

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen <[REDACTED]>
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Article 1.

The Washington Post

Nuclear weapon reductions must be part of strategic analysis

Henry A. Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft

April 23 -- A [New START treaty](#) reestablishing the process of nuclear arms control has recently taken effect. Combined with reductions in the U.S. defense budget, this will bring the number of nuclear weapons in the United States to the lowest overall level since the 1950s. The Obama administration is said to be considering negotiations for a [new round of nuclear reductions](#) to bring about ceilings as low as 300 warheads. Before momentum builds on that basis, we feel obliged to stress our conviction that the goal of future negotiations should be strategic stability and that lower numbers of weapons should be a consequence of strategic analysis, not an abstract preconceived determination.

Regardless of one's vision of the ultimate future of nuclear weapons, the overarching goal of contemporary U.S. nuclear policy must be to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used. Strategic stability is not inherent with low numbers of weapons; indeed, excessively low numbers could lead to a situation in which surprise attacks are conceivable.

We supported ratification of the START treaty. We favor verification of agreed reductions and procedures that enhance predictability and transparency. One of us (Kissinger) has supported working toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, albeit with the proviso that a series of verifiable intermediate steps that maintain stability precede such an end point and that every stage of the process be fully transparent and verifiable. The precondition of the next phase of U.S. nuclear weapons policy must be to enhance and enshrine the strategic stability that has preserved global peace and prevented the use of nuclear weapons for two generations.

Eight key facts should govern such a policy:

First, strategic stability requires maintaining [strategic forces of sufficient size](#) and composition that a first strike cannot reduce retaliation to a level acceptable to the aggressor.

Second, in assessing the level of unacceptable damage, the United States cannot assume that a potential enemy will adhere to values or calculations identical to our own. We need a sufficient number of weapons to pose a threat to what potential aggressors value under every conceivable circumstance. We should avoid strategic analysis by mirror-imaging.

Third, the composition of our strategic forces cannot be defined by numbers alone. It also depends on the type of delivery vehicles and their

mix. If the composition of the U.S. deterrent force is modified as a result of reduction, agreement or for other reasons, a sufficient variety must be retained, together with a robust supporting command and control system, so as to guarantee that a preemptive attack cannot succeed.

Fourth, in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain — and when possible, reinforce — that confidence.

Fifth, the global nonproliferation regime has been weakened to a point where some of the proliferating countries are reported to have arsenals of more than 100 weapons. And these arsenals are growing. At what lower U.S. levels could these arsenals constitute a strategic threat? What will be their strategic impact if deterrence breaks down in the overall strategic relationship? Does this prospect open up the risk of hostile alliances between countries whose forces individually are not adequate to challenge strategic stability but that combined might overthrow the nuclear equation? Sixth, this suggests that, below a level yet to be established, nuclear reductions cannot be confined to Russia and the United States. As the countries with the two largest nuclear arsenals, Russia and the United States have a special responsibility. But other countries need to be brought into the discussion when substantial reductions from existing START levels are on the international agenda.

Seventh, strategic stability will be affected by other factors, such as [missile defenses](#) and the roles and numbers of tactical nuclear weapons, which are not now subject to agreed limitations. Precision-guided large conventional warheads on long-range delivery vehicles provide another challenge to stability. The [interrelationship](#) among these elements must be taken into account in [future negotiations](#).

Eighth, we must see to it that countries that have relied on American nuclear protection maintain their confidence in the U.S. capability for deterrence. If that confidence falters, they may be tempted by accommodation to their adversaries or independent nuclear capabilities. Nuclear weapons will continue to influence the international landscape as part of strategy and an aspect of negotiation. The lessons learned

throughout seven decades need to continue to govern the future.

Article 2.

The National Interest

The Fantasy of Zero Nukes

[Amitai Etzioni](#)

April 23, 2012 -- Nowhere is President Obama's tendency to confuse speech making with policy making more evident than in his treatment of nuclear weapons, the greatest threat to both U.S. security and world peace. The main hot spots are well known: North Korea, Iran and Pakistan. Instead, the president has focused for the last three years on Russia. President Obama believes that the best way to deal with WMD is to lead by example. He holds that, as the United States and Russia recommit themselves to nuclear disarmament, other nations will be inspired to either give up their nuclear arms or refrain from acquiring any. It is a policy Keith B. Payne fairly labeled "nuclear utopianism."

The strategy that calls for the United States and Russia to lead the parade to nuclear disarmament was formed by four highly regarded statesmen: the quad of two Republicans, Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, as well as two Democrats, Sam Nunn and William Perry. All four are very senior veterans of the Cold War. Their strategy relies on reductions in the number of warheads loaded on the two powers' strategic bombers and missiles, a major threat before 1990 but not a hot issue today.

