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[Article 1.](#)

Haaretz

**Kerry can survive failure, but can Israel?**

[S. Daniel Abraham](#)

Jan. 19, 2014 -- U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's peace mission is approaching its moment of truth, but the Israeli public remains indifferent. Over the years it has experienced American peace envoys arrive with excitement only to leave in bitter disappointment.

This thought pattern leads many in Israel to believe that even after Kerry leaves other U.S. emissaries will try their luck. Such thinking is misguided. For the foreseeable future, Kerry is likely to be the last American who tries to make peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

My many years of involvement in the peace process teach me that the approaching decision is unlike previous ones. This is a watershed moment after which Israel will face a completely different situation – one which will be governed by new realities much less favorable than those Israel faces today. If Kerry's mission fails, Israel will miss a historic window of opportunity to achieve an agreement that is optimal from its viewpoint. In the future, Israel may be forced to accept a bad agreement or live without an agreement, thereby compromising its Jewish or democratic character. If this round of negotiations fails, the United States will probably disengage from further attempts to bring about an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. The vacuum will be filled by other actors such as the UN Security Council. Unlike the United States, these actors have no great affection for Israel. Israeli interests will not receive as much positive attention as they do when Washington is in charge of the political process. Take, for example, U.S. President Barack Obama and Secretary Kerry's tremendous efforts to understand and address Israel's security needs. They recruited John Allen, a retired four-star Marine Corps general, to lead 160 military and intelligence experts to devise a plan, in consultation with the Israel Defense Forces, to make the border on the Jordan River the most secure in the world.

If Kerry's mission fails, Israel will be mistaken to assume that America will automatically veto every decision brought to the UN Security Council. Especially if such decisions correspond more or less to Washington's perception of the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel will discover that America's patience with friends who demand its help while simultaneously ignore its interests is shorter than before. And it's no secret that the United States believes that the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict significantly harms U.S. national security interests.

U.S. demographics are changing and as a result the automatic sympathy Israel enjoys in the U.S. has greater potential of eroding. Even the support of American Jewry is not guaranteed. The high rate of assimilation combined with an aversion to Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank is distancing young Jews from Israel and causing them to become less and less involved and identified with Israel.

Israel's official spokespeople often complain about the excessive attention given to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the world stage. They tend to forget that this excessive attention is the foundation of the generous foreign assistance that the Palestinians have received for all these years.

What will happen when the flow of donations recedes? Who will bear the financial responsibility for the fate of the Palestinians living under Israeli rule? Indeed, the donor countries are increasingly fed up. The Europeans, for example, believe their aid is funding the Israeli occupation. The possible failure of Kerry's mission could lead to the increasing erosion of donor assistance, transferring responsibility solely to Israel. The Palestinian camp calling for the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority will be strengthened. If that happens, Israel will be responsible for the health, education, employment and sewage of the Palestinians living in the West Bank.

Without an agreement, we will witness the weakening of the moderate Palestinian camp that prefers a negotiated agreement with Israel and opposes terror. The one-state-for-two-peoples paradigm could become the preferred and practical option while violence most probably will escalate on the ground. The Palestinians will cease their independence campaign and will turn it into an anti-apartheid one. This will be an international media and PR battle that Israel cannot win.

If Israel continues with its policy of settlement expansion and is viewed as not being forthcoming with the Palestinians, Israel's friends will then be hard pressed to counter the treacherous international efforts to isolate it. Unfortunately, economic and legal sanctions against Israel and Israelis will become prevalent. Ultimately, Israel will find itself on the defendant's seat in international tribunals. The delegitimization campaign against it will worsen. Isolation will grow. Friends will become few. Even though Israel won't be solely responsible, it will still have to face this difficult reality.

Such calamitous scenarios can still be avoided. The negotiations can succeed. After all, Israel needs an internationally recognized border to retain its Jewish and democratic character. To achieve such borders Israel needs a peace agreement based on two-states. Such an agreement will also grant Israel full normalization with the entire Arab and Muslim world, as the Arab Peace Initiative stipulates.

The failure of Kerry's mission will not start the countdown for the next emissary's arrival. It will mark a dramatic milestone in Israel's history and identity. Israel will not become the awe-inspiring nation it can be. Rather, it will be a ruptured country losing its Jewish and democratic identity and becoming increasingly estranged from its own sons and daughters, as well as from the world community. Kerry can survive the failure of his mission. But the price for Israel will be dire.

*S. Daniel Abraham is an American entrepreneur and founder of the [Center for Middle East Peace](#) in Washington.*

[Article 2](#)

The Guardian

## **There's reason for optimism on Arab-Israeli peace**

[Michael Cohen](#)

19 January 2014 -- It's quite possible that of all the people writing about the Arab-Israeli conflict these days, I'm the only one with any confidence that the current peace talks will [lead to a positive outcome](#).

Generally, betting on a Middle East peace deal is the political equivalent of playing Three Card Monte. It's impossible to win. But, at the same time, there are real reasons for optimism about where this process might lead. In fact, Israelis and Palestinians may be closer to peace today than any point in the past 65 years.

This is, in part, the result of a number of historical currents that have come together at this moment. Israelis continue to remain generally supportive of a two-state solution; the Palestinians, while less supportive, have seen their political leverage slowly dissipate; and perhaps above all, the rejectionists

on both sides but particularly on the Palestinian side (and I'm speaking here of Hamas) are in an unusually weak position.

But historical currents by themselves are not determinative. There is also the role of personality and contingency. Enter [John Kerry](#).

When Kerry began his quixotic pursuit of a comprehensive peace deal, many were skeptical. But even the doubters gave begrudging hosannas to the approach he had taken. Unlike the flawed Oslo process, Kerry insisted that this round of peace talks aim towards the achievement of a final settlement on all outstanding issues. Even more importantly, he brought the neighboring Arab states into the mix by incorporating the [Arab Peace Initiative](#), which calls for full recognition of [Israel](#) in return for acceptance of a Palestinian state. This had the effect of both giving Israel a major sweetener for a deal but also offered the prospect of marginalizing Hamas even further by drying up their support in the Arab world. It was a strong starting point.

Since then Kerry has kept up the pressure and created a negotiation structure that left both sides (but particularly the Israelis) with little choice to move forward or be blamed for any breakdown in talks. Case in point, earlier this month Kerry [traveled to the region](#) in order to get sign off from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Abbas on a framework agreement that would serve as the template for future negotiation. While the framework represents a rough set of principles, it will likely establish certain baseline ideas, like a Palestinian state oriented around the 1967 lines, that are anathema to the Israeli right-wing. As a State Department official said to me, "We strongly believe that the framework would be significant breakthrough in the process as we move toward a final status agreement/peace treaty."

