernhard Zand</a>
<a href="#">Article 8.</a>	The National Interest <b><u>Ukraine's Dangerous Game</u></b> <a href="#">Anya Schmemann</a>

[Article 1.](#)

The Wall Street Journal

## **What a Final Iran Deal Must Do**

Henry A. Kissinger and George P. Shultz

Dec. 2, 2013 -- As former secretaries of state, we have confronted the existential issue of nuclear weapons and negotiated with adversaries in attempts to reduce nuclear perils. We sympathize with the current administration's quest to resolve the Iranian nuclear standoff through diplomacy. We write this article to outline the options as we see them emerging from the interim agreement for a policy based on the principle of "trust and verify."

For two decades, American presidents from both parties have affirmed that the U.S. is unalterably opposed to an Iranian military nuclear capability. They have usually added a warning to the effect that "all options are on the table" in pursuit of this policy. A clear trans-Atlantic consensus, a decade of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports and six United Nations Security Council resolutions have buttressed this position. The interim nuclear deal with Iran has been described as the first step toward the elimination of Iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon. That hope resides, if at all, in the prospects of the next round of negotiations envisaged to produce a final outcome within six months. Standing by itself, the interim agreement leaves Iran, hopefully only temporarily, in the position of a nuclear threshold power—a country that can achieve a military nuclear capability within months of its choosing to do so. A final agreement leaving this threshold capacity unimpaired would institutionalize the Iranian nuclear threat, with profound consequences for global nonproliferation policy and the stability of the Middle East. For 35 years and continuing today, Iran has been advocating an anti-Western concept of world order, waging proxy wars against America and its allies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and beyond, and arming and training sectarian extremists throughout the Muslim world. During that time, Iran has defied unambiguous [REDACTED] and IAEA demands and proceeded with a major nuclear effort, incompatible with any exclusively civilian purpose, and in violation of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty in effect since 1970. If the ruling group in Iran is genuinely prepared to enter into cooperative relations with the United States and the rest of the world, the U.S. should welcome and encourage that shift. But progress should be judged by a change of program, not of tone.

The heart of the problem is Iran's construction of a massive nuclear infrastructure and stockpile of enriched uranium far out of proportion to

any plausible civilian energy-production rationale. Iran amassed the majority of this capacity—including 19,000 centrifuges, more than seven tons of 3.5%- to 5%-enriched uranium, a smaller stock (about 196 kilograms) of 20%-enriched uranium, and a partly built heavy-water reactor that will be capable of producing plutonium—in direct violation of IAEA and Security Council resolutions.

Efforts to resolve this issue through negotiation have a long pedigree. They began in 2003, after the revelation that Iran had been secretly constructing a uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy-water reactor at Arak. They have continued on and off in different permutations, with the Geneva negotiations the most recent and fullest expression.

The record of this decade-plus negotiating effort combines steadily advancing Iranian nuclear capabilities with gradually receding international demands. A negotiation begun by the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany, with the backing of the U.S.) started from the position that, in light of Iran's record of nondisclosure of nuclear matters and its noncompliance with [REDACTED] resolutions, any Iranian uranium enrichment or plutonium-production capability was unacceptable. Following the revelation of the Natanz and Arak facilities, the IAEA board of governors adopted a 2003 resolution expressing "grave concern" and calling on Iran to "suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities" and "any reprocessing activities." The resolution called it "essential and urgent" for Iran to provide unrestricted access to IAEA inspectors, and requested that Iran "promptly and unconditionally sign, ratify and fully implement" an additional protocol to its Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards.

Nearly every year since then, the Western powers—first through the EU-3 and then through the P5+1 (the permanent members of the Security Council, including China and Russia, plus Germany)—offered Iran diplomatic and technical inducements to take account of Iran's announced aspiration to become a technologically advanced country. These countries put forward programs of technical assistance and nuclear fuel for a verifiably civilian Iranian nuclear program.

Iran rejected the proposals and accelerated its nuclear efforts. It periodically engaged in talks but never dismantled any aspect of its enrichment infrastructure or growing stockpile of fissile material. Six [REDACTED] Security Council resolutions passed in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010

condemned Iran's defiance and imposed sanctions, demanding an unconditional halt to nuclear enrichment.

The interim agreement reached on Nov. 24, though described by all sides as temporary, thus represents a crucial test of whether the seemingly inexorable progress to an Iranian military nuclear capability can be reversed. In exchange for an estimated \$8 billion in sanctions relief, Iran will freeze for six months its existing nuclear program and stockpile, but through an unusually circuitous mechanism that reflects its determination to continue to enrich.

Iran has been permitted during the interim agreement to continue to add to its existing stockpile of seven tons of 3.5%- to 5%-enriched uranium with the proviso that this stockpile must be reduced again to its original level by the end of six months. (This means that Iran retains the additional enriched material throughout most of the agreement, adding to its leverage in the follow-up negotiations.) Iran has agreed to "neutralize" its small stockpile of 20%-enriched uranium by converting it to an oxide by the end of the agreement, though Iran retains the technical capability to enrich an equivalent stockpile at a later date. Progress on a heavy-water reactor and plutonium-reprocessing facility at Arak has been paused, though it appears that ancillary work on the site will continue. Daily inspections are stipulated to verify Iran's compliance while the interim deal is in force. A modest benefit of the Geneva agreement is that it achieves, albeit temporarily, a small lengthening of the "breakout" time Iran would need to construct a nuclear weapon by several weeks, as described by administration spokesmen. American diplomacy in the next phase will need to grapple with the challenge that this gain has come at the price of a subtle but fundamental change in the conceptual basis of the nuclear standoff.

Until now, the [REDACTED] resolutions and IAEA directives have demanded an immediate halt to all activities related to uranium enrichment and plutonium production, and unconditional compliance with an IAEA inspections regime as a matter of right. Under the interim agreement, Iranian conduct that was previously condemned as illegal and illegitimate has effectively been recognized as a baseline, including an acceptance of Iran's continued enrichment of uranium (to 5%) during the agreement period. And that baseline program is of strategic significance. For Iran's

stockpile of low-enriched uranium is coupled with an infrastructure sufficient to enrich it within a few months to weapons-grade, as well as a plausible route to producing weapons-grade plutonium in the installation now being built at Arak.