The quad's position is best understood in the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that took effect in 1970, which created two groups of nations: those that had nuclear weapons and agreed to give them up, and those that did not have them and promised not to seek them. Many of the nuclear have-not class of countries lived up to their NPT obligations and ended their nascent military nuclear programs in the years that followed, including South Africa, Argentina, Brazil and Egypt. But the members of the "nuclear club"—China, Russia, the UK, France and the United States—failed to honor their commitments. These failures are often

cited by nations such as Iran when they vent their outrage at being pressured by the United States and other nuclear “haves” to not acquire nuclear weapons.

During his first major speech about nuclear arms, in Prague in 2009, President Obama promised to make amends by moving toward the promised land of zero nukes. In the following months, his administration invested much energy in fashioning a treaty with Russia that did reduce the nuclear weapons of the old Cold War adversaries. But the treaty had no effect on the main sources of current threats: terrorists acquiring nukes in Pakistan or North Korea and mounting them on long-range missiles, or Iran employing them to threaten Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Moreover, zero is a dangerous notion. If either Russia or the U.S. concealed ten weapons more than the levels currently permitted by the treaty, it would matter little, since both countries have hundreds of them. However, if one of the superpowers indeed gave up its entire nuclear arsenal and the other then pulled ten out of a hiding place, it would pose a major threat. Moreover, even if both Russia and the United States move to a true and verified zero, any other nation that did not could blackmail one or both superpowers and the rest of the world merely by threatening to use its nuclear weapons.

A world of zero nukes may be merely a vision President Obama projected to inspire other nations to give up their nuclear ambitions, but he has failed to inspire any nation to give up its bombs or to stop making more.

Consider the reasons nations develop a nuclear arsenal. Whatever Russia and the United States do will not stop them. For example, Pakistan is retaining its weapons stockpile because India has a much bigger population and can sustain a much larger conventional army than Pakistan. A nuclear capability thus serves, from the viewpoint of Islamabad, as the main deterrent against being overrun—Pakistan would maintain its arsenal even if the US. and Russia dismantled their last nukes.

Iran seeks a nuclear weapon to deter attacks by the United States and its allies, as a source of prestige and possibly as the means needed to wipe out Israel. North Korea claims to need nuclear weapons to deter the United States, Japan and South Korea from what it sees as their aggressive tendencies—and views them as a major source of prestige as well. None of

these reasons are much affected by whatever deals Moscow and Washington are making.

Chasing the mirage of a world without nukes distracts attention and uses up political capital badly needed for addressing urgent problems concerning these arms. Top among these—if one is to focus on Russia—are not strategic arms but the tactical nuclear bombs and fissile materials terrorists seek. Russia has an estimated arsenal of tactical nukes between five thousand and fourteen thousand, while the United States has about one thousand. However, New START does not cover tactical weapons. It deals exclusively with strategic weapons, which terrorists are extremely unlikely to be able to handle.

The nuclear arsenals of rogue states and failing states are not being ignored by the Obama administration. It is trying diplomacy, engagement and even some sanctions in dealing with Iran, and it is desperately seeking ways to deal with Pakistan and North Korea. But these discussions are on a different track, where zero is not so much as mentioned.

Thus, we see another example in which Obama's speeches—which presumably set the direction of US. foreign policy and are intended to inspire other nations—are out of sync with the small efforts his administration is making in handling the nuclear hot spots. Anyway you look at it, the rhetoric about zero nukes is completely disconnected from the international reality.

Amitai Etzioni's book [The Hot Spots](#) will be published by Transaction in 2012.

Article 3.

The Weekly Standard

Negotiations That Matter

Reuel Marc Gerecht

April 30, 2012 -- Since we don't know what Saeed Jalili, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, said at the recent confab in Istanbul, we can't be sure that Israeli prime minister Bibi Netanyahu was right to dismiss the powwow as a "freebie" for Tehran. Also, the Islamic Republic is a theocracy: The most senior officials need to report face-to-face to their master. Jalili, an ill-tempered, narrow-minded, one-legged veteran of the

Iran-Iraq war, lost face after a disastrous meeting in Geneva in October 2009, when he tentatively agreed to a nuclear-fuel swap, only to see the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, bat the deal down from Tehran. So no matter how well rehearsed, Jalili would need time for his boss to digest what was demanded and offered. In any case, as long as the Iranians were polite, we were going to have two meetings. And so there is another get-together scheduled for May 23 in Baghdad.