This will likely leave a clear set of options for Bibi: sign the framework agreement and set Israel on the path to peace or don't and risk a break with the [United States](#) or worse (more on this in a second). Of course, much will depend on how decisively the framework agreement lays out the clear outlines of a final deal – and the extent to which it forces Netanyahu to adopt positions that he and his right-wing supporters have long rejected. But Netanyahu has bobbed and weaved his way during these negotiations and has refused to make conclusive moves in the direction of peace. Kerry is making it increasingly difficult for him to continue that charade.

The US secretary of state, however, is not alone in tightening the vise on Netanyahu. The Palestinians are playing their part as well – though, truth be told, more out of a position of weakness than strength. Considering the inclination of the Palestinian political leadership to, in the depressingly accurate words of former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, never miss an opportunity, it is quite possible (and many have speculated) that [Bibi's approach to Kerry's gambit](#) was to hope the Palestinian leadership would blow things up.

But with the head of Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas as supportive of a two-state solution as any Palestinian leader ever; with Hamas in a historically weak position and with Palestinians having largely turned their back on violence as a political tool the Palestinian leadership have stuck along with Kerry's diplomacy even they are almost certain to get something less than a good deal. Try as hard as he might to conjure examples of Palestinian duplicity, Netanyahu has failed, putting him and Israel in the uncomfortable position that if the talks don't move forward, it is Israel that will likely shoulder the blame – a fact [not lost on the Israeli Prime Minister](#).

This matters more than it did in the past because it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the growing signs of [Israel's international isolation](#). For those not getting the hint, the message from Europe and, in particular, the European Union has been fairly clear. Over the past several weeks there have been repeated examples of European countries and companies putting Israel on notice. There were the guidelines put forward by the European Union last August banning EU grants or loans to Israeli companies doing business in the West Bank. Last month, a Dutch water company [ended its business relationship](#) with an Israeli firm that operates in the occupied territories and the UK Trade & Investment, a business promotion book, warned companies about the "[reputational implications](#)" of collaborating with Israeli settlements.

Yet at the same time the EU has said that a deal with the Palestinians would open up a [floodgate of new investment](#) and closer economic ties with the Jewish state. The Europeans have used both the carrot and stick with Israel – and made abundantly clear what will be the consequences of failure.

Finally, there is the pressure coming from inside Netanyahu's own government. Over the past several weeks, two of Bibi's more prominent coalition members – Tzipi Livni, who is helming the peace talks and [Yair Lapid](#), who helms the second largest voting bloc in the Israeli Knesset, have hinted that they expect the peace process to move forward ... or else. Livni's departure would not be a major problem for Bibi, but Lapid leaving would be something else altogether. It would force Netanyahu to create a new coalition in the Israeli Knesset – one composed almost exclusively of far right and religious parties.

Bibi could, of course, choose to go down that road or he could move forward with negotiations, sign the framework agreement and hope that an exit ramp somehow materializes along the way. In short, he could do what the recently deceased [Ariel Sharon would never do](#) – let others dictate decisions about Israel's future.

To some extent, however, the train has already left the station. Anything less than a deal in these talks – no matter who is blamed for their collapse – will almost certainly lead to a very dark future for Israel. No longer will a nation that rules over millions of Palestinian Arab, and denies the majority of them full political rights, be able to label itself the Middle East's only true democracy. Relations with the United States (particularly with the Obama Administration) will inevitably suffer. How much? No one can say for sure, but that uncertainty alone should concern Israelis.

The [harsh criticism last week](#) of Kerry by Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon – and the tough US reaction to it – offers one potential preview. Finally, the international sanctions and boycott effort will only gather steam; as too will Israel's growing international isolation.

For Netanyahu, the choice to make peace and give up the West Bank is increasingly the only good option he has left. The question now is whether Bibi realizes that the game is up or whether he fully appreciates the consequences of failure. The argument for optimism on the peace process is that never before have the historical forces been so well-aligned for the achievement of a final deal.

State Department officials speak to the "courageous decisions" taken on both sides to date: namely Netanyahu's agreement to release Palestinian prisoners and Abbas's assent to put off efforts to "upgrade the status of the Palestinians in international organizations". But, of course, far more

difficult steps will need to be made to reach a deal that is acceptable to all sides. Ultimately, any breakthrough will come down to political leaders willing to make a decisive break with the past. We're not there yet.

[Article 3.](#)

The Washington Post

## **America chooses the wrong allies in Egypt**

[Jackson Diehl](#)

January 20, 2014 -- While a minority of Egyptian voters [straggled to the polls last week](#) to ratify a new constitution [enshrining a police state](#); while emerging strongman Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Sissi theatrically prepared to announce whether he will deign to become president; and while Secretary of State John Kerry pronounced himself [“hopeful — though not yet certain”](#) that the military regime’s promised transition to democracy is on track, the most genuine and committed supporters of a secular liberal order in Egypt were sitting in Cairo’s Tora prison.

According to the National Council on Human Rights, a nongovernmental organization, Ahmed Maher, Mohammed Adel, Ahmed Douma and Alaa Abdel Fattah were [suffering from mistreatment](#), including confinement to their cells for more than 20 hours a day, and had not been allowed to meet with their lawyers. Naturally, they were unable to vote in the referendum, which approved a charter that exempts the military, police and intelligence services from civilian oversight and subjects anyone those agencies consider threatening to summary trial in a military court.

The four men were jailed in late November for the crime of protesting a new law banning all protests, not long after Kerry proclaimed that “the road map” to democracy “is being [carried out to the best of our perception](#).” On Dec. 22, Maher, Adel and Douma were [sentenced to three years of imprisonment](#).

Their real crime is known to everyone in Egypt: They were the prime intellectual authors and organizers of the January 2011 demonstrations that brought down the military-backed regime of Hosni Mubarak. They are leftist, secular intellectuals who have devoted their adult lives to fighting for human rights as the West conceives of them: free speech, free elections,

gender equality, religious tolerance. They are in jail because the generals and secret police they ousted have returned to power, literally [with a vengeance](#).