Not surprisingly, the Iranian negotiator, upon his return to Tehran, described the agreement as giving Iran its long-claimed right to enrich and, in effect, eliminating the American threat of using force as a last resort. In these circumstances, the major American negotiating leverage—the threatened reimposition and strengthening of sanctions—risks losing its edge. For individuals, companies and countries (including some allied countries), the loss of business with Iran has been economically significant. Most will be less vigilant about enforcing or abiding by sanctions that are the subject of negotiations and that seem to be "on the way out." This risk will be enhanced if the impression takes hold that the U.S. has already decided to reorient its Middle East policy toward rapprochement with Iran. The temptation will be to move first, to avoid being the last party to restore or build trade, investment and political ties.

Therefore, too, the proposition that a series of interim agreements balancing nuclear constraints against tranches of sanctions relief is almost certainly impractical. Another tranche would spell the end of the sanctions regime. It will need to be part of a final agreement.

The danger of the present dynamic is that it threatens the outcome of Iran as a threshold nuclear weapons state. If the six-month "freeze" period secured in Geneva is to be something other than a tactical pause on Iran's march toward a military nuclear capability, Iran's technical ability to construct a nuclear weapon must be meaningfully curtailed in the next stipulated negotiation through a strategically significant reduction in the number of centrifuges, restrictions on its installation of advanced centrifuges, and a foreclosure of its route toward a plutonium-production capability. Activity must be limited to a plausible civilian program subject to comprehensive monitoring as required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Any final deal must ensure the world's ability to detect a move toward a nuclear breakout, lengthen the world's time to react, and underscore its determination to do so. The preservation of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and the avoidance of a Middle East nuclear-arms race hang in the balance.

American diplomacy now has three major tasks: to define a level of Iranian nuclear capacity limited to plausible civilian uses and to achieve safeguards to ensure that this level is not exceeded; to leave open the possibility of a genuinely constructive relationship with Iran; and to design a Middle East policy adjusted to new circumstances.

Some adjustments are inherent in the inevitable process of historic evolution. But we must avoid an outcome in which Iran, freed from an onerous sanctions regime, emerges as a de facto nuclear power leading an Islamist camp, while traditional allies lose confidence in the credibility of American commitments and follow the Iranian model toward a nuclear-weapons capability, if only to balance it.

The next six months of diplomacy will be decisive in determining whether the Geneva agreement opens the door to a potential diplomatic breakthrough or to ratifying a major strategic setback. We should be open to the possibility of pursuing an agenda of long-term cooperation. But not without Iran dismantling or mothballing a strategically significant portion of its nuclear infrastructure.

*Mr. Kissinger is a former U.S. secretary of state (1973-77); Mr. Shultz is a former U.S. secretary of state (1982-89).*

[Article 2.](#)

The Daily Beast

## **Memo to Bibi Netanyahu: It's Time to Build an Arsenal of Awe**

Lloyd Green

December 2nd 2013 -- So your Plan A on Iran—a U.S. strike—isn't going to work. Time for Plan B: Work with the U.S. on joint technology investment and deployment to safeguard against asymmetrical attacks. Bibi, you're off your game—Plan A didn't work. The United States and the rest of the ██████████ Security Council have lined up in favor of a [deal with Iran](#). Within the U.S., the policy elites are [squarely behind the president](#), and the public either is [tepidly divided](#), or [lukewarmly supportive](#) of the interim accord on enrichment. Either way, Republicans and Democrats alike are

not keen on another war. So with Plan A, an American strike against Iran, off the table, it is time to explore Plan B.

Plan B? Yes, a Plan B, one that places more stock in patient strategy as opposed to impatient action. Israel needs to regain its technological edge in military matters, and it needs America to regain its tech edge, too. Israel can't afford wars of attrition with Arabs who are 50 times more numerous, and the U.S. has shown, in Iraq and now Afghanistan, that it won't sustain such quagmires.

It's time to return to technology and guile as the cornerstones of Israeli policy.

Over the last two decades, Israeli deterrence has eroded. Yes, Israel has nukes, and that technology has made Israel safe from symmetrical attack. But what about asymmetrical attacks, where the use of nuclear weapons is inappropriate? Here, the record isn't so good. Since the 1991 Gulf War, Israel's vulnerability to missile strikes has been an Achilles' heel. When you're handing out [gas masks](#) to your own population, you're not winning. The 2006 Lebanon war [made the shortcomings of the Israel Defense Forces' ground game manifest](#). Israel has been unwilling to commit ground troops to uprooting Hezbollah positions, and yet at the same time, Israel lacks the technology to prevent Hezbollah rockets from hitting Israel. And today, Hezbollah has more rockets threatening Israeli than seven years ago. During Israel's 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense, Israel's [Iron Dome system](#) successfully destroyed [no more than 40 percent of incoming warheads fired from Gaza](#). This is not the Israel of high intelligence, high technology, or high performance.

And the U.S. too is bogged down in a similar low-grade and low-tech dance. China and the U.S. are playing cat and mouse in the Senkaku Islands, and [China does not seem to be backing down. For its part](#), the U.S. doesn't seem able to impress technologically the way it once did.

Uncle Sam sent a pair of unarmed B-52 bombers into disputed airspace? Not exactly fear-inspiring. But a fleet of unmanned aircraft, capable of delivering high-yield killer payloads faster than the speed of sound—now that would have been an attention-grabber.

Unfortunately, the Pentagon appears more concerned about the impact of sequestration on U.S. Army ground forces than it does in developing and

deploying technology to project American might. Note to the Pentagon: If America gets into a conflict with China, such forces are irrelevant.

As for President Obama, well, he's proved himself irrelevant to technological discussions. From Solyndra to HealthCare.gov, his tech-strategy acumen leaves a bit to be desired.

As for the Iranians, I think we both know they are going to get a bomb one of these days. You care about that. All friends of Israel should care about that. However, the P-5+1 doesn't really care.

And in the meantime, Israel seems to lack the technology either to eliminate the Iranian bomb or to defend against it. That's a problem, and that's the challenge.

