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Article 1.

The Washington Post

A new road map to Middle East peace?

[David Ignatius](#)

May 28 -- Secretary of State John Kerry's cardinal rule in trying to restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been that he won't talk publicly

about the details, so it's difficult to know how he's doing. But he's still hard at it, and he seems to be employing some modest variations on the traditional choreography of Middle East shuttle diplomacy.

Kerry has made a restart of the peace process a personal priority: He has played his cards close to the vest during a string of private meetings with key Israeli and Arab officials. But it appears that he's seeking agreement on basic parameters — the borders for a Palestinian state and an understanding about Israel's security requirements — that would allow negotiations to begin in earnest.

[“What we all want to do is restart the peace talks with the Palestinians,”](#) Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Kerry in the presence of reporters Thursday. But Netanyahu wants a clear U.S. commitment that any Palestinian state will be demilitarized and won't become a base for launching attacks on Israel.

Kerry knows all the reasons why this new peace effort could fail. Yet he's back in the region this week on his fourth visit in the last two months, and diplomatic observers say he's surprisingly close to getting the parties back to the table.

How has Kerry addressed the challenge that has defied so many of his predecessors? He and his staff won't discuss tactics, but you can sense some of his starting points: Rather than waste time haggling over a formal settlement freeze or other confidence-building measures, he got both sides to make unannounced concessions. The Israelis have refrained from making inflammatory announcements about new settlements, and the Palestinians have held back from taking their cause to the United Nations. Kerry's window of opportunity will close soon: If he can't produce real negotiations by this summer, the Palestinians will be back at the United Nations in September, and the Israeli settlement machine will be an issue again.

Kerry has taken some innovative steps to sweeten a negotiating option that has been soured by so many decades of failure. In effect, he has front-loaded some potential benefits, so that Israelis and Palestinians can see what could be gained if they negotiated the difficult final-status issues. The first of these steps was to reanimate [the Arab Peace Initiative](#), originally launched in 2002 by Saudi Arabia and repackaged this year by

Qatar, which is always looking for a way to show up its big brother in the gulf.

The revived initiative, ratified by Arab League foreign ministers in April, included several important amendments. The Arabs called for a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, as before, but endorsed a “[comparable and mutually agreed minor swap of the land](#),” in the words of Sheik Hamad Bin Jasim al-Thani, Qatar’s peripatetic foreign minister. Second, and perhaps more important, the Arabs said that if the deal were ratified by both sides, “they would consider the conflict ended,” as Kerry put it, and they would have peace treaties and normalized relations with Israel.

The bottom line for Israel is that rather than just a two-state solution, it would get a 22-state solution (the Arab League members) and even a 57-state solution (if you add in the additional Muslim countries in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation).

Netanyahu offered only a grudging acknowledgement of [the rejiggered Arab Peace Initiative](#) in April. But Israeli President Shimon Peres made an unusual intervention, specifying that such a two-state solution “is also accepted by us and a broad structure of support is being created for making progress.” The Peres statement appears to be the operative Israeli position. Kerry’s second sweetener has been [a \\$4 billion economic assistance plan for the West Bank and Gaza](#). It was crafted with help from Israeli and Palestinian business executives working with the international group of nations known as the Quartet and was discussed by Kerry last weekend at the World Economic Forum meeting in Jordan.

“He wants to convey to people in the region how peace would improve their daily lives,” explained one Kerry adviser. The economic package is not meant as a substitute for a final-status agreement, as Palestinians fear, but to “underscore the desirability of peace.”

Kerry has one unlikely advantage in the frustrating, obstacle-strewn search for an Israeli-Palestinian peace. He knows what it’s like to fail at something big in life in his unsuccessful 2004 Democratic presidential campaign — and to stay in the arena for one more try at achieving greatness.

The Washington Post

Iran's nuclear games demand a tougher U.S. approach

Dennis Ross and David Makovsky

May 28 -- As the conflict in Syria rivets international attention, Iran's nuclear program continues apace. Unfortunately, while the Iranians [install the next generation of centrifuges](#) — machines that can produce enriched uranium three to four times faster than before — the “P5+1” negotiations on Iran's nuclear program have ground once again to a halt.