Who are the allies of the United States in Egypt? The Obama administration's judgment is crystal clear: Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has [plied Sissi with more than two dozen phone calls](#) since he [led a coup](#) against the elected Islamist government of Mohamed Morsi in July, while Kerry has repeatedly endorsed the general's increasingly implausible claim to be building a democracy — as opposed to restoring the pre-2011 dictatorship in a more repressive form. The administration just persuaded Congress to pass legislation [exempting it from an awkward ban](#) on giving aid to regimes that gained power through a military coup so that the \$1.3 billion in annual U.S. aid to Sissi's army can keep flowing.

Sissi and his cohort, however, are anything but pro-American. The media they control have been orchestrating an orgy of vile propaganda, charging the United States with everything from seeking to carve Egypt into pieces to subverting its morals.

Maher, Adel, Douma and Abdel Fattah aren't particularly pro-American either — no one in Egypt is these days. But they at least share core American values. If they and their followers ever came to power, Egypt might come to resemble India or Brazil: a sometimes difficult partner but a democratic one. That is another reason they are in jail: The military's strategy is to present Washington with a choice between their secular thuggishness and that of the Islamists.

[Natan Sharansky](#), the former Soviet refusenik and Israeli politician who now heads [the Jewish Agency for Israel](#), has been [arguing for a decade](#) that the West, led by the United States, should base its policies involving Egypt and the rest of the Middle East on alliance with such democratic dissidents. When I saw him last week, he was despairing about the disastrous results of Obama's decision to embrace first Mubarak, then Morsi and now Sissi. "Today in Egypt people believe that America is on the side of freedom even less than they did in the time of Mubarak," Sharansky said. "Such a huge change happened in Egypt, and yet Washington remains the same. Whoever takes power is supported — and with each cycle, there is more instability and America is less supported by the Egyptian people."

Why not make it a U.S. priority to free Maher, Adel, Douma and Abdel Fattah and to help them and people like them organize a genuinely democratic mass movement? That used to be dismissed as unrealistic; Egyptians supposedly weren't interested in democracy. But 2011 disproved that canard. That the country is reverting to authoritarianism shows only that the old order and the Islamists were better organized to seize power after the revolution. Shouldn't the United States aim to correct that? "If you were to start putting a focus on the real democrats in Egypt, and on building civil society, and stuck with that, in a few years you would have a real democratic change," Sharansky said. Instead, this U.S. president appears committed to repeating past mistakes.

*Jackson Diehl is deputy editorial page editor of The Post.*

[Article 4.](#)

The National Interest

## **Will America End Syria's Humanitarian Nightmare?**

[Morton Abramowitz](#)

January 20, 2014 -- The United States and like-minded countries will soon have to make up their minds on how to keep millions of Syrians going. In the past three years of civil war the world's humanitarian efforts have concentrated on helping Syria's neighbors keep their borders open to refugees and providing support for almost three million, and supplying multi-million dollars of assistance to needy peoples inside Syria. That has been a significant achievement. But the problem keeps growing and has become even more difficult to manage.

Washington is currently focused on working out a political settlement at the Geneva conference beginning January 22, in the hope that Russia and perhaps even Iran can somehow be brought around to produce an agreement. However necessary a political settlement is, it is highly unlikely to be achieved at this time whatever our determined efforts with the Russians. That probable failure makes the deepening humanitarian debacle in Syria an even more pressing concern.

The US and its friends working closely with the UN will continue to try hard to stem Syria's dismal humanitarian situation internally and externally. Aid monies were aggressively pursued at the second international pledging conference on Syria January 15, but the 2.4 billion dollars promised for both Syrian refugees and internal victims, even if paid, is far less than the 6.5 billion dollars the UN insists it needs for this year. Whether or not a peace settlement is achieved we will seek at Geneva ways of better dealing with the terrible internal humanitarian situation. International aid goes to the needy in Assad controlled areas where the population is greater and apparently lesser amounts to the non-Assad controlled areas where the need is probably greater but more difficult to deliver. Assad forces and some rebel groups often prevent aid deliveries. The US is leaning now on Russia and through others on Iran to find ways of persuading mostly the Assad regime to allow more goods into encircled areas. There is the belief that the Sochi games and efforts to embarrass the Russians may help prod Moscow to persuade Assad to allow more goods into beleaguered areas. Assad has recently offered Moscow to allow goods into some encircled areas including Aleppo but only if there is a ceasefire. The rebels have looked with justifiable suspicion at the government's behavior on this score.

Even if Geneva produces increased internal deliveries, it is doubtful they will be permanent or proportionate to the need. Continued fighting will again resume in civilian populated areas and we can expect renewed blockades by Assad and some rebel groups. In short we may well be back to the previous situation, except worse for the non-combatants. The conflict will likely drag on with the tide of war seemingly back and forth. Some knowledgeable American officials think Assad will ultimately crack, but they are obviously uncertain when that hoped for development will take place. In the interim millions will continue to flee to supposedly safer areas in Syria, or to the neighbors who are increasingly fed up with the continuing Syrian influx and whose political stability may be approaching its limits. Many more will certainly die.

If this unfortunately turns out to be what the world faces, will the US and its friends continue its current posture of managing as best they can both the refugee outflow, now reaching incredible proportions in weak neighboring countries except for Turkey, and the further decline of many

Syrians who won't or can't flee to these countries. We have watched it for well over two years and our domestic political considerations make it likely we will end up watching it some more.

Syrians flee often for safety internally or to neighboring countries. Many remaining inside also need sustenance: they will have to come to the goods abroad or the goods have to come to them. Clearly the latter is preferable to avoid further harm to neighbors and better preserve Syria. If more Syrians are to be saved we will have to again consider a difficult course of action the administration has always rejected and is not politically popular, using force to insure the delivery of goods to Syrians in desperate circumstances on a continuing basis. If we want to significantly improve the humanitarian equation in any short term time frame this course will be essential. Such a response also offers perhaps another way to enhance the possibility of a political settlement. Whether it will all be seen that way here is another matter.

*Morton Abramowitz, a senior fellow at The Century Foundation, is a former ambassador to Thailand and Turkey.*

[Article 5.](#)

The Daily Star

## **Geneva should help end Syrian suffering**

Javier Solana

January 18, 2014 -- The [Geneva](#) II peace conference, to be held on Jan. 22, will take place against a backdrop of singularly appalling numbers: Syria's brutal civil has left an estimated 130,000 dead, 2.3 million refugees registered in neighboring countries, and some 4 million more internally displaced. The stakes at the conference are thus exceptionally high, both for [Syria](#) and for its neighbors, which are straining against severe destabilization. Lebanon has taken in more than 800,000 Syrian refugees. Jordan and [Turkey](#) have more than a half-million each. [Iraq](#) has received more than 200,000, and Egypt has nearly 150,000. These figures, a result of three years of civil war, are simply unacceptable.