As for the Palestinians, they hate you, and now an al Qaeda-linked cell has [found a West Bank home](#). Paeans to patrimony and to the sanctity of land are good at rallying the faithful not only for Jews, but also Arabs.

In his recent book, [Startup Rising: The Entrepreneurial Revolution Remaking the Middle East](#), Chris Schroeder, an aide back in the day to Secretary of State James A. Baker III and now a tech entrepreneur, makes clear that the startup impulse is showing signs of life in the Arab world. Left unsaid is that technological innovation frequently comes with dual capabilities, including military use.

Still, Israel retains technological superiority and a GDP growing at 3.4 percent annually. Recently, [Apple paid about \\$350 million](#) for Israel-based PrimeSense Ltd., whose technology drives the gesture controls in Xbox Kinect. Tel Aviv is now [ranked 32nd as a world financial center](#), ahead of Melbourne, Munich and Rome. So you have resources.

Bibi, it's time to shoot for the stars and reach out to your American friends. If using U.S. forces to "liberate" Israel's enemies is no longer an option, and if Israel is vulnerable to a rising tide of Iranian and Arab technology, then you only have one course: Get better at technology. Enlist Israel's supporters in a quest for sustained technological superiority against Iran, China, everyone.

It's what the U.S. needs, too, to retain its status as the leading superpower. And as you know, Israel's survival depends on America staying No. 1. So Bibi, use your clout with Congress to get the Americans to do what's best for them—and for you. Get them to see the strategic situation in a new way.

After all, the [Reuters poll showing American approval for the Iranian deal](#) also showed that support for Israel is widespread. Given all these data points, joint American-Israeli development of a smorgasbord of high-tech weaponry is a military and political imperative.

An electromagnetic shield could potentially halt incoming projectiles launched from Gaza, Tehran, or North Korea. A swarm of insect-size nano-drones could compensate for lack of familiarity with terrain and [difficulties in attracting recruits](#) for Israel's combat units.

Mr. Prime Minister, imagine drones and robots replacing Israeli soldiers in the West Bank. That would make the occupation easier, at least optically. It's what the U.S. should have had in Iraq and Afghanistan from the start, before the casualties started to mount.

Israel and the U.S. have a life-and-death interest in maintaining their technological advantage. Joint development of an Arsenal of Awe should become a priority for both countries. With a two-state solution appearing ever more distant and the U.S. facing new threats over the horizon, technology investment and deployment are "must-dos" for both countries.

*Lloyd Green was the opposition research counsel to the George H.W. Bush campaign in 1988, and served in the Department of Justice between 1990 and 1992.*

[Article 3.](#)

Washington Post

## **Ousting Assad may be only the beginning**

[David Ignatius](#)

As al-Qaeda grows more powerful in Syria — seeking “complete control over the liberated areas,” according to a new Syrian rebel intelligence report — moderate opposition leaders are voicing new interest in a political settlement of the grinding civil war. But a peace agreement may just be a prelude to a new war against the terrorists.

This search for a political transition has also drawn together a disparate group of nations, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia and the United States. These nations met quietly in Geneva on Nov. 21 to discuss ways to

provide humanitarian relief for thousands of civilians who face the threat of starvation this winter.

Negotiations have focused on providing supplies to civilians trapped in three areas: the old city of Homs, in central Syria; the town of Darayya, about six miles southwest of Damascus; and the town of Moadamiyeh, about eight miles southwest of the capital. A relief working group has been coordinated by [Valerie Amos](#), the United Nations' emergency relief coordinator.

The raw materials for peace negotiations are there. But as always in the tragic Syrian conflict, the forces of sectarian hatred and political inertia seem stronger. The two-year failure to find an exit is leading to what observers predict could be a humanitarian disaster this winter, with the loss of tens of thousands of lives.

[Gen. Salim Idriss](#), the commander of the moderate Free Syrian Army, said in a telephone interview Monday that he's prepared to join the so-called Geneva 2 peace negotiations [scheduled for Jan. 21](#) if the Syrian regime will agree to confidence-building measures such as a humanitarian relief corridor to besieged areas.

Idriss didn't demand as a precondition that President Bashar al-Assad resign before negotiations begin. Instead, he said, Assad's departure should come "at the end of negotiations." This position was echoed by [Monzer Akbik](#), a spokesman for the Syrian Opposition Council, the moderate rebels' political arm.

Idriss stressed the threat posed by the al-Qaeda affiliate known as the "[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria](#)," or ISIS. He said that the group was "very dangerous for the future of Syria" and that, after Assad's departure, the Free Syrian Army would be ready to join the regular Syrian army in fighting them.

An intelligence report prepared for the State Department by Idriss's colleagues paints a frightening picture of the growth of ISIS. According to this document, the group now includes about 5,500 foreign fighters, who "form the main backbone of ISIS in its sensitive operations."

These foreign jihadists are recruited from their home countries by a network headed by a fighter known as Abu Ahmad al-Iraqi. Once they reach Syria, "the fighters are constantly fitted with explosive vests and threaten all who dare to confront them," according to the intelligence

report. The “most dangerous and barbaric” of these al-Qaeda fighters are about 250 Chechens, based in the suburbs of Aleppo and coordinated by an operative known as Abu Omar al-Chechani, the report says.

Joining this core group of foreign fighters are about 2,000 young ideological recruits, drawn mostly from northern Syria. Another 15,000 fighters support the group “out of fear or greed.” These include fighters from 14 Sunni tribes in the Raqqah area and eight tribes from Deir al-Zour, both in the northeast.

“ISIS employs the policy of kidnapping in the areas in which it is deployed,” warns the intelligence report. The group’s prisons hold more than 35 foreign journalists, 60 Syrian political activists and more than 100 Free Syrian Army fighters. It also controls key areas along the Turkish-Syrian border, where it lies in wait for kidnap victims.

Idriss said the Free Syrian Army is trying to fight a two-front war, battling al-Qaeda fighters at 24 locations over the past six months and fighting Assad’s army. The CIA is said to be training about 200 fighters for Idriss each month, though the commander wouldn’t acknowledge this support.

Asked about U.S. tactical advice to stage more “hit and run” guerrilla operations, Idriss said he had advised his recruits “to fight in small groups and hit targets and move — and not try to control the land.”