The odds are high, however, that the next session will lead to no diplomatic yellow-brick road. Round two could be a success, and lead to a round three, if Khamenei agreed to do five things: (1) Stop all uranium enrichment to 20 percent purity, which is near bomb-grade; (2) ship abroad the entire stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium; (3) close the Fordow enrichment facility, which is buried under a mountain near the clerical city of Qom; (4) allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency immediate and unfettered access to any suspected nuclear site; and (5) permit the IAEA to install devices on centrifuges for monitoring uranium-enrichment levels. Khamenei is, to say the least, unlikely to agree to this. It's worth stressing that it is a serious mistake to allow Khamenei and his Revolutionary Guards, who oversee terrorist operations and the nuclear program, any domestic enrichment capacity. This was the position of the Obama administration and our Western European allies. Now that consensus has apparently collapsed because Iranian agreement seems impossible. Khamenei's determination to keep advancing uranium enrichment despite increasingly severe sanctions has paid off. Tehran has enough low-grade, 3.5 percent enriched uranium stockpiled to produce at least one, soon two, nuclear weapons. It also has a 163-pound stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium. As Oli Heinonen, the former deputy director general of the IAEA, has pointed out, mastering 3.5 percent enrichment is 70 percent of the way to mastering the fuel cycle for an atomic weapon. Twenty percent enrichment is 90 percent of the process.

As of February, Iranian centrifuges were producing 256 pounds per month of 3.5 percent enriched uranium and 15 pounds per month of 20 percent enriched uranium (the Fordow facility accounted for 9.5 pounds of this total). The Iranian regime had 8,800 centrifuges spinning at Natanz and 696 at Fordow. Once the Islamic Republic can produce 44 pounds of highly enriched uranium per month, which is not that far off given the

increasing rate of production, the supreme leader and his guards can have a nuclear weapon in their hands in as little as 43 days, provided Iran's nuclear scientists have mastered the manufacture of a nuclear trigger (technically much less difficult than enrichment). Per the IAEA's most recent report, "information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device." In other words, Khamenei will win his race for a nuclear weapon unless something dramatic intervenes to stop him.

The best that can be hoped from another round of negotiations with Tehran is that Khamenei is hooked into a process that enfeebles him. The cleric has consistently avoided any meaningful embrace of the negotiating process because he sees it as dangerous, a slippery slope where the Americans and Europeans dictate limitations on his nuclear program. Many American critics of negotiations have seen this process as the reverse, a slippery slope that has Western diplomacy enabling the Islamic Republic's nuclear ambitions. Khamenei may have the stronger argument. But he shows no sign of yielding to pressure.

There is certainly a risk that continuing these negotiations puts Israeli prime minister Bibi Netanyahu and defense minister Ehud Barak into a real pickle, since it's more difficult for the Israelis to make the case for bombing Iran's nuclear sites while the negotiations are going on.

Nonetheless, the Israelis need to decide whether a preventive attack on the Islamic Republic can work. Their internal deliberations should not be constrained by a false promise of a diplomatic solution. Moving forward with negotiations now is actually more likely to free the Israelis to act in the summer, if they choose to, than to entrap them.

Americans, too, need to have an honest debate about whether they are willing to permit Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards—the principal state sponsors of terrorism in the Middle East, whom the Obama administration has increasingly nailed for their operational relationship with al Qaeda—to develop atomic weapons. It would be healthy for Democrats and Republicans to debate the Iranian conundrum, which is not going to happen as long as sanctions-backed diplomacy seems viable. We are fortunate that the nuclear timeline overlaps well with the 2012 presidential campaign: It's the ideal moment for a ripping discussion about probably the most momentous foreign-policy question before us.

The above five requirements—nearly identical to the reported minimum requirements of the White House—ought to clarify where we are on May 23. These conditions will be extremely difficult for Khamenei to accept because they are so humbling. Shuttering the Fordow facility, which Iran’s state-controlled press has reported on with pride, would be gut-wrenching for the supreme leader. It’s likely that Khamenei wants to build more Fordow-like facilities—bomb-resistant sites that signal spiritual resistance to the West. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s boast that Iran intends to open 10 more enrichment facilities no doubt was hyperbolic, but the sentiments clearly reflect Khamenei’s disposition. Closing Fordow would offend the supreme leader’s identity as the anti-American Islamic paladin. Even more galling and dangerous, U.N. inspectors under this agreement would have the right to fan out across the country hunting for suspicious nuclear activity. The IAEA’s Additional Protocols, to which Khamenei would have to assent, are intrusive and would allow inspectors access to Iranian military and Revolutionary Guard bases. No doubt, the supreme leader and his guards could still cheat (they have lied about the nuclear program from the beginning). Iran is a big country. Satellites and other technical means of observation can only do so much. The regime is surely working clandestinely to perfect more advanced centrifuges that could be hidden in smaller buildings and underground facilities.