While economic pressures impose a cost on Iran, so far they have [failed to alter its nuclear program](#). Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may acknowledge that sanctions are “brutal,” but he also seems to feel that Iran has endured worse. In light of President Obama's objective of preventing the Iranians from acquiring nuclear weapons, something has to give. At a minimum, the supreme leader must be made to feel that when the United States says the time for diplomacy is running out, we mean it — and that the consequence is likely to be the use of force.

Perhaps because of U.S. hesitancy on Syria, or our withdrawal from Iraq, or our transition out of Afghanistan, or talk of the U.S. “pivot” to Asia, Iranian leaders seem not to believe that we will use force if diplomatic efforts fail. Obama insists that he means what he says on preventing Iran from having nuclear weapons and that he will do whatever is necessary. The Iranian misreading of this determination could put us on a fast track to conflict.

If diplomacy is to be given a final chance, the United States needs to shift its negotiating strategy away from the confidence-building “step-by-step” approach — which only deepens Iranian perceptions that they can string us along until we acquiesce. Instead, the United States needs to establish greater clarity about what we can and cannot live with regarding Iran's nuclear program and give further credence to the administration's statements that the time for diplomacy is running out.

The confidence-building approach, which seeks to reach a limited agreement in a bid to buy time for a wider deal in the future, simply cannot

do that. Even if it were possible now, it is not clear that such a tactic would be in U.S. interests. A limited deal is based on the notion that capping Iran's "medium-enriched" uranium at 20 percent enrichment will guard against it being able to upgrade its fuel to weapons-grade enrichment. Yet if Iran has a bomb's worth of uranium enriched to 20 percent, it would take only 30 to 40 days for it to produce weapons-grade fuel.

With Iran [expanding its number of first- and second-generation centrifuges](#), even if its medium-enriched uranium were capped or shipped out of the country as part of some international agreement, the Iranians could surge to weapons-grade almost as fast with their four to five bombs' worth of low-enriched uranium.

Iran continues to stall negotiations under the cover of not ostensibly crossing a "red line." The United States and its allies must change gears. It may be best to do so before [Iran's June 14 elections](#) — not because a deal is likely to be reached before the vote but because the Iranians will need time to contemplate the meaning of an approach geared more toward a nuclear endgame.

This new approach would involve defining an acceptable civil nuclear capability for Iran — something that the confidence-building approach has largely avoided. It could mean accepting limited enrichment but with strict and verifiable restrictions. This would prevent Iran from being able to break out and present the world with a nuclear weapons fait accompli. Practically, there would need to be limits on the number and type of centrifuges, maximum level of enrichment and amount of enriched uranium that could remain in Iran. Each of these amounts would have to be small. Clearly, if Iran is prepared to alter its nuclear program in this fashion, we should be prepared to lift the harsh economic sanctions. But the Iranians cannot get the latter unless they do the former.

Apart from taking away Iranian excuses, an endgame approach to the nuclear issue also has the benefit of creating far greater clarity in Iranian minds. It would signal that we mean what we say — that time is indeed running out. By offering Iran what its leaders have claimed to want, civil nuclear power, the United States could expose Iran's true intentions to the world, including its own people. Were Iranian leaders to turn down the opportunity to have civil nuclear capability, their real aims of acquiring nuclear weapons would be revealed. In such circumstances, the United

States would be far better positioned to make the case to the international community that military action is warranted.

Coercive diplomacy succeeds when threats are believed and the game-playing and manipulation stop. Offering a credible endgame proposal could convince the Iranians that time is truly running out — and that we are setting the stage for the use of force if diplomacy fails. We should give Iran a clear diplomatic way out — and Iranians should understand the consequences if they don't take it.

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Article 3.

NYT

In Syria, Go Big or Stay Home

Ray Takeyh

May 27, 2013 -- FROM liberal internationalists to hawkish conservatives, a chorus of influential voices in Washington is suggesting that American intervention in [Syria](#) would also do serious damage to [Bashar al-Assad's](#) close ally, [Iran](#).

Military action in Syria would demonstrate, so the argument goes, that America is serious about enforcing its red lines. Impressed and crestfallen, Iran's recalcitrant mullahs would scale back their nuclear zeal and conform to international nonproliferation agreements.