The two tracks — fighting and negotiating — sound good in principle. But the rebels haven’t been strong enough to make either approach work, and the United States hasn’t been ready to provide the necessary additional firepower. There’s more support now for a political settlement at a Geneva 2 conference, but it’s clear that even if Assad leaves, a second Syrian war against al-Qaeda is ahead.

[Article 4.](#)

Al-Monitor

## **Allen mission key to Israeli-Palestinian security talks**

[Geoffrey Aronson](#)

December 2, 2013 -- Lots of ink has been devoted to the formal negotiations that commenced in midsummer between Israeli and

Palestinian negotiators. An arguably more important undertaking, however, has been led by recently retired four-star Marine Corps Gen. [John R. Allen](#), former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, to come up with a made-in-America solution to Israel's security needs on its "eastern front" — across the Jordan River eastward to Iraq and Iran. Unlike the diplomatic track, whose failure to get out of neutral is subject to much informed and uninformed commentary, Allen's effort has largely succeeded in maintaining a low public and political profile.

Summary [Print](#) Gen. John Allen, former commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, quietly pursues the security talks required to support an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

Author [Geoffrey Aronson](#) Posted December 2, 2013

This is in inverse proportion to the issue at hand. Allen and a team drawn largely from the ranks of serving US military officers are in the broadest sense trying to define the security architecture of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, particularly as it relates to Israel's strategic security. He is looking at how Israel's security can be increased as part of an agreement — through redeployment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) behind recognized borders and the creation of a third-party monitoring presence. His recommendations were passed on to Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, IDF chief of staff .

The United States has traditionally bowed to Israel's own expansive assessments on this issue, so the very fact that US policymakers are instructing their own generals and colonels to think critically about defining and addressing Israel's security needs is a topic of concern to many Israeli officials and politicians, who will not easily surrender their absolute control of both the negotiating agenda or its practical elements. It is difficult to measure Allen's effort directly. But it is possible to see evidence of the consternation it is causing in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's effort to [challenge the notions](#) at the heart of Allen's and more broadly the Kerry-led policy to facilitate a negotiated agreement. So, for example, Netanyahu has wrapped himself in the revered mantle of slain Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the leader most associated with Israel's uneven reconciliation with Palestinian nationalism, in reiterating opposition to any significant change in Israel's military presence in and control over the Jordan Valley.

At a Knesset meeting in October marking the 18th anniversary of the Rabin's assassination Netanyahu declared, "Our strength is the guarantee for our existence and peace. We do not want an Iranian offshoot in Judea and Samaria. This requires a [security border](#) in the Jordan Valley, as Rabin said in his last speech."

In a May 2011 appearance before the US Congress, long before Allen's appointment, Netanyahu insisted that "it's therefore vital — absolutely vital — that a Palestinian state be [fully demilitarized](#), and it's vital — absolutely vital — that Israel maintain a long-term military presence along the Jordan River."

And last month, citing concerns about an influx of refugees and terrorists from Syria, Netanyahu raised the prospect of constructing a new and improved barrier along the Jordan River.

Peace requires that the sides agree on "a security [framework] that can defend the peace and defend the state of Israel in case that peace frays. These security arrangements are important to us, and we continue to insist strongly on them," Netanyahu told a weekly cabinet meeting.

The security arrangements "will no doubt include many things," Netanyahu added, "but first among them will be that the state of Israel's [security border remains](#) along the Jordan [River]."

According to the report in Maariv on Nov. 3, "In Netanyahu's eyes, creation of a fence may also send a message to the Palestinians opposed to an Israeli presence along the Jordan River and its control of the border crossings that Israel intends to defend its eastern border in the Valley and that it has no intention to evacuate in any agreement whatsoever."

The announcement of support for a barrier separating the Jordan Valley from Jordan reflects political as much as security concerns. Indeed, for decades Israel derided the concept of physical barriers along its de facto borders as limiting both its territorial aspirations and freedom of military action, a view that is reflected today in the refusal of some West Bank settlements to build fences around their undefined perimeters.

Israel in recent years has nonetheless adopted a strategy of creating physical barriers around its entire perimeter — from Gaza in the south to the "blue line" separating Lebanon from Israel in the north. The construction of a barrier in the Golan Heights has been announced. The separation barrier in the West Bank is too a material reflection of Israel's

new focus on defensive operational strategy, framed as part, however, of an aggressive political intention to unilaterally determine the borders of the state.

Netanyahu's push-back in the face of a US diplomatic initiative to challenge this prerogative is not unexpected.

An earlier, similar US effort was attempted during the administration of President George W. Bush. In the wake of the Annapolis conference in November 2007 Bush appointed another Marine Corps general with an outsized reputation, James Jones, to “fly at 30,000 feet” to scope out how best to structure a security regime as part of a final status agreement. Jones, like Allen, assembled a US military team, and a draft report was duly presented to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who put it in drawer where it promptly disappeared. As the Annapolis effort progressed, Jones’ mission lost its initial focus. Instead of planning for security in the context of peace, its mandate was narrowed to improving the security environment on the ground in and around the market town of Jenin — from an Israeli perspective a far more manageable and acceptable objective. Allen’s effort could suffer the fate of the Jones mission, becoming yet another victim of US intentions undermined by a loss of focus and lack of commitment to achieving the objective.

There is good reason to believe however, that there will be a happier ending to this story. For a start, the Obama administration finds itself today leading a [broad reappraisal](#) of key security principles throughout the region — most notably toward Iran. While no one is contemplating a diminution of US support for Israel’s security, it would be foolish to assume that the goal of increasing Israeli security by agreement with Iran would not have an impact on a US assessment of Israel’s security requirements on its eastern front. US and many Israeli security professionals have long believed that Israel’s demand for a controlling presence beyond secure and recognized borders poses a fundamentally destabilizing challenge to any agreement with the Palestinians, and that there are better ways of meeting legitimate Israeli concerns that would increase Israel’s security and also enable the state of Palestine — with Israel’s support and that of the international community to exercise sovereign control over its territory. Palestinians and other Arab neighbors have been excluded from Allen’s mission, which remains focused on establishing a US view of Israel’s

security requirements in an era of peace and introducing these concepts to skeptical and wary Israelis.