What seemed like a new phase of the Arab revolts in early 2011 has become the worst conflict so far this century. Meanwhile, the international community has been disastrously divided. Since the fighting began, Syrian President [Bashar Assad](#) has had Russia's explicit international support. But while Russia's strategy, from the outset, has been coherent and well-defined, the West's has not. The [United States](#) and the [European Union](#) have remained hesitant, establishing no clear aims regarding the conflict. This vacillation contrasts starkly with the position taken by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, which have steadfastly supported the Sunni opposition to Assad, and that of Shiite [Iran](#) and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, which have been equally resolute in supporting the regime.

Syria's civil war has crystallized the complex geopolitical problem that has long characterized the region: the Sunni-Shiite cleavage. The sectarian divide underlies the latent struggle for regional control between [Saudi Arabia](#) and Iran. The radicalization of Syria's opposition, however, has complicated the situation even further, nesting one problem within another – much like Russian matryoshka dolls. The [Sunnis](#) are divided, with the more moderate forces opposing the radical [Al-Qaeda](#) affiliates. In fact, in just the last few days, internecine clashes have left more than 700 dead. The turn for the worse followed last year's chain of events, which started with the United Nations' accusation that the Assad regime had used chemical weapons and ended with the U.S.-[Russia](#) brokered agreement to destroy the regime's chemical arsenal (thereby avoiding a poorly planned and ill-timed Western military intervention). Indeed, it is now clear that the agreement's chief side effect has been to breathe new life into the regime, thereby frustrating the hope of the more moderate rebel groups and allowing Al-Qaeda-linked forces to gather support and strength within the opposition.

The consequences of this radicalization are spreading throughout the region and worldwide. Syria is now a problem for global security. The main concern now seems to have shifted to defeating Al-Qaeda, rather than Assad. The region is in turmoil, and the presence of groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda is an enormous risk for everyone. Indeed, 10 years after the start of the war in Iraq, groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda have taken control of key Iraqi cities, including the symbolically important city of Fallujah.

The Geneva II conference offers an opportunity to address these dangers. But risks abound. We still do not know who will represent the Syrian opposition, or if the [Syrian National Council](#) – which demands that Assad step down unconditionally – will even be there. The regime, for its part, wants the conference to focus on combating the growing extremist presence within the opposition, which it refers to generically as “terrorist.” Nor is it known whether Iran will participate. As a key actor in the conflict, Iran should have an important role in its resolution. And, despite the resistance of Saudi Arabia and the Sunni opposition, the U.S. and the EU currently seem more inclined to accept Iran’s inclusion in the Geneva II negotiations, especially now that advances are being made in the implementation of the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program concluded in November.

The top priority at the conference must be to secure a cease-fire. This is the only way to return to what should be the international community’s main concern: ending the suffering of Syrians, restoring their country to them and offering them the chance to construct the peaceful future they deserve. Beyond the geopolitical risks that Syria’s civil war has created, the suffering of millions of human beings cries out for an end to the violence. After three years of war, a cease-fire is currently the best path to peace. For that reason, Geneva II is an opportunity that must not be wasted.

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*Javier Solana was EU high representative for foreign and security policy, secretary-general of NATO and foreign minister of Spain. He is currently president of the [ESADE Center](#) for Global Economy and Geopolitics and distinguished fellow at the Brookings Institution.*

[Article 6.](#)

Sunday’s Zaman

## **What to expect in 2014 Turkey**

Doğa Sacit

19 January 2014 -- Turks are used to their state persecuting Islamic groups and even individual apolitical Muslims. The past century is full of examples of such groups being banned, their leaders being summarily

executed or jailed without fair trial and individual Muslims being purged from either the military or other state institutions. All were done in the name of “protecting the state's secular regime.”

This is the first time in Turkey, however, that an Islamist-rooted government has openly declared another Islamic community its nemesis. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his close circle of advisers, pro-government journalists and well-coordinated army of “tweeps,” have accused Fethullah Gülen and the Hizmet movement he has inspired of being part of a “dirty operation, with external ties” aimed at overthrowing the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government.

Prime Minister Erdoğan's war on Gülen and the Hizmet community comes as a shock to all and, as an event, is something new for Turkey. But it is quite an old and familiar one for Muslim communities given the countless infamous examples throughout Islamic history. This history is replete with stories of caliphs resorting to unspeakable levels of violence against respected Islamic scholars and their followers, whom they perceived as a threat to their absolute control of the state and society.

Two graft probes have recently implicated members of Erdoğan's government and family, but there are also the indications that similar corruption charges, including those directly implicating Erdoğan himself, may follow. The prime minister's overreaction to the graft probe suggests that he may take some precautionary steps in order to protect himself, his family and his rule, while he still can. These steps may have far-reaching implications that could affect the type of regime in the Turkish Republic. Not war, but McCarthyism and assault on the republic

Faced with bribery and corruption charges, the AK Party government made a number of overnight actions that paralyzed two operations launched, respectively, on Dec. 17 and 24. First, the interior minister -- who was implicated in the case along with his son -- sacked all the police chiefs carrying out the investigation, including the chief of police in İstanbul. The purge has spread to other cities, amounting to 2,000 police officers in about 30 cities. Second, the prosecutors of both investigations were removed from the cases. Third, a new regulation was put in place requiring the police to inform superiors before carrying out any investigation sanctioned by a prosecutor. So, according to this regulation, the interior minister would have to be informed before an investigation implicating him and his

son for bribery could be initiated. At this point, neither investigation is moving. But the government's purge within the police and judiciary is continuing at full force.

From the very beginning, instead of responding to the corruption charges, the AK Party leaders have continued to say the case is the work of an international conspiracy targeting their government. Now, nobody doubts that when the prime minister talks about “a dirty operation with external ties” he is referring to an alleged conspiracy masterminded by the US, Israel and European countries, and assisted by the Hizmet movement. It is also widely known that Erdoğan and his camp accuse Hizmet of organizing the Gezi protests that rocked the country this past summer as well.