However, given the fact that any intervention by the Obama administration is likely to be tentative and halting, rather than an overwhelming show of military force, it is not likely to end Syria's civil war or intimidate Iran's rulers.

The sort of intervention needed to bring about a decisive rebel victory would require more than no-fly zones and arms. It would mean disabling Mr. Assad's air power and putting boots on the ground. America would have to take the lead in organizing a regional military force blessed by the Arab League and supported by its own intelligence assets and Special Forces. After that would come the task of reconstituting Syria and mediating its sectarian conflicts. As the war in Iraq painfully demonstrated,

refashioning national institutions from the debris of a civil war can be more taxing than the original military intervention.

Because it would take all of this to oust Mr. Assad and end the violence, America must accept the need for a robust intervention. There is no easy solution or middle ground. Moreover, rather than intimidating Iran, a less-than-decisive American intervention in Syria would do the opposite. It would convince Iran's leaders that America doesn't have an appetite for fighting a major war in the region.

There is something curious about the debate gripping Washington.

Although the Assad regime has massacred more than 70,000 of its citizens and appears to have violated all norms of warfare by using chemical weapons against civilians, calls for robust intervention are muted.

The legacy of Iraq looms large. A war-weary nation that has sacrificed so much on the battlefields of the Middle East is reluctant to embark on new campaigns. Neither the Obama administration nor its Congressional critics seem to have an appetite for nation-building. And there is a reluctance to admit that half measures like arming the rebels or establishing a no-fly zone are unlikely to end the suffering of the Syrian people in the face of a determined Alawite minority, led by a vicious Mr. Assad, who has no qualms about carrying out ethnic cleansing in a struggle to the death.

A prolonged war in Syria would offer Iran the same advantages that America's invasion of Iraq did. Once the United States settled into the task of reconstituting Iraq, generals, politicians and pundits insisted that a second front couldn't be opened in the Middle East. As Washington tried to sort out Iraq's troubles, it ignored Iran's mischief and subversion.

While Iran enjoyed immunity from American military force as a result of Washington's preoccupation with Iraq's civil war, Iranian proxies in Iraq systematically assaulted American troops with [REDACTED]'s and helped derail their mission. In the meantime, Iran's mothballed nuclear infrastructure was taken out of storage and refurbished.

If a very reluctant Obama administration does become entangled in Syria, it is likely to treat Iran with the same degree of caution as the more hawkish Bush administration did — avoiding any direct confrontation with Iran and refraining from issuing ultimatums about [Iran's nuclear program](#). The result would be an emboldened Iran willing to cross the nuclear threshold and assert its dominance throughout the region.

To be clear, there is no doubt that a decisive rebel victory in Syria and the fall of the Assad dynasty would constitute a major setback for Iran, given that Syria has always been Iran's most reliable pathway to its proxy Hezbollah. But a rebel rout is highly unlikely without full-scale, decisive American intervention.

Facing public pressure to stop the violence, Washington may soon embark on an incremental intervention that would gradually deepen American involvement without producing a decisive outcome. But such half measures won't impress Iran's hardened rulers, who are engaged in a fundamental struggle for the future of the Middle East.

Pleased with Mr. Obama's much vaunted pivot to Asia, the mullahs in Tehran are already convinced that America seeks deliverance from its Arab inheritance. A major American intervention would give them pause; a reluctant intercession in Syria by a hesitant America would only enhance their resolve.

Paradoxically, an intervention intended to persuade Iran's leaders of the viability of American red lines could instead convince them that their nuclear program is safe from American retaliation.

Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Article 4.

The Wall Street Journal

The Problem of Muslim Leadership

[Ayaan Hirsi Ali](#)

May 27, 2013 -- I've seen this before. A Muslim terrorist slays a non-Muslim citizen in the West, and representatives of the Muslim community rush to dissociate themselves and their faith from the horror. After British soldier Lee Rigby was hacked to death last week in Woolwich in south London, Julie Siddiqi, representing the Islamic Society of Britain, quickly stepped before the microphones to attest that all good Muslims were "sickened" by the attack, "just like everyone else."

This happens every time. Muslim men wearing suits and ties, or women wearing stylish headscarves, are sent out to reassure the world that these

attacks have no place in real Islam, that they are aberrations and corruptions of the true faith.