Nevertheless, the odds are decent that these inspectors would catch the regime in its big lie about the “peaceful” intent of the program. Nuclear experts have some idea where the Iranians have been militarizing their nuclear “research.” Even so, an astonishing number of intelligent people in America and Europe appear to believe that Khamenei’s fatwa about the “sinfulness” of nuclear weapons is significant, that it isn’t just ketman, deception deployed against a stronger enemy. Exposing Khamenei’s flagrant mendacity, for both Iranians and foreigners, is not without value and would again refocus the discussion on the real question: Is it acceptable for Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards to have nuclear weapons?

But what if the Iranians accept all of the demands? Could we still be staring at an Iranian nuke, just delivered at a slower pace? It’s possible. If Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former major-domo of Iranian clerical politics and the true father of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear-weapons

program, were still in charge, we'd likely be enmeshed in the rope-a-dope tactics that he successfully used against the trade-happy Europeans in the 1990s. Rafsanjani has always advocated the go-slow nuclear approach. He has even broached the idea of direct talks with Washington. But we're not confronting Rafsanjani, who was purged after the crackdown on the Green Movement in 2009. Moving forward with one more round of negotiations now is much more likely to expose the supreme leader's intransigence than entangle America (and Israel) in a pointless, lengthy diplomatic dance. Senior officials in the Obama administration probably have few illusions about Iranian mendacity. The last three years have been an education: Candidate Obama and lots of Democrats believed that President Obama could transform American-Iranian relations. But Ali Khamenei has tried hard to show that George W. Bush was not the problem. Although it's dangerous to suggest that diplomacy with the Islamic Republic has just about run its course (for die-hard diplomats, the process never ends), it's going to be challenging for the administration to pretend that sanctions-backed diplomacy can work given the increasing enrichment at Natanz and Fordow. If the Israelis decide to strike, the president will be hard pressed not to back them, as he promised to do in his speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. The collapse of the negotiating process in May most likely will not provoke the White House to do anything more bellicose, but it will at least get us talking seriously, at last, about the nature of the Iranian regime and how best to deal with it—and how to help Israel deal with it, if Israel feels it must act. That would be an enormous step forward.

Reuel Marc Gerecht is a senior fellow at the [Foundation for Defense of Democracies](#), focusing primarily on the Middle East, Islamic militancy, counterterrorism, and intelligence. Mr. Gerecht served as a case officer at the [CIA](#), primarily working on Middle Eastern targets.

Article 4.

The Washington Post

Fears of extremism taking hold in Syria as violence continues

[Liz Sly](#)

April 23 -- BEIRUT — As Syria's revolution drags into its second year amid few signs that a U.N.-mandated cease-fire plan will end the violence, evidence is mounting that Islamist extremists are seeking to commandeer what began as a non-ideological uprising aimed at securing greater political freedom.

Activists and rebel soldiers based inside Syria say a small but growing number of Islamist radicals affiliated with global jihadi movements have been arriving in opposition strongholds in recent weeks and attempting to rally support among disaffected residents.

Western diplomats say they have tracked a steady trickle of jihadists flowing into Syria from Iraq, and Jordan's government last week detained at least four alleged Jordanian militants accused of trying to sneak into Syria to join the revolutionaries.

A previously unknown group calling itself the al-Nusra Front has [asserted responsibility](#) for bombings in the cities of Damascus and Aleppo using language and imagery reminiscent of the statements and videos put out by al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations in Iraq, although no evidence of the group's existence has surfaced other than the videos and statements it has posted on the Internet.

Syrian activists and Western officials say the militants appear to be making little headway in recruiting supporters within the ranks of the still largely [secular protest movement](#), whose unifying goal is the ouster of the regime led by President Bashar al-Assad.

But if the United Nations' peace plan fails to end [the government's bloody crackdown](#) and promises of Western and Arab help for the rebel Free Syrian Army do not materialize, activists and analysts say, there is a real risk that frustrated members of the opposition will be driven toward extremism, adding a dangerous dimension to a revolt that is threatening to destabilize a wide arc of territory across the Middle East.

"The world doing nothing opens the door for jihadis," said Lt. Abdullah al-Awdi, a Free Syrian Army commander who defected from the regular army in the summer and was interviewed during a visit he made to Turkey. He says that he has rebuffed several offers of help from militant groups in the

form of arms and money and that he fears the extremists' influence will grow.

"This is not a reason for the international community to be silent about Syria. It should be a reason for them to do something," Awdi said.

Flow of jihadis reported

U.S. officials and Western diplomats in the region, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject, say they have seen several indications that al-Qaeda-like groups are trying to inject themselves into the Syrian revolution, although they stress that the Islamist radicals' impact has been limited. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called on "mujaheddin" to head to Syria in support of the rebels earlier this year, and Western diplomats are convinced that operatives affiliated with al-Qaeda carried out a string of bombings in Damascus and Aleppo between December and March.