*[Geoffrey Aronson](#) has long been active in [Track II](#) diplomatic efforts on various Middle East issues. He writes widely on regional affairs and is the author of *From Sideshow to Center Stage: US Policy Towards Egypt, 1945–1955*.*

[Article 5.](#)

Bloomberg

## **Middle East Mess Isn't About Settlements**

Jeffrey Goldberg

Dec 2, 2013 -- In [an interview](#) with Charles Gati in Politico Magazine, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as national security adviser to Jimmy Carter, proves once again that he is a man of profound religious faith. He worships at the Church of Linkage, which holds that Israel's settlement policy on the West Bank is the primary cause of Middle East instability and a principal cause -- if not the main cause -- of the U.S.'s troubles in the Muslim world.

Before I go on, the usual caveats: The settlement project -- especially those settlements far from Jerusalem that have been planted in the middle of thickly populated Palestinian areas -- is a strategic and moral disaster for Israel. The settlements should be dismantled. They threaten Israel's standing in the world; they threaten to undermine the very nature and purpose of Israel. And so on. I've [written](#) before about the threat that settlements pose, at great length.

But there is danger in thinking that the removal of these settlements would bring about a liberal, enlightened Middle East. The danger is analytical: If you don't understand what ails the Middle East, how can you possibly fix it? It is also dangerous to scapegoat Israel for problems it didn't cause, in the same way that it has historically been quite dangerous to blame the Jewish people for problems they didn't cause. Brzezinski's native Poland provides lessons in this regard.

Brzezinski has had hard feelings toward Israel for years, and he has been consistent in suggesting that American Jews possess too much political power. In Politico, he asserts in drive-by fashion -- which is to say without offering proof to buttress his contention -- that “the Jewish community is the most active political community in American society.”

Here is what Brzezinski told Politico about President Barack Obama’s failure to force Israel to permanently freeze settlements: “At a critical juncture he failed to show he had steel in his back, he failed to follow through. He spoke on the record and very sensibly about the settlements, but when a confrontation developed between him and [Israeli prime minister Benjamin] Netanyahu, Obama caved in. That has contributed significantly to the general mess we now have in the Middle East.”

Brzezinski is referring to one of Obama’s earliest confrontations with Netanyahu. Early in his first term, the president demanded that Israel stop building in the settlements as a confidence-building measure in advance of peace negotiations. Israel gave in partially, but only partially, and when settlement building continued, Obama offered rhetoric but did nothing concrete to shape Israel's behavior.

Obama’s mistake was to make a public demand of an ally (and a client) and then have no Plan B ready when that ally refused to listen.

Netanyahu’s unwillingness to reverse himself on settlements -- an unwillingness born of careerism as much as anything else (his governing coalition includes a disproportionate number of settlers and their sympathizers) -- has hurt Israel, but has it actually, as Brzezinski alleges, “contributed significantly to the general mess we now have in the Middle East”?

Let’s look at the Middle East as it is today. Here is a partial catalog of phenomena that plausibly illustrate the idea that the Middle East is a “general mess”:

1. Tensions over Iran’s nuclear program. Jewish settlements did not provoke Iranian leaders to build the infrastructure of a nuclear weapons program. Regional ambitions, fear of American domination, a desire to counterbalance Saudi Arabia and opposition to Israel’s existence (as opposed to its settlement policy) have all contributed to Iran’s nuclear policy decision making.

2. The broad anger directed at the U.S. by the governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Egypt. Though these governments pay lip service to the Palestinian cause, the source of their current anger with the U.S. stems from the Obama administration's decision to negotiate with Iran.
3. The Syrian civil war, in which more than 100,000 people have died so far. The Syrian cataclysm does not appear to be traceable to Israel's West Bank settlement policy or Obama's failure to challenge it.
4. The regionwide schism between Sunni and Shia Muslims, which manifests itself in violence and disorder, not only in Syria, but also in Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq and, beyond the Middle East, in Pakistan. This schism does not seem to be caused by settlements.
5. The slow-motion collapse, amid horrendous violence, of Iraq as a unitary state. A settlement freeze on the West Bank will not stop the dissolution of Iraq.
6. Continued political instability and violence in Egypt. Tensions among Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers, advocates of liberalism and the Egyptian military would not be ameliorated by a settlement freeze. The overthrow of former President Hosni Mubarak was not prompted by Obama's failure to confront settlements. Nor was the subsequent coup launched against the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Mursi triggered by settlements.
7. Libya's descent into gangsterism and chaos. The civil war that led to the ouster and death of Muammar Qaddafi was not caused by settlements. Nor was the fatal attack on the American consulate in Benghazi. It is difficult to imagine how a settlement freeze on the West Bank would stabilize Libya.
8. The proliferation, from Somalia to Yemen to Syria to Pakistan, of al-Qaeda-affiliated and -inspired groups. Settlements have not "contributed significantly" to persistent al-Qaeda activity. It could be argued that the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East is one of several sources of anger for al-Qaeda sympathizers, but a settlement freeze, as opposed to the elimination of Israel as a country, would not affect the views of radical Sunni terrorists. It could also be argued that the annihilation of Israel would empower radical terrorists by making them believe that they were one step closer to the establishment of a global caliphate.

9. Pathological misogyny that impoverishes the lives of millions and weakens countries that would otherwise be able to tap into the brainpower of their women. A settlement freeze would not lead to the widespread liberation of women.

10. The persecution of Christians in a dozen countries across the Muslim world, which will eventually lead to the elimination of these ancient communities. This persecution was not caused by Netanyahu's recalcitrance on settlements.

And so on. I've neglected to mention such issues as literacy, water shortages, corruption, education stagnation, torture and the suppression of free speech, all of which contribute to general instability in the Middle East. The willingness of esteemed foreign-policy thinkers such as Brzezinski to scapegoat the Jewish state for problems it did not cause is myopic and dangerous.