But then what to make of Omar Bakri? He too claims to speak for the true faith, though he was unavailable for cameras in England last week because the Islamist group he founded, Al-Muhajiroun, was banned in Britain in 2010. Instead, he talked to the media from Tripoli in northern Lebanon, where he now lives. Michael Adebolajo—the accused Woolwich killer who was seen on a video at the scene of the murder, talking to the camera while displaying his bloody hands and a meat cleaver—was Bakri's student a decade ago, before his group was banned. "A quiet man, very shy, asking lots of questions about Islam," Bakri recalled last week. The teacher was impressed to see in the grisly video how far his shy disciple had come, "standing firm, courageous, brave. Not running away."

Bakri also told the press: "The Prophet said an infidel and his killer will not meet in Hell. That's a beautiful saying. May God reward [Adebolajo] for his actions . . . I don't see it as a crime as far as Islam is concerned."

The question requiring an answer at this moment in history is clear: Which group of leaders really speaks for Islam? The officially approved spokesmen for the "Muslim community"? Or the manic street preachers of political Islam, who indoctrinate, encourage and train the killers—and then bless their bloodshed?

In America, too, the question is pressing. Who speaks for Islam? The Council on American-Islamic Relations, America's largest Muslim civil-liberties advocacy organization? Or one of the many Web-based jihadists who have stepped in to take the place of the late Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born al Qaeda recruiter?

Some refuse even to admit that this is the question on everyone's mind. Amazingly, given the litany of Islamist attacks—from the 9/11 nightmare in America and the London bombings of July 7, 2005, to the slayings at Fort Hood in Texas in 2009, at the Boston Marathon last month and now Woolwich—some continue to deny any link between Islam and terrorism. This week, BBC political editor Nick Robinson had to apologize for saying on the air, as the news in Woolwich broke, that the men who murdered Lee Rigby were "of Muslim appearance."

Memo to the BBC: The killers were shouting "Allahu akbar" as they struck. Yet when complaints rained down on the BBC about Mr.

Robinson's word choice, he felt obliged to atone. One can only wonder at people who can be so exquisitely sensitive in protecting Islam's reputation yet so utterly desensitized to a hideous murder explicitly committed in the name of Islam.

In the wake of the Boston Marathon bombing and the Woolwich murder, it was good to hear expressions of horror and sympathy from Islamic spokesmen, but something more is desperately required: genuine recognition of the problem with Islam.

Muslim leaders should ask themselves what exactly their relationship is to a political movement that encourages young men to kill and maim on religious grounds. Think of the Tsarnaev brothers and the way they justified the mayhem they caused in Boston. Ponder carefully the words last week of Michael Adebolajo, his hands splashed with blood: "We swear by almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you. The only reason we have done this is because Muslims are dying every day."

My friend, the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, was murdered in 2004 for having been insufficiently reverent toward Islam. In the courtroom, the killer looked at Theo's mother and said to her: "I must confess honestly that I do not empathize with you. I do not feel your pain. . . . I cannot empathize with you because you are an unbeliever."

And yet, after nearly a decade of similar rhetoric from Islamists around the world, last week the Guardian newspaper could still run a headline quoting a Muslim Londoner: "These poor idiots have nothing to do with Islam."

Really? Nothing?

Of course, the overwhelming majority of Muslims are not terrorists or sympathetic to terrorists. Equating all Muslims with terrorism is stupid and wrong. But acknowledging that there is a link between Islam and terror is appropriate and necessary.

On both sides of the Atlantic, politicians, academics and the media have shown incredible patience as the drumbeat of Islamist terror attacks continues. When President Obama gave his first statement about the Boston bombings, he didn't mention Islam at all. This week, Prime Minister [David Cameron](#) and London Mayor Boris Johnson have repeated the reassuring statements of the Muslim leaders to the effect that Lee Rigby's murder has nothing to do with Islam.

But many ordinary people hear such statements and scratch their heads in bewilderment. A murderer kills a young father while yelling "Allahu akbar" and it's got nothing to do with Islam?

I don't blame Western leaders. They are doing their best to keep the lid on what could become a meltdown of trust between majority populations and Muslim minority communities.