The diplomats say dozens of jihadis have been detected crossing the border from Iraq into Syria, some of them Syrians who had previously volunteered to fight in Iraq and others Iraqi. There may also be other foreign nationals among them, reversing the journey they took into Iraq years ago when jihadis flowed across the border to fight the now-departed Americans.

The Syrian government facilitated the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq for many years, and there are widespread suspicions that it may be covertly reactivating some of those networks to discredit the revolutionaries, deter international support for the opposition and create conditions under which the harsh crackdown by authorities will appear justified.

The regime portrayed the uprising as the work of radical Islamists in its earliest days, and the reports that extremists are surfacing in Syria only play into the official narrative, said Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar.

"This drip, drip, drip of extremists across the border . . . there are signs the regime is aiding and abetting it," Shaikh said. "And it will become a self-fulfilling prophecy."

It is also plausible that these groups, adherents of a radicalized form of Sunni Islam, have turned against their former benefactors and are making their way back to Syria motivated by religious and sectarian zeal. Although many Syrian opposition activists insist that their revolution is not sectarian,

a majority of Syrians are Sunnis, while Assad, along with most leading figures in the regime and in the security forces, belongs to the Shiite-affiliated Alawite minority, lending a sectarian dimension to the populist revolt.

Syrian activists and rebels insist that the extremists are not welcome in communities that have long prided themselves on their tolerance of the religious minorities in their midst, including Christians, Alawites, Druze, Kurds and Ismaili Shiites.

A rebel leader in northern Syria who asked to be identified by his nom de guerre, Abu Mustafa, described how he and his men drove out a group of about 15 radicals, all of them Syrian but none of them local, who arrived in a northern village in January. Led by a commander who identified himself as Abu Sulaiman, the group tried to recruit supporters for an assault on the nearby town of Jisr al-Shughour.

Abu Sulaiman “had money, he had weapons, and he sent a guy to negotiate with me, but I refused,” Abu Mustafa recalled in an interview in Turkey. “We asked him to leave, but he didn’t, so we attacked him. We killed two of them, and one of our men was injured. Then he left, but I don’t know where he went.”

“The good thing is that Syrians are against giving our country to radicals,” Abu Mustafa added. “But these groups have supporters who are very rich, and if our revolution continues like this, without hope and without result, they will gain influence on the ground.”

A largely secular revolt

There is a distinction between the naturally conservative religiosity of Syrians who come from traditional communities and the radicalism of those associated with the global jihadi movement, said Joseph Holliday, who is researching [the Free Syrian Army](#) at the Institute for the Study of War in Washington and believes extremists are a small minority.

“While there are elements [in the opposition] that are very conservative, they are not the driving force,” he said. “There is definitely an argument to be made that this will increase over time, because insurgencies often become more extremist over time, but for now the driving force behind this revolution is secular.”

Adherents of the strict Salafi school of Islam have emerged in many Syrian communities and are playing a role in the opposition, but they, too, are to

be distinguished from the jihadis, said [Yezid Sayigh](#) of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.

“People who are local and pious and moving in an Islamist direction and are taking up guns don’t have the same organization and are not necessarily the same thing as jihadists, who are not necessarily al-Qaeda,” he said.

“There’s a range of different directions and trends.”

Many activists fear, however, that the influence of the extremists is growing as Syrian rebels who have for months appealed in vain for Western military intervention look for help elsewhere.

“Of course it is growing, because no one is doing anything to stop it,” said a Syrian activist who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he fears retribution from some of the radicals he has encountered while attempting to organize the opposition in many northern communities.

“They have rules,” he said. “They say: If we give you money, you have to obey our orders and accept our leadership. Some of my friends drink alcohol, and they aren’t like this. But when they find no other way to cover their expenses, they join these groups and then they follow them.”

Article 5.

Asharq Al-Awsat

interview: The PLO's Ahmad Quray

Kifah Zaboun

22 April 2012 -- Ahmad Quray, member of the PLO Executive Committee and former chief negotiator, describes the Palestinian mentality as experimental, and says that the mechanism that the Palestinians have tried for many years at the negotiations has failed, and he calls for changing it by including Arab and international sides in negotiating the most important dossiers, such as Jerusalem, the refugees, and security. The following is the full text of the interview:

[Asharq Al-Awsat] I would like to start with the two-state solution, which you said this week is dead. Can it be resurrected?

[Quray] I have said that the two-state solution has been exposed to lethal blows. I am convinced that Israel talks about the two-state project, while it is carrying out its assassination. There can never be a Palestinian State without Jerusalem. If the state project is a living body, then Jerusalem is its head, and if the head is severed, the body cannot live.