[Article 6.](#)

NYT

## **Gaza Need Not Be a Sewer**

Alon Tal and Yousef Abu-Mayla

December 2, 2013 -- For two decades, Palestinian and Israeli environmentalists set aside their differences to call for urgent measures to address the impending water crisis in the Gaza Strip. These calls went unheeded. The price of inaction, protracted conflict and unsustainable policies is being paid today by the 1.7 million residents of Gaza, who face catastrophic conditions thanks to the collapse of Gaza's sewage system. Since the Israeli and Egyptian blockade, Gaza has not had sufficient fuel to sustain its electricity supply and keep its 290 water and sewage facilities running. The Hamas government refuses to buy alternative fuels, because taxes on these would go to the rival Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority. As a result, pumping stations ceased operation in November, and many streets in southern Gaza City are now inundated with human excrement. Residents must sandbag their homes so they won't be flooded by raw sewage. The stench is intolerable. With the pumping stations out of action, fresh water will soon cease to reach taps at all.

The health impact is already apparent. According to a recent Unicef survey, 20 percent of Gazan children suffer from waterborne diseases. Without remedial action, the situation will only get worse.

Aside from humanitarian decency, there are ample pragmatic reasons for Israel to be concerned. Every day, 3.5 million cubic feet of sewage pours into the Mediterranean. Israel's own drinking water supply is increasingly dependent on seawater desalination. One of its largest facilities, in Ashkelon, is just a few miles north along the coast from Gaza. Erecting a fence can prevent terrorist infiltration, but it can't stop the flow of feces. This sewage crisis is only the most acute manifestation of Gaza's hydrological nightmare. Pressure on water resources long since became unsustainable. Historically, Gaza obtained its water from a shallow aquifer below its sandy soils. This aquifer was already overexploited before 1967, when Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip, and extensive contamination by seawater occurred. Its annual recharge from rainfall is no more than 1.8 to 1.9 billion cubic feet, but Gaza's rapidly growing population uses more than 6 billion cubic feet of water a year. This mounting deficit exacerbates the problem: Last year, the United Nations reported that 95 percent of the aquifer's water was unfit for human consumption because of pollution from seawater intrusion, fertilizers and sewage. Demand is expected to increase by 60 percent by 2020.

Well aware that the water in their taps makes them sick, many Gaza residents purchase bottled and filtered water at considerable cost. Others take matters into their own hands. After the 2005 Israeli withdrawal, thousands of unregistered wells were drilled in Gaza — causing water tables and water quality to decline still further.

Gaza's water crisis can be tackled, but fundamental change is necessary to begin the slow process of aquifer restoration. Water demand needs to be controlled effectively. A reduction can be achieved by better conservation in domestic supply and in agriculture, while new infrastructure will save on loss through leaks in the municipal system. But technical fixes alone won't reduce demand as long as Gaza's population continues to grow at a steep annual rate of 3.2 percent.

A complete moratorium on groundwater extraction is imperative. Gaza's water should come from alternative sources, such as comprehensive programs to collect roof rainwater and catch runoff from streets. Sewage

treatment should be upgraded so that wastewater can be reused in agriculture (as is done in water-stressed states like Texas and Arizona). Finally, most of Gaza's water should come from the sea. Desalination has been done since Roman times. Today, economies of scale and improvements in reverse-osmosis technology have reduced the price of desalinated water significantly. Israel's water authority reports that, on average, each of Israel's five major facilities can produce 1,000 liters of water for roughly 60 cents.

For over 20 years, a major desalination plant for Gaza has been discussed, but nothing has been done. Large desalination facilities could easily provide Gazans with affordable potable water. There are several small pilot plants already operating, most sponsored by international agencies, but they can meet only a fraction of present demand.

The Palestinian water authority has approved a large-scale \$500 million facility, which Israel supports. And Israel has quietly begun to offer Palestinians desalination training. With funding doubtful, though, construction delays continue.

The other obstacle is that desalination plants require large amounts of electricity, which is in short supply in Gaza, where much of the power is still provided by Israel's utility company. The festering conflict between Israel and Gaza's government does not help the situation, even though Israel remains committed to selling power to the Palestinian territories, including Gaza. Israel continues to sell water to Gaza, and both parties have agreed on a pipeline that will double the amount of water supplied to the Gaza Strip.

Of course, just this sort of good will might smooth a path to progress in the vexed Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. But with no sign of any meaningful advance in the negotiations, it is time to think about decoupling the water conflict from other, more intractable issues. The interim water accord signed in 1995 needs to reflect Gaza's new realities, but there is no reason its people should lack basic water resources.

The United Nations Environmental Program warns that if present trends continue, the Gaza aquifer may be irreversibly damaged by 2020. This is one area where the international community could get involved to bring a meaningful improvement to Palestinians' quality of life. That, at least, would decontaminate a perilously toxic environment.

*Alon Tal of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev is a visiting professor at the Center for Conservation Biology at Stanford University. Yousef Abu-Mayla is a water expert at Al Azhar University in Gaza.*

[Article 7.](#)

Spiegel

## **Cold War in the Pacific: China Escalates Tensions with Neighbors**

Hans Hoyng, Wieland Wagner and [Bernhard Zand](#)

12/02/2013 -- Beijing's recent establishment of a new air defense zone in the East China Sea is exacerbating long-running disputes with its neighbors Japan and Taiwan -- and threatens to draw the US military into a larger regional conflict.

If it were only a matter of distance, the solution to a dispute over a small group of hotly contested islands in the East China Sea would be simple. Taiwan, which is just 200 kilometers (125 miles) away from the islands, would take the prize. The Chinese mainland is farther off, at 330 kilometers away, and the Japanese island of Okinawa even more distant, at 400 kilometers. Why then shouldn't small Taiwan take control of the five uninhabited islands and three rock outcroppings, known as the Diaoyu in China and Senkaku in Japan?

While Taiwan does lay claim to the islands, so do its more powerful neighbors, China and Japan. And the dispute is, unfortunately, not about distance. It has to do with influence and natural resources, with hegemony and nationalism, and with bitter historical memories and fresh, global aspirations -- in short, it's a toxic mixture of geopolitics. In fact, a military crisis is brewing in East Asia -- one that is being played out hundreds to thousands of kilometers away from these desolate islands.