Accordingly, ever since Dec. 17, Erdoğan has resorted to an increasingly threatening rhetoric against the Hizmet movement, and at times vulgar language against Mr. Fethullah Gülen. He alleged that Hizmet sought to establish a “parallel state” through its men within the police and judiciary and that it sought to create an “AK Party without Erdoğan.” During his campaign rallies for the upcoming municipal elections, Erdoğan repeatedly vowed to “break the hands” of those plotting against his government.

Similarly, he announced that his government could declare the US ambassador to Turkey persona non grata due to the latter's alleged comments about the situation in the country during a meeting with his European counterparts. Shortly after, it was revealed that such a meeting never took place, nor did the US ambassador make such comments.

Again, Mr. Gülen himself, his lawyer and the Journalists and Writers Foundation (GYV) affiliated with the Hizmet movement, have not only condemned and denied the allegations of meddling in state affairs, but they have also called upon the government to use everything at its disposal to bring to justice those so-called “men of Hizmet” within the police and judiciary who are allegedly bypassing their superiors and acting according to the directives of the movement.

So far, no such “man of Hizmet” has been identified, nor have the state authorities produced any evidence to validate this charge of “establishing a parallel state.” Yet hundreds of individuals within the police, the judiciary and other state institutions have been sacked on the alleged charges of being “men of Hizmet.” According to the statements of government officials as well as pro-AK Party media reports, this trend will continue

and expand. Unless evidence is produced, what the AK Party government is doing is nothing but McCarthyism -- that is, "the practice of making accusations of disloyalty, subversion or treason without proper regard for evidence, and the practice of making unfair allegations or using unfair investigative techniques, especially in order to restrict dissent or political criticism."

But, at the same time, the AK Party government and pro-government media are trying to portray the ongoing tension as a "war" between the government and the country as a whole on the one side, and foreign conspirators and Hizmet on the other. Then, whatever the government does would look like a rightful response to an assault on the country. However, the situations as it stands, the government's reaction and the response of the Hizmet movement all suggest that this is not a war but a government assault on Hizmet and whoever it deems a threat to its absolute control of the state and society. More tragically, this is the AK Party government's assault on Turkey's democratic regime, which rests on the principle of the separation of powers. The AK Party government's hitherto interference in the judiciary and its bypassing of Parliament illustrate its rapid departure from democracy towards authoritarianism.

Resurrecting the caliphate: From de facto to de jure?

What can explain this radical change in the AK Party government's attitude? Could the AK Party government have been involved in such a massive bribery and corruption plot? Could Prime Minister Erdoğan have let that happen, let alone be one of the main culprits himself?

Well, under normal circumstances Erdoğan would get neither himself nor his government involved in what looks like plain bribery, because the allegations against it would be a fatal blow to any government claiming to be democratic. But the situation would be completely different if the underlying assumption of the government is that Erdoğan is the de facto caliph. Then what looks like bribery or unlawful government appropriation would be the legitimate right of Erdoğan and his government. After all, according to a peculiar interpretation of the Islamic tradition, the caliph is entitled to own 20 percent of the state income since he is the defender of the faith and protector of the Islamic ummah. For quite some time, pro-government Islamic jurists such as Hayrettin Karaman have been referring to the concept of "humus" in order to legitimize the AK Party

government's appropriations from business tenders or similar revenue-generating projects. Neither Erdoğan nor any other high-ranking AK Party official has so far publicly claimed that Erdoğan is the caliph. Yet, neither has denied such oft-repeated claims either.

Perhaps some statements may just be tossed out as fanatical and thoughtless utterances. These include: pro-government journalist Fatih Altaylı saying, "If there be a need, I would prostrate before the prime minister"; AK Party Aydın provincial office head İsmail Eser saying, "Our prime minister is like a second prophet to us"; a Facebook fan page claiming "Erdoğan is the mehdi"; pro-government journalist Atılğan Baya declaring, "I recognize Erdoğan as the caliph on earth and pledge my absolute obedience"; AK Party Bursa deputy Hüseyin Şahin suggesting that "even touching Erdoğan is worship"; and former EU Affairs Minister Egemen Bağış saying, "Rize, İstanbul and Siirt are holy cities because one is where Erdoğan was born, the other is where he got into politics and the third is where he was elected to Parliament." Though not as bombastic as these, similar statements by AK Party supporters and Erdoğan fans have recently flooded social media as well.

With so many supporters at all levels more or less believing in his somewhat messianic role and de facto caliphate, Erdoğan may be tempted to respond to this popular expectation by taking legal steps that would officially make him the caliph. If he does so, it would not be simply for religious or idealistic purposes of uniting the ummah, but it would serve pragmatic, though heinous, ends. After all, if there were a caliph in charge, all the faithful, including all groups and their leaders -- such as Mr. Fethullah Gülen -- would be required to pledge their absolute loyalty to him, or they would have to be treated as traitors. We can cite as an example the second Abbasid caliph, Abu Ja'far al-Mansur, who ruled during the eighth century and persecuted respected Islamic scholars and founders of two major schools of jurisprudence: Ja'far al-Sadiq and Imam Abu Hanifa. The two had various things in common: both opposed Caliph Mansur's oppressive reign and, as a result, were jailed, tortured and poisoned to death on the orders of the latter. Interestingly, Caliph Mansur had initially offered his blessings to both scholars in order to lure them to legitimize his oppressive regime, but turned against them once they refused to comply.

The revival of the caliphate would have deep symbolic meaning for Turkey, and seriously affect its domestic politics, as well as foreign relations. As such, it may sound unthinkable to some. But, practically, it is not so. When Mustafa Kemal Atatürk abolished the caliphate in 1924, he did not terminate it. He transferred the mantle of the caliphate from the Ottoman dynasty, all the members of which he sent into exile, to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, in which today Mr. Erdoğan's AK Party has an invincible majority. There is also no need to mention that it would be difficult for many to publicly criticize Erdoğan's move in that direction since that move would undoubtedly come with the promise to transform the Hagia Sophia back into a mosque.

All in all, it is becoming clear that the ongoing tension in Turkey is not because of a war between the AK Party government and the Hizmet movement, but because of the former's assault on Hizmet and every other actor that it deems an obstacle to its establishment of absolute control over the state and society. As such, the year 2014 will be unlike any other as the Islamist AK Party government will seek to persecute the Hizmet movement and its affiliates, as well as other critical voices in the name of that phony goal of protecting Turkey against what Erdoğan described as a “dirty operation with external ties.” The AK Party government's actions to legitimize this illegitimate persecution will have destructive implications on the regime type, as well as integrity, of the Turkish Republic.