Secondly, pay attention to the settlement blocs. Everybody ought to know where their borders are. I will start from the north, Ariel Settlement (near Nablus) extends for 24 km from west to east into the belly of the West Bank, and they will add to it Shilo Settlement, which will expand by some 500 housing units; all of it will be transformed into a single bloc that will reach the Jordan River Ghawr, and splits the West Bank. In the middle there is Givat Zeev, which puts an end to the connectivity of Ramallah, and extends to South Jerusalem and to the west until Bayt Sira, and then Maale Adumim is added to it in the east, and hence it will reach Al-Khan al-Ahmar (on the road to Jericho). This is without even mentioning the "E1 plan," which if built would seal Jerusalem from the east, and there would be no scope for visiting it except from the west, or by permission from the Israeli controller. As for the Jerusalem settlements, there is no need to talk about them.

I do not believe that it is possible to deal with such blocs in the project of a solution for a Palestinian State. Israel has built the wall, and drawn up the settlement blocs, and I am afraid that it might say: This is your state until God changes the situation. This will be the end of it, without Jerusalem, without refugees, and with the Jordan River Ghawr staying as a security space.

We want the two-state solution. However, if Israel is not committed to the two-state solution on the basis of international legitimacy, international law, and the authority related to the peace process, the talk about the two-state solution will become mere intellectual exercise, and will not lead to any results.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] What do you think is a satisfactory solution?

[Quray] A two-state solution that is based on a Palestinian State on the lines of 4 June 1967 with exchanges in borders equivalent in value and

similar to each other, but not in the settlements.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Is what the Israelis doing today going to be fate?

[Quray] I do not say that what the occupation plans is going to be fate, but what the occupation plans if the situation stays as it is, the occupation will have the opportunity to impose on the ground. The Palestinian internal state is not healthy, and the Arab state is not healthy, as it has become neutral. I do not want a statement from the Arab summit, I want real Arab participation. This is Palestine, and it is the center of the region that separates the octopus from the Arab world. The Palestinian cause needs a different Arab stance. What are they offering to Jerusalem? What the Arabs offer is nothing worth mentioning. [Jerusalem Mayor] Nir Barkat (chairman of the Jerusalem Jewish Municipal Council) has a budget bigger than all the Arab countries offer.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] But they have allocated large funds to Jerusalem, the last of which at the Baghdad summit. Have these funds arrived?

[Quray] No, no they have not. None of the countries has paid, except Saudi Arabia.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Then, in the light of this diagnosis, what is the necessary next step at the Palestinian level?

[Quray] In order to be objective, we should know clearly the magnitude of our strength, and our stance now. The Palestinian stance to some extent is not bad. Second, we need an Arab stance. If the Arab stance is not serious about making the Palestinian cause one of its priorities, this will be a point of weakness. Unfortunately, we no longer are one of the priorities of the Arab stance, neither are we one of the priorities of the international stance. The United States is turning toward East Asia; this is not a secret; Hillary Clinton wrote about that. There is a transformation that might create a vacuum.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] You have said that the Palestinian stance toward the negotiations is not bad. Are you really satisfied with it?

[Quray] The Palestinian stance still is experimenting, and the policy of experimenting sometimes leads to mistakes. I am not against the negotiations, but the negotiations with the mechanisms to which we are used no longer lead to any results, and will not lead to any result. The mechanism of the bilateral meetings that are published in the newspapers before they start is no longer beneficial; this is first.

Second, there are issues that the Palestinian side cannot decide alone. Let me give you an example; the issue of the refugees, you cannot decide this issue without Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. These are the rights of citizens, the rights of peoples, and the right of the host country. Therefore, you need these sides. Also some international sides ought to be informed step by step as we proceed.

This also applies to the issue of Jerusalem in which we need indirect participation by the Arab and Muslim countries.

The same applies to security. Israel talks everyday about security, and has transformed it into a condition for negotiations. There ought to be an understanding of the issue of security at the regional level.

I do not call for partnership at the negotiations table, but there has to be participation and a change of mechanism.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] But you are talking about the most important sovereignty issues in the negotiations?

[Quray] Yes, (the decision) is ours, but we cannot contract it on our own. We want Arab, regional, and international sides to be present with us. We ought to depart from the logic of bilateral negotiations. This is no longer beneficial, and for this reason these bilateral negotiations one time are transformed into overview negotiations, and another time are exploratory negotiations. If there are negotiations, let them be through the new mechanisms.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Had you been still the chairman of the negotiating team or had you had the power to decide, how would you act now?

[Quray] I am not saying that our stance is correct. The condition of halting the settlement activities is right and correct. However, it is important to say that I will not under any circumstances recognize any settlement bloc that has been built on the 1967 territories, and I will never accept it. Syria has not said stop the settlement activities, but it said no settlements after the agreement. Egypt did not say, for instance, stop the building activities in Yamit (settlement in Sinai), but when the situation was resolved the settlement was demolished. In Gaza, have they [the Israelis] not left it? Therefore, our stance ought to be clear, but without making it understood that the required amendments are in exchange for the settlements.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] But the Israelis say that you have agreed that the settlements can stay in exchange for land?