### **A New Air Defense Zone**

In Beijing, 1,600 kilometers to the northwest of the islands, the Defense Ministry announced a surprise decision a week ago Saturday to establish an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea. The ministry said all

aircraft that fly into the defined area will now be required to declare their intentions and adhere to the orders of Chinese air traffic controllers.

Two days later in Washington, 12,500 kilometers to the east of the disputed islands, US President Barack Obama challenged the Chinese move by sending two unarmed B-52 long-range bombers into the new zone. The aircraft took off from an air force base on the American island of Guam and, a few hours later, penetrated the Chinese surveillance zone without notifying Beijing. B-52s are designed to carry nuclear bombs to their targets. It was a strong signal.

When news of these US flights broke, it boosted confidence in Tokyo (1,800 kilometers away from the islands) and in Seoul (1,400 kilometers away). Since then, Japan and South Korea have also dispatched military aircraft into the Chinese zone. China responded by placing its air force on alert and sending up fighter jets to escort Japanese and American planes. The situation begs an obvious question: What happens if a foreign fighter jet and a Chinese interceptor meet and one of the pilots loses his nerve?

#### Strategic Obsession

All of the players involved -- except China -- have concluded that Beijing's actions could jeopardize peace in East Asia. All it takes is for someone to make a sudden move. According to the Financial Times, retired Admiral William Fallon, the former commander of US armed forces in the Pacific, called the dispute "absolutely unnecessary," adding that "If you send up fighters, it is another opportunity for people to screw up." His comment was apparently aimed at all the parties involved: the Chinese, the Japanese, the South Koreans and the Americans.

This week, US Vice President Joe Biden is set to visit Beijing. This was initially intended to be a relaxed meeting with President Xi Jinping, whom Biden knows well. But instead Obama's deputy now has to consider some serious questions: Could the Far East actually stumble into a war? What is driving the parties involved in this island dispute, which has been smoldering for decades, and is now threatening to become extremely dangerous? And what can the US do to avert an escalation?

China's motives in this conflict are clear: One year ago, the country surpassed the US as the world's largest trading nation, and 90 percent of Chinese exports are shipped by sea. At the same time, the rapidly growing country has been racing to establish its naval presence, just as the German

Empire did over 100 years ago. Yet it bothers Beijing's military leaders that Chinese access to the Pacific is blocked by a chain of islands and peninsulas that are controlled by American allies.

The so-called "first island chain" has become a strategic obsession for the Chinese. China's navy celebrates maneuvers in which its ships sail out into the Pacific -- as the aircraft carrier Liaoning did last week -- as the "breakthrough" of this chain. Right in the middle of this chain, only 600 kilometers from the bustling port of Shanghai, lie the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.

In the eyes of China's military, logic dictates that the country should gradually expand its airspace to include these islands; they view all objections from competitors as pure envy. "America is applying a double standard," says Chinese Major General Lou Yuan. "The US has surrounded itself with exclusion zones and demands of others that they identify themselves. Yet their aircraft refuse to call in. This is totally overbearing!" The strategic fixation with the islands has also become a political one that extends beyond the narrow sphere of the military. Many mainstream bloggers in the country also vehemently criticize China's biggest rival, while supporting China's alleged right to self-assertion. "The Americans are like spoiled teenagers," writes blogger Jiangchen-jc, who argues that "they have to challenge others in order to prove their uniqueness." The timing is most convenient for China's new political leadership. By taking a hardline approach on foreign and defense policy, it can now silence critics who suspected that the government had become too liberal with recent sweeping economic and social reforms.

### Demonstrating Chinese Resolve

China's simplest means of demonstrating its resolve in the current nationalistic climate in East Asia is to take a tough stance against Japan. Neither the perpetrators nor the victims have come to terms with the years of occupation -- and the war crimes committed -- by the Japanese on Chinese soil during World War II. It is easy for China's leaders to score political points against the Japanese in a bout of saber-rattling. Meanwhile, Tokyo is reveling in the US show of strength in the Pacific, taking it as a sign of solidarity. From Japan's perspective, China's efforts to expand its air defense zone have backfired. Beijing's unilateral action

instead forced the Americans to more declaratively take sides with the Japanese in the ongoing island dispute.

The Obama administration had generally refrained from getting too deeply involved in the conflict. And even though the White House left little doubt last week that the Senkaku islands fall under the protection of the US-Japanese military alliance, it also stopped short of overtly taking sides with Japan. Furthermore, thanks to its own flyover, the US Air Force preempted a Japanese reaction, which Beijing might have responded to in a more aggressive manner. Japan, which maintains a strong, highly advanced army, would prove to be a significant opponent for China in the event of an outright military conflict. What's more, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has expressed a desire to water down his country's strictly pacifist constitution.

### US 'Pivots' to Asia

In 2011, Obama announced a "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific region, shifting the American approach to China. The move was seen as a way of not only continuing US cooperation with China, but also containing Beijing's power in the region. "As a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future," Obama said.

US reengagement in the Asia-Pacific also referred to America's military presence. General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Obama's chief military adviser says, "The US military will be obliged to overtly confront China as it faced down the Soviet Union." By 2020, the Pentagon intends to station roughly 60 percent of its naval military forces in the Pacific, including six aircraft carriers and numerous destroyers, cruisers and submarines.

In 2011, the US began to expand its military presence in Australia, the first US military buildup in the Pacific since the Vietnam War. In the future, up to four US warships will be allowed to moor in the city-state of Singapore. Since 2011, former wartime opponent Vietnam has allowed the US Navy to use the port of Cam Ranh Bay.

Meanwhile, the Philippines are likely to become America's most important partner in a separate, but similar, conflict over disputed islands in the South China Sea. Some 40 percent of international maritime trade passes through those contested waters.

Washington and Manila have been negotiating since August on stationing more US Marines in the country. Filipino Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin has already announced that the US will in the future inform his country's armed forces if Chinese ships enter territorial waters claimed by Manila. In exchange, US warships will soon be able return to Subic Bay, a Filipino naval station that the US Navy vacated in 1992.

Lessons from Europe?

The growing US military presence is intended to reassure America's closest Asian allies, but China views US encroachment in the region as a threat. When Vice President Biden travels through the region this week, he will have to maintain a delicate balance: He has to reassure US allies, yet at the same time caution them not to overreact. He also has to warn China over its provocative air defense zone, while maintaining an ongoing relationship between the two world powers.