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*Doğa Sacit is an investigative journalist based in İstanbul.*

[Article 7.](#)

New Republic

## **Harry Truman's concerns about Israel and Palestine were prescient—and forgotten**

John B. Judis

January 15, 2014 -- In November 1953, after he had left the presidency, Harry Truman traveled to New York to be feted at the Jewish Theological Seminary. When his old friend Eddie Jacobson introduced him as “the man who helped create the state of Israel,” Truman responded, “What do you

mean ‘helped to create’? I am Cyrus.” Truman was referring to the Persian King who overthrew the Babylonians in 593 B.C.E. and helped the Jews, who had been held captive in Babylon, return to Jerusalem and rebuild their temple.

In his Memoirs, published in 1956, Truman cast himself as a consistent proponent of the Jewish state, and some of his noted biographers have followed suit. In Truman, David McCullough writes that when Truman recognized the new state of Israel in May 1948, he had “no regrets” about what “he achieved.” Truman’s reputed devotion to Israel has become the standard by which subsequent president’s commitment is measured. In 1982, Richard Nixon described Ronald Reagan as the “most pro-Israel president since Truman.” A Boston Globe editorial in 1998 described Bill Clinton as “the most pro-Israel president since Harry Truman.” In 2009, Charles Krauthammer described George W. Bush as “the most pro-Israel president since Harry Truman.” And Vice President Joseph Biden declared in 2012 that “no president since Harry Truman has done more for Israel’s security than Barack Obama.”

To be sure, Truman had no regrets about Israel after he left office. Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion recounted how when, during a meeting in New York in 1961, he praised the former president for his “constant sympathy with our aims in Israel ... tears suddenly sprang to his eyes.” But in the years leading up to, and in the months following, American recognition of Israel in May 1948, Truman was filled with doubt and regret about his role. The rosy portrayal of Truman’s unquestioning commitment to and constant sympathy with Israel, which is often linked to a picture of the younger Truman as a Christian Zionist, is dead wrong.

As president, Truman initially opposed the creation of a Jewish state. Instead, he tried to promote an Arab-Jewish federation or binational state. He finally gave up in 1947 and endorsed the partition of Palestine into separate states, but he continued to express regret in private that he had not achieved his original objective, which he blamed most often on the “unwarranted interference” of American Zionists. After he had recognized the new state, he pressed the Israeli government to negotiate with the Arabs over borders and refugees; and expressed his disgust with “the manner in which the Jews are handling the refugee problem.”

Of course, there were good reasons why Truman failed to achieve a federated or binational Palestine, and I don't intend by recounting Truman's qualms to suggest that he was wrong to recognize Israel. But Truman's misgivings about a Jewish state and later about the Israeli stance on borders and refugees were not baseless. Truman was guided by moral precepts and political principles and concerns about America's role in the Middle East that remain highly relevant today. Understanding his qualms is not just a matter of setting the historical record straight. It's also about understanding why resolving the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians needs to be high on America's diplomatic agenda.

Some of the same people who portray Truman as a dependable supporter of a Jewish state also describe him as having been a proto-Zionist or a Christian Zionist along the lines of Britain's Arthur Balfour or David Lloyd George, who in 1917 got the British government to champion a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Truman biography Michael T. Benson says that Truman's support for Israel was an "outgrowth of the president's religious upbringing and his familiarity with the Bible." But Truman's love for the Bible was partly based on his flawed eyesight. The family Bible, with its extra large print, was one of the few books at home the young Truman could read. By his teens, Truman's favorite author was the irreverent Mark Twain, and like Twain, he would come to have no patience with religious piety.

Truman was not a philo-Semite like Balfour or Lloyd George. He was skeptical of the idea that Jews were a chosen people. ("I never thought God picked any favorites," he wrote in his diary in 1945.) He had the ethnic prejudices of a small town Protestant Midwesterner from Independence, Missouri. He referred to New York City as "kike town" and complained about Jews being "very very` selfish." But Truman's prejudice was not exclusive to Jews (he contrasted "wops" as well as "Jews" with "white people") and did not infect his political views or his friendships with people like Eddie Jacobson, his original business partner in Kansas City. He was, his biographer Alonzo Hamby has written, "the American democrat, insistent on social equality, but suspicious of those who were unlike him."

There were two aspects of Truman's upbringing and early political outlook that shaped his view of a Jewish state. Truman grew up in a border state

community that had been torn apart by the Civil War. That, undoubtedly, contributed to his skepticism about any arrangement that he thought could lead to civil war. And Truman, like his father, was an old-fashioned Democrat. His political heroes were Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, and he shared Jefferson's insistence on the separation of church and state. He blamed Europe's centuries of war on religious disputes, which, he said, "have caused more wars and feuds than money." That, too, contributed to his skepticism about a Jewish state.

When Truman assumed office in April 1945 after Franklin Roosevelt's death, he had little knowledge of Palestine and even less of what Roosevelt's policies in the region had been. What immediately concerned him was what to do about the Jewish refugees, the survivors of the Nazi's final solution, most of whom were stranded in ramshackle displaced person camps in Central Europe, and some of whom wanted to migrate to Palestine. Truman was deeply sympathetic to the Jews' plight and defied the British, who still controlled Palestine and were worried about the Arab reaction, by calling for 100,000 Jewish refugees to be let in.

Truman was first lobbied to back a Jewish state in September 1945 by Rabbis Abba Hillel Silver and Stephen Wise, the leaders of the American Zionist Emergency Council (AZEC), a coalition of Zionist groups. They urged him to support turning all of Palestine, which was about thirty percent Jewish, over to the Jews. Truman told them that he objected to a religious state, whether Catholic or Jewish. He also expressed fear that trying to establish one would lead to war. In November, Truman repeated his opposition to a Jewish state to a meeting of American diplomats in the Middle East. Proponents of a Jewish commonwealth, Truman said, "didn't give consideration to the international political situation in that area." In a December meeting with Jewish representatives, Truman said that "the government of Palestine should be a government of the people of Palestine irrespective of race, creed, or color."