[Quray] The PA has not agreed to this not even once.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Have they not agreed even that principal settlements can stay?

[Quray] No, no, in Camp David we said there can be amendments to the borders. Let me be frank, neither Abu-Ammar (Yasser Arafat), nor Abu-Mazin (Mahmud Abbas) agreed that settlements could stay.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Then, you are in favor of announcing a categorical stance toward the settlements and going to the negotiations?

[Quray] Of course, if there are clear mechanisms I am not against the negotiations.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] But is this not a new experiment?

[Quray] No, no, the international community will be present, the International Quartet and Arab and regional sides, and also there will be a time limit.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] But rather than doing this, the PA has addressed a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Have you seen it?

[Quray] Not at all, I heard about it the same as you have.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Are you in favor of sending it?

[Quray] God willing, it will lead to a result. Our stance is known, and Netanyahu's stance has become known.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Netanyahu has said that he will reply with a letter. In your opinion, will this lead to negotiations through letters?

[Quray] I do not know how that will be. However, he answered in advance saying no to the return of the refugees, no to Jerusalem, and that the settlement blocs will stay. Therefore, he has answered.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you mean that the step is futile?

[Quray] God willing, it will be useful.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you have other options that could have been activated rather than, for instance, the letter?

[Quray] Of course we have options. We have a cause and we do not lack options.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] What are the options that you consider that they have not been used?

[Quray] Popular resistance, for instance, is an important option. Consolidating the Palestinian presence, providing its requirements, and strengthening it, is also an important option. Also the option of a state for

two peoples, a single democratic state is also an option. Our options exist as long as our national rights are not fulfilled.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] You talk about the one-state solution; do you consider it possible to apply?

[Quray] This has been a Fatah project since 1967, a secular democratic state in which the Muslim, the Christian, and the Jew coexist. This originally is a Fatah option, but it was amended in 1974 when it started to talk about the establishment of a state on any part from which the occupation withdraws, and hence the National Council adopted its resolution in 1988 to establish a Palestinian State. Later on, the negotiations started on the basis of the National Council resolution. However, I say if this vision is not achieved, what can we do? We can activate our other options, including the one-state option. We - this generation - might not be able to fulfil the aspirations of the people, but we should not squander them. The options ought to remain open to the people.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] But these options have been proposed by the PA every now and then, which has made them lose their seriousness?

[Quray] They should not be brandished for the sake of threatening; these are strategic options of a people and a cause.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you agree with those who say that the two-state solution is dead, and the option now is the one-state solution?

[Quray] No, I say that Israel is killing the two-state solution, and I look up to the international community to tell Israel to stop, and also to say that the requirements of the two-state solution are the following.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] And then we start waiting again?

[Quray] Our issue is not a picnic; it is an issue of a people, a homeland, and international and regional equations.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Some people consider that there is the option of dissolving the PA rather than all this?

[Quray] No, this is as if we are in the middle of a race and then we shoot ourselves in the foot. The PA is an achievement, and one of the signposts of the Palestinian national struggle. It was not achieved free of charge; it was achieved through long struggle and a great uprising. This is a temporary transitional authority for a transitional stage during which the Palestinians hold the reins of their affairs until the occupation ends. It is forbidden that a Palestinian should say that he wants to dissolve the PA; this is despite the

fact that Israel indeed has taken away much of the powers of the PA when it returned to Ramallah and put Arafat under siege; nevertheless we ought to preserve the PA.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] There are those who call for thinking about the job of the PA and its relationship with Israel, and redrafting all this?

[Quray] I do not negotiate over the PA rather than negotiating over the permanent solution. For instance, some people say that the economic agreement is unfair; this is true, but I do not negotiate over the economic agreement. I do not want to improve the conditions of the transitional solution; this is not what we want. We want an agreement over the permanent solution; this is what will give us complete sovereignty.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] The PA has tried to obtain sovereignty through going to the United Nations. In your opinion, was this step correct?

[Quray] This is a correct, good, and required step.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Does it contradict the negotiations?

[Quray] No, no, this is our right. I am in favor of any step that brings us closer to our right.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Are you also in favor of going back again to the United Nations?

[Quray] I believe that obtaining the status of non-member state is an important achievement. This will enable us to participate in many organizations and bodies along the way to the UN Security Council.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] But it has been raised that a non-member state might cancel the legitimate representation of the PLO?

[Quray] A non-member state means that the PLO exists as a sole legitimate representative until the independent state is established.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Some people link the failure of the UN Security Council step and the divisions. Do you think that there is a link?