But I do blame Muslim leaders. It is time they came up with more credible talking points. Their communities have a serious problem. Young people, some of whom are not born into the faith, are being fired up by preachers using basic Islamic scripture and mobilized to wage jihad by radical imams who represent themselves as legitimate Muslim clergymen.

I wonder what would happen if Muslim leaders like Julie Siddiqi started a public and persistent campaign to discredit these Islamist advocates of mayhem and murder. Not just uttering the usual laments after another horrifying attack, but making a constant, high-profile effort to show the world that the preachers of hate are illegitimate. After the next zealot has killed the next victim of political Islam, claims about the "religion of peace" would ring truer.

Ms. Hirsi Ali is the author of "Nomad: My Journey from Islam to America" (Free Press, 2010). She is a fellow at the Belfer Center of Harvard's Kennedy School and a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Article 5.

Project Syndicate

Why Turkey is Thriving

Jeffrey D. Sachs

27 May 2013 -- A recent visit to Turkey reminded me of its enormous economic successes during the last decade. The economy has grown rapidly, inequality is declining, and innovation is on the rise.

Turkey's achievements are all the more remarkable when one considers its neighborhood. Its neighbors to the west, Cyprus and Greece, are at the

epicenter of the eurozone crisis. To the southeast is war-torn Syria, which has already disgorged [almost 400,000 refugees](#) into Turkey. To the east lie Iraq and Iran. And to the northeast lie Armenia and Georgia. If there is a more complicated neighborhood in the world, it would be difficult to find it.

Yet Turkey has made remarkable strides in the midst of regional upheavals. After a sharp downturn in 1999-2001, the economy grew by 5% per year on average from 2002 to 2012. It has remained at peace, despite regional wars. Its banks avoided the boom-bust cycle of the past decade, having learned from the banking collapse in 2000-2001. Inequality has been falling. And the government has won three consecutive general elections, each time with a greater share of the popular vote.

There is nothing flashy about Turkey's rise, which has been based on fundamentals, rather than bubbles or resource discoveries. Indeed, Turkey lacks its neighbors' oil and gas resources, but it compensates for this with the competitiveness of its industry and services. Tourism alone attracted more than 36 million visitors in 2012, making Turkey one of the world's top destinations.

Even a short stay in Ankara allows one to see these underlying strengths. The airport, highways, and other infrastructure are first class, and a high-speed intercity rail network links Ankara with other parts of the country. Much of the advanced engineering is homegrown. Turkish construction firms are internationally competitive and increasingly win bids throughout the Middle East and Africa.

Turkey's universities are rising as well. Ankara has become a hub of higher education, attracting students from Africa and Asia. Many top programs are in English, ensuring that Turkey will attract an increasing number of international students. And the country's universities are increasingly spinning off high-tech companies in avionics, information technology, and advanced electronics, among other areas.

To its credit, Turkey has begun to invest heavily in sustainable technologies. The country is rich in wind, geothermal, and other renewable energy, and will most likely become a global exporter of advanced green innovations.

Waste-treatment facilities are not typically tourist attractions, but Ankara's novel integrated urban waste-management system has rightly attracted

global attention. Until a few years ago, the waste was dumped into a fetid, stinking, noxious landfill. Now, with cutting-edge technology, the landfill has been turned into a green zone.

The private waste-management company ITC receives thousands of tons of solid municipal waste each day. The waste is separated into recyclable materials (plastics, metals) and organic waste. The organic waste is processed in a fermentation plant, producing compost and methane, which is used to produce electricity in a 25-megawatt power plant. The electricity is returned to the city's power grid, while the heat exhaust is piped to the facility's greenhouses, which produce tomatoes, strawberries, and orchids. Turkey's diversified, innovative base of industry, construction, and services serves it well in a world in which market opportunities are shifting from the United States and Western Europe to Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Turkey has been deft in seizing these new opportunities, with exports increasingly headed south and east to the emerging economies, rather than west to high-income markets. This trend will continue, as Africa and Asia become robust markets for Turkey's construction firms, information technology, and green innovations. So, how did Turkey do it? Most important, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his economics team, led by Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan, have stuck to basics and looked to the long term. Erdoğan came to power in 2003, after years of short-term instability and banking crises. The International Monetary Fund had been called in for an emergency rescue. Step by step, the Erdoğan-Babacan strategy was to rebuild the banking sector, get the budget under control, and invest heavily and consistently where it counts: infrastructure, education, health, and technology.