That fall, Truman had agreed to a British proposal for an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry that would recommend solutions to the refugee crisis and the future of Palestine. The committee handed down its findings in the spring of 1946. It called on Britain to permit 100,000 refugees to enter Palestine, but also recommended that Palestine not become either a Jewish or an Arab state. It proposed instead that it continue under a United Nations

trusteeship, administered presumably by Britain. That part of the proposal infuriated the Zionists who successfully lobbied Truman to withhold his endorsement of the plan, but Truman, who favored the idea, sent a State Department official Henry Grady to Britain to devise with British representative Herbert Morrison a specific plan for Palestine's future. Truman conferred regularly with Grady and in late July approved what was called the "Morrison-Grady Plan." It would establish a federated Palestine with autonomous Jewish and Arab regions. The British, or whoever the United Nations appointed, would retain control of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and the Negev until the Arabs and Jews, who would enjoy equal representation in a national legislature, were ready to rule all of Palestine without going to war with each other. Truman and State Department were eager to publicly endorse the plan, but Silver and the Zionist lobby mounted a furious campaign against the proposal.

The Zionist lobby, which itself could call on thousands of activists around the country, was joined by Democratic officials and White House aides who were worried that without the Jewish vote in New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Ohio, the Democrats could lose Congress that November. (At that time, New York was the important political prize, and the Jewish vote had proven decisive in New York elections.) At a cabinet meeting on July 30, Truman held up a stack of telegrams protesting Morrison-Grady that, according to Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace, was "four inches thick." Speaking of the Zionists, Truman exclaimed, "Jesus Christ couldn't please them when he was here on earth, so how could anyone expect that I would have any luck?" Truman, who was sensitive to criticism from the British, insisted that he was immune to political pressure on Palestine, but he gave in, and failed to endorse the proposal he had helped to design.

Truman's defeat on the Morrison-Grady plan marked the end of his active involvement in trying to shape Palestine's future. From then on, Truman followed a pattern of fleeting involvement and resentful withdrawal. After agreeing under political pressure to take the Zionists' side, he would withdraw from the issue, leaving it to the State Department, which generally opposed the Zionists. The State Department would then take a position unfriendly to AZEC, and the Zionist lobby would begin pressuring Truman, using the threat of electoral defeat. With the 1948 presidential

election looming, this threat was even more credible than in 1946. Truman and the Democrats had to worry not just about the Jewish vote, but also about fundraising from wealthy Jewish contributors. And they had to worry, too, not just about the Republican opponent, but about Progressive Party candidate Henry Wallace, who charged that a vote for Truman was a “vote to rebuild Nazi Germany.” The political pressure would finally get to Truman, and the pattern would recur.

Thus, after having given in on Morrison-Grady in August 1946, Truman withdrew and turned his attention elsewhere. When the Jewish Agency in Paris issued a new proposal for partitioning Palestine—a breakthrough that occurred over AZEC's opposition—Truman initially refused to take a public stand, and assured a visiting diplomat that he still could only support “some local autonomy arrangement.” But after visits from Democratic officials worried about Jewish support, lobbying from a major Jewish contributor, and the threat of a Zionist ad campaign against the Democrats, Truman gave in and issued a statement of support. Afterwards, however, a disgusted Truman washed his hands of the issue, writing to a Democratic National Committee official that “the situation is insoluble in my opinion.” When the British gave up and ceded Palestine's future to the U.N. in the winter of 1947, Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall initially attempted to take no position whatsoever. Finally, with the 1948 election only a year away, and telegrams, calls, and visits mounting, Truman, after tentatively backing a plan that would divide Palestine into parts roughly proportionate to the Jewish and Arab populations, agreed to help win support for a partition proposal that gave the Arabs only 40 percent of the lands. “I don't think I've ever had as much pressure put on the White House,” Truman wrote in a letter. But after the U.N. passed the proposal in November 1947 and the Arabs took up arms, as the State Department had warned, Truman, resentful toward the “pressure boys,” withdrew and let the State Department handle the repercussions.

That winter, the State Department, worried about the raging war, won Truman's tacit support for abandoning partition and reviving the idea of a U.N. trusteeship. But when America's U.N. representative introduced the proposal, the Zionist movement reacted sharply. The movement planned hundreds of nationwide rallies to take place on the evening of May 14, when the new state of Israel was supposed to be announced. Truman's

political advisors warned that the rallies would be used to denounce the president. Truman once again gave in and agreed to recognize the new state that evening.

Yet throughout this period, Truman continued to admit privately that he preferred the Morrison-Grady plan for a federated Palestine and to blame AZEC and also (at various times), the British, the Jews in Palestine, and the Arabs for its abandonment. What's most remarkable is that he continued to insist Morrison-Grady was the right choice in the months before and after his having recognized the new state of Israel.

In February 1948, Truman told an American diplomat that in 1946 he had "found a sound approach ... Grady had gone to London to get implemented but had failed because of British bullheadedness and the fanaticism of our New York Jews." On May 6, Truman told Rabbi Judah Magnes, the president of the Hebrew University, that it "was a thousand pities" that the Morrison-Grady plan "had not been carried out." "You Jews and your Arabs are spoiling things," he complained.

On May 15—the day after he recognized Israel—Truman wrote leftwing editor Bartley Crum, a supporter of the new state, that he thought "the report of the British-American Commission [sic] on Palestine was the correct solution, and, I think, eventually we are going to get it worked out just that way." On May 18, he told Dean Acheson, who was between jobs at the State Department, that in 1946 "we had the problem solved, but the emotional Jews of the United States and the equally emotional Arabs in Egypt and Syria prevented that settlement from taking place."

Months later, Truman was still at it. In early September, a delegation of Jewish War Veterans led by Brigadier Julius Klein visited the White House. Truman expected a handshake, a few photos, and a request to appear at the war veterans' next event, but what he got instead was strenuous lobbying by Klein for arms to Israel. An irritated Truman told the war veterans that he and the British "had agreed on the best possible solution for Palestine, and it was the Zionists who killed that plan by their opposition."

Was Truman right that Morrison-Grady was the "best possible solution" all along? Certainly, as an American, one has to believe that the best possible solution is one where peoples of different religions and nationalities get along in one country. And it remains, perhaps, an ideal solution, but it was not going to happen in those years after World War II. Even if one sets

aside the fierce political opposition in the United States to the proposal, there were ample reasons why the plan for a federated or bi-national Palestine was not feasible.

The Arabs and Jews in Palestine both rejected the plan. The Arabs, who, in Rashid Khalidi's words, had been "envenomed" by their failed rebellion against Zionism and the British, saw the arrival of more Jewish immigrants as a harbinger to a Jewish-controlled Palestine, while the Jews saw any restriction on their sovereignty (or the size of their state within Palestine) as a threat to their survival in the wake of the Holocaust. Still, in the year before Britain gave up trying to mediate between the contending forces, there were hints of compromise from the Arabs and the Jews. What was finally lacking, however, was an outside power capable of imposing and then enforcing a compromise.