After all, Europeans know all too well how quickly even rational foreign policy actors can find themselves enmeshed in irrational chain reactions in times of crisis. Historians and politicians have been discussing the similarities between China's current situation and the international stage prior to the outbreak of World War I for years.

American political scientist Robert Kagan says that Washington has taken on the role of the British Empire in East Asia, and the US must make it clear to Beijing -- "which is the Germany of the time" -- that it "will in fact respond if China behaves in a way that seems unacceptable."

In his bestseller "The Sleepwalkers," which describes how Europe entered the bloody catastrophe of World War I, historian Christopher Clark comments on today's global order: "Since the end of the Cold War, a system of bipolar stability has made way for a more complex and unpredictable array of forces, including declining empires and rising powers -- a state of affairs that invites comparison with the Europe of 1914," he writes.

[Article 8.](#)

The National Interest

## **Ukraine's Dangerous Game**

[Anya Schmemmann](#)

December 3, 2013 -- Ukrainians took to the streets over the weekend in massive protests against their government's abrupt about-face on closer ties with the European Union. The protests recalled the Orange Revolution just over nine years ago, when tens of thousands rallied in Kiev's central square for weeks to protest a flawed election.

Protests have been held daily since Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich backed away last week from an agreement that would have established free trade and deepened political cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in favor of reopening talks with Moscow on a customs union of states of the former Soviet Union.

The EU agreement, long in the works, [was supposed to have been signed in Vilnius](#) [3] on Friday. Instead, disappointed European leaders lamented Ukraine's sudden U-turn and [cast blame on Russia](#) [4] for bullying its former Soviet republic. Russia, for its part, reproached the EU for putting pressure on Ukraine. The EU is now under criticism for mishandling negotiations with Yanukovich, who had previously rejected European terms for closer association.

So why Ukraine's last-minute reversal on the EU deal?

In retrospect, Yanukovich was playing a risky geopolitical bargaining game, pitting the EU against Russia to see who would offer the better financial package.

At first, it looked like he simply lacked courage and had bowed to Russian pressure and threats. However, when he showed up at the Vilnius summit demanding cash, his brinkmanship was revealed.

Yanukovich derided the EU offer of over \$800 million in financial assistance as "[candy in a pretty wrapper](#) [5]"—far short of the \$20 billion per year he said was needed to upgrade Ukraine's faltering economy to EU standards. He also asked for three-way talks between the EU, Russia, and Ukraine on trade—a demand that was quickly rejected by the EU.

Ukraine initially began to pursue a path towards closer cooperation with the EU after Russia refused to offer a cheaper price for gas. The Ukrainian public supported the turn to the West—preprotest [opinion surveys](#) [6] show about 45 percent of Ukrainians supporting closer integration with the EU, and a third or less favoring closer ties with Russia.

Yanukovych, a wily politician, is hoping to win reelection in 2015 and must balance several constituencies. He was elected in part based on his promise to improve relations with Russia. Until Vilnius, he was able to portray himself as pursuing closer ties with the West while also maintaining good relations with Russia. At Vilnius, he could no longer avoid picking a side. In the end, he apparently did not think the short-term sacrifices of EU partnership—including political, judicial and economic reforms—were worth the long-term benefits.

Closer cooperation with the EU is also seen by Yanukovych's powerful oligarch "family" as a threat that could expose their insider deals to the greater transparency required by the EU and force them into competition with other firms.

Yanukovych also balked at the EU's demand that Ukraine release his charismatic political opponent Yulia Tymoshenko from jail. Tymoshenko had led the protests against Yanukovych in 2004 and was narrowly beaten by him in 2010; she was jailed the following year on charges of abusing her office while serving as prime minister. The decision to insist on the release and parole of Tymoshenko has also been criticized for being shortsighted and politically motivated.

Ukraine knows all too well what Russian pressure feels like. A 2009 dispute between Kiev and Moscow over gas prices resulted in a three-week cutoff of gas to Ukraine—a painful (and cold) period that no one in Ukraine wants to repeat.

Russia played a large part in the failure in Vilnius as well. Russia, which sees Ukraine as a historical friend and ally, made its disapproval of the EU agreement clear and did all it could to derail the deal. It brought its considerable pressure to bear by banning some Ukrainian imports, imposing trade sanctions, and threatening Ukraine with large gas bills. EU leaders accused Russia of bullying Ukraine into ditching the deal so that the former Soviet republic would stay locked in Moscow's orbit. But the EU has been ambivalent about Ukraine, with some members reluctant to forge closer links with the troubled and corrupt economy.

Ukraine is clearly an attractive trading partner for Europe, with significant mineral resources, a large landmass bordering four EU member states (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania), an educated population of forty-five million, and a 2012 GDP of more than \$175 billion. However, it

has heavy financing needs in the coming eighteen months and must find [more than \\$17 billion next year](#) [7] to meet gas bills and debt repayments. Yanukovych complained that the EU had not offered enough in financial incentives to win him over. He said any financial aid package should encompass macroeconomic assistance, reestablishing a working relationship with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund on “acceptable terms,” a review of EU limitations on some Ukrainian exports, and assistance with modernizing Ukraine’s extensive gas pipeline network. EU leaders [countered](#) [8] that the ditched trade pact would have boosted Ukraine’s economy by more than 6-percent and would have saved Ukrainian businesses 500 million euros a year in import duties. Despite publicly voicing disappointment in unequivocal terms, it seems that some of the EU nations are relieved not to have to bail out another failing economy. And it seems convenient for them to now blame Russia for their defeat.

The EU says the door remains open, and Yanukovych—facing ever-larger crowds on the streets—[said](#) [9] on Sunday that he would accelerate the process of moving Ukraine closer to the EU.

If there is another round of negotiations, the world should realize that this is not just a geostrategic tussle between Russia and Europe, but that the primary factors for Yanukovych involve his domestic political calculations. If true, it seems unlikely that he will sign a new agreement unless the payoff is much larger next time around.

*Anya Schmemann is an Assistant Dean at American University’s School of International Service. She is a non-resident Senior Fellow at The Center for the National Interest.*