Smart diplomacy has also helped. Turkey has remained a staunchly moderate voice in a region of extremes. It has kept an open door and balanced diplomacy (to the extent possible) with the major powers in its neighborhood. This has helped Turkey not only to maintain its own internal balance, but also to win markets and keep friends without the heavy baggage and risks of divisive geopolitics.

No doubt, Turkey's ability to continue on a rapid growth trajectory remains uncertain. Any combination of crises – the eurozone, Syria, Iraq, Iran, or world oil prices – could create instability. Another global financial crisis

could disrupt short-term capital inflows. A dangerous neighborhood means inescapable risks, though Turkey has demonstrated a remarkable capacity during the last decade to surmount them.

Moreover, the challenge of raising educational quality and attainment, especially of girls and women, remains a priority. Fortunately, the government has clearly acknowledged the education challenge and is pursuing it through school reforms, increased investments, and the introduction of new information technologies in the classroom.

Turkey's successes have deep roots in governmental capacity and its people's skills, reflecting decades of investment and centuries of history dating back to Ottoman times. Other countries cannot simply copy these achievements; but they can still learn the main lesson that is too often forgotten in a world of "stimulus," bubbles, and short-term thinking. Long-term growth stems from prudent monetary and fiscal policies, the political will to regulate banks, and a combination of bold public and private investments in infrastructure, skills, and cutting-edge technologies.

*Jeffrey D. Sachs, Professor of Sustainable Development, Professor of Health Policy and Management, and Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is also Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on the Millennium Development Goals. His books include *The End of Poverty and Common Wealth*.*

Article 6.

Haaretz

The prophetic lesson of Stephen Hawking's Israel boycott

S. Daniel Abraham

May 28, 2013 -- What Stephen Hawking did was dishonorable. He accepted an invitation to the Israeli Presidential Conference and then, under pressure, withdrew.

Yes, it was a dishonorable thing to do but the most important lesson to learn is that his actions portend the face of the future.

Ironically, this conference is convened in honor of President Shimon Peres, one of Israel's strongest voices for peace with the Palestinians.

Ironic, too, that it is Peres who has been predicting that these sorts of reactions to Israel's occupation are destined to become more and more common.

Almost two years ago Peres voiced his fear that if Israel refuses to commit to its 1967 borders, with modifications, the world will turn against Israel in a far more substantive way than Hawking has done now.

More and more people are going to stop coming to conferences in Israel because the world, whether it's fair or not, will not accept Israel's continuing occupation of the Palestinians in the West Bank.

We can write Op-ed articles assuring ourselves that Hawking is a hypocrite, that he lectures in China, where the occupation of Tibet is far more brutal than Israel's occupation of the West Bank. And he has lectured in Russia, where human rights violations are profound.

Fair or not, Israel is being judged by a different standard than Russia and China. And it will continue to be judged that way.

Even if we conclude that the world's attitude toward Israel is hypocritical, the important question we must ask ourselves is the following: "Is the price of holding onto the West Bank worth the price of ever-increasing isolation?"

The prophet Isaiah declared that the Jewish people are to be "a light onto the nations." And in many ways we have been. We brought into the world the idea of monotheism, of one God, in whose image every human being of every race and religion is created. The Jewish people have made extraordinary contributions to the world, and these include the Israeli scientists who created the device that enables the very ill Dr. Hawking to speak.

The Jewish people have many things of which to be proud. But ruling over 2.5 million Palestinians on the West Bank is not one of them.

The sooner Israel realizes this, the sooner they will establish two states, side by side: The State of Israel and The State of Palestine. We can all have a field day denouncing Stephen Hawking for hypocrisy, but at the end of

the day what matters most is that we realize just how wrong it is to occupy a people whose leader, Mahmoud Abbas, wants to make peace with us. What Hawking did was wrong. What we are doing is self-destructive. Maybe we can't change Hawking's mind but we had better learn how to change ours.

S. Daniel Abraham is an American entrepreneur and the founder of the Center for Middle East Peace in Washington.