Britain was crippled by its war debts after World War II. It could no longer support an overseas military, and in February 1947 announced the withdrawal of its troops from Greece and Turkey. It threw the future of Palestine into the lap of the U.N. in the hope of being able to remove its troops from there, where it was in the midst of war with Zionist forces. The British believed they could only oversee Palestine if the United States contributed money and troops. They could have believed, with some justification, that they could intimidate the Arabs and that the Americans could intimidate the Jews into co-existing with each other. Truman, however, was willing to contribute money but not troops. The United States had undergone rapid demobilization after World War II, but the Cold War had begun. By 1947, Truman and the State Department were preoccupied with having enough troops to defend Europe against Soviet communism. As the final debate over partition was occurring in the United Nations, the U.S. was in the midst of the Berlin crisis with the Soviet Union. There was no support in the American government, or in the public, for sending troops to Palestine.

Truman rejected sending troops to enforce Morrison-Grady and later to enforce the original U.N. partition plan. Without American troops, the British and then the U.N. were powerless to prevent a civil war and to alter the final results, which left the Jews with almost 80 percent of Palestine, and the Palestinian Arabs stateless and dispersed as refugees throughout the region. Even with an American-led intervention force, the U.N. might

still have been unable to prevent a civil war from breaking out or the subsequent war between Israel and the Arab states, but without such a force, there was simply no chance of realizing the Morrison-Grady plan or the original U.N. plan of November 1947. Truman's nostalgia for the Morrison-Grady plan was based on a fantasy.

But the considerations that led Truman to favor a bi-national or federated Palestine were not fantastic, and remain relevant today. There was always a strong moral streak in Truman's foreign policy. He thought of the world divided between underdogs and bullies and good and evil. He genuinely hated Nazis and sympathized with Jews as their victims. His support for the right of the refugees to emigrate to Palestine reflected his moral conviction rather than any concern about electoral support. And in Palestine, he wanted a solution that was fair to the Arabs as well as to the Jews.

Truman didn't know all the details of the history of Palestine, but he knew that the Jews had come to Palestine a half century before to establish a Jewish state where another people had lived, and had made up the overwhelming majority for the prior 1,400 years. He was offended by the proposal, pressed by Silver and American Zionists, that a minority should be allowed to rule a majority. He wanted an arrangement that would respect the just claims of both Jews and the Arabs.

After he dropped his public opposition to a Jewish state, and supported some form of partition, Truman continued to be guided by moral considerations. In October 1947, he had endorsed a partition that would more accurately reflect the size of the existing populations. After Israel was established, and had defeated the Arabs, he supported a peace agreement that would allow some of the 700,000 Arab refugees from the war to return to their homes. (The Israeli ambassador to the United States complained that Truman was "sentimentally sympathetic" to the refugees.) In each case, however, Truman backed down under pressure from the Zionist lobby. In August 1949, Truman and the State Department finally gave up trying to influence the Israelis.

Today, of course, the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a moral issue. The Jews got their state in 1948, but the Palestinians did not. After the 1948 war, Jordan annexed the West Bank and Egypt Gaza, and the term "Palestine" was banned from Jordanian textbooks. After the Six Day War, Israel

annexed East Jerusalem and took over the West Bank and Gaza. It evacuated its settlers from Gaza after 2006, but continues to control its outer access and air space. The Israeli government has allowed over 500,000 Jews to settle in Palestinian areas of Jerusalem and in the West Bank. The “underdogs,” as Truman once put it in a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, are now acting like the “top dogs.”

Truman and the State Department were also worried that the attempt to create a Jewish state in an Arab-dominated region would lead to war and continued strife. Many of their concerns have become outdated. They were worried originally that the Arabs would slaughter the Jews and that the United States would have to prevent a second Holocaust. They worried for decades that American support for Israel would drive the Arabs into the arms of the Soviet Union. But their underlying concern—that a Jewish state, established against the opposition of its neighbors, would prove destabilizing and a threat to America’s standing in the region—has been proven correct.

That’s been even more the case in the wake of Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem, a Muslim holy site, and its occupation of the West Bank. Opposition to the Israeli occupation was central to the growth of Islamic nationalism in the Middle East in the 1970s and to the rise of international terrorist groups. Osama bin Laden’s 1996 [Fatwa](#) was directed at the “Zionist-Crusader alliance.” America’s continued support for Israel—measured in military aid and in its tilt to Israel in negotiations with the Palestinians—has fueled anti-Americanism. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2010, General David Petraeus, then in charge of operations in Afghanistan [said](#) publicly what many American officials privately believe:

Resolving the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians would not necessarily calm the turbulent Middle East, but at a time when Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and even Lebanon are in chaos and could become havens for international terrorism, it would remove an important source of unrest and allow the United States to act as an honest broker rather than a partisan in the region.

Truman’s solution to the conflict was, of course, a federated or binational Palestine. If that was out of the question in 1946, it is even more so almost 70 years later. If there is a “one-state solution” in Israel/Palestine, it is

likely to be an authoritarian Jewish state compromising all of British Palestine. What remains possible, although enormously difficult to achieve, is the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. That is what the last three American Presidents, sometimes facing opposition from Israel's lobby in Washington as well as from the Israeli government and the Palestinian Hamas organization, have tried unsuccessfully to promote, and what Secretary of State John Kerry is currently trying to negotiate. If Truman were still around, he would wish Kerry well. The same moral and strategic imperatives that led Truman to favor the Morrison-Grady plan for Palestine now argue in favor of creating a geographically and economically viable Palestinian state. And if it is going to happen, America, the leading outside power in the region, has to play a major role. It has to be "Cyrus"--not just for the Israelis, but for the Palestinians.

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*John B. Judis is an American journalist, who is a senior editor at [The New Republic](#) and a contributing editor to [The American Prospect](#). In 2002, he published [The Emerging Democratic Majority](#) (co-written with political scientist [Ruy Teixeira](#)), a book arguing that Democrats would retake control of American politics, thanks in part to growing support from minorities and well-educated professionals. Its title was a deliberate echo of [Kevin Phillips'](#) 1969 classic, [The Emerging Republican Majority](#). The book was named one of the year's best by [The Economist](#).*