[Quray] The divisions are one of the factors of the erosion of the Palestinian status. This is a small country, and we have a cause, and we are under occupation. This situation should not continue; cohesion must be restored to the people. These divisions most certainly weaken us in front of Israel, and in front of the world. The internal situation cannot continue like this, and I fear that the divisions could turn into a fait accompli with which everybody deals. The two sides, wittingly or unwittingly, are dividing the country; there are many examples on this that arouse concern. The

divisions are a national issue that ought to end.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Then, what do you think is the way out after all the previous agreements have failed?

[Quray] I do not believe that the Doha agreement has failed. There is a possibility. We should not allow the divisions to remain. I went to China and Vietnam earlier, and they were saying to us: Comrades, make it your priority to consolidate your national unity, because it is the guarantee of your victory.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] You are a member of the PLO; are you satisfied with the work, role, and status of the PLO?

[Quray] I wish the work of the PLO to be institutionalized, and that the resolutions are adopted through a great deal of serious consultations, because this is a difficult stage. The PLO needs activation in all its departments, which need care, attention, and support. The PLO, with its departments, committee, two councils, and embassies ought to enjoy real care and support.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] The PLO sometimes is accused of being absent, or of not participating seriously in decision making?

[Quray] I said that it needs activation (Quray smiles).

[Asharq Al-Awsat] You were a close friend of Arafat, and he always said that he could see a light at the end of the tunnel. Do you still see it?

[Quray] As long as our people are standing fast and firmly on their land, we will continue to see light at the end of the tunnel.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] As we are talking about Arafat, do you miss him today?

[Quray] Yes, of course, always.

[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you miss him on a personal or a national level?

[Quray] I miss him on both levels. On the national level, he was a leader and had special charisma, and he was always present. On the personal level he was loyal and committed to the cadres, and the people.

Article 6.

Hürriyet Daily News

Turkey blocks Israel from NATO summit

April 23 2012 -- Turkey has blocked the participation of [Israel](#) in a key [NATO](#) summit that will take place in Chicago on May 20 and 21, despite calls from influential allies including the United States, Western diplomatic have sources told the Hürriyet Daily News. The veto was conveyed to the [NATO](#) bodies by Turkish Foreign Minister [Ahmet Davutoğlu](#) during the Alliance's meeting last week in Brussels.

“There will be no Israeli presence at the [NATO](#) meeting unless they issue a formal apology and pay compensation for the Turkish citizens their commandos killed in international waters” a senior Turkish official told the Daily News.

“There are demands from us for the removal of our veto, but this is out of question.”

“Those countries who wish to see normalization in ties between [Turkey](#) and [Israel](#) should advise [Israel](#) to apologize and to compensate the killing of Turks in international waters,” the official said.

Turkey has vetoed a number of Israeli attempts to deepen its partnership with the alliance - such as opening an office at the [NATO](#) headquarters and participating in the activities of the Mediterranean Dialogue group - on the grounds that it should first bear the consequences of its unlawful action against Turkish citizens. This reflects the two-year old strife between [Turkey](#) and Israel, which is a result of the Mavi Marmara incident that claimed the lives of eight Turkish and one Turkish-American citizen. The level of diplomatic relations between the two has been reduced to the level of “second secretary” since then.

Turkey's blockage against [Israel](#) was brought to the table during the [NATO](#) foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on April 18, the Daily News learnt. Some ministers of the allied countries including the United States, [France](#) and Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen indirectly criticized [Turkey](#) for bringing its bilateral problems with [Israel](#) to the [NATO](#) platform. Some ministers went so far as to vow to veto the participation of Egypt, Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco and other partner countries in the activities of the Mediterranean Dialogue if [Turkey](#) continues to do so against Israel, something they called “a violation of NATO's values.”

Criticism from Davutoğlu

In response to such statements, Davutoğlu harshly criticized his counterparts sitting around the same large table. “You are talking about being partners and partnership values. But partners, first of everything, should act like partners, so that we’ll treat them accordingly,” was the main message Davutoğlu delivered to his [NATO](#) colleagues. He elaborated:

- The army of a country which you call a partner killed our citizens upon a political order given by its administration. We do not call this kind of country a partner.

- [Turkey](#) evacuated from [Israel](#) not only Turks but citizens from many countries, after they were detained by Israeli forces due to Mavi Marmara incident. It also evacuated citizens of all nationalities from Libya and Syria without making distinction. Our expectation from all allied countries is to pay the same respect to our citizens as we do to yours.

- I assure you that [Turkey](#) will be the first country acting to protect the citizens of [NATO](#) countries in a similar incident. We believe in the notion of solidarity in [NATO](#) much more than the discrimination some of you have expressed.