




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Article 1.

Foreign Policy

America's Pacific Century

Hillary Clinton

The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action.

NOVEMBER 2011 -- As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point. Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those two theaters. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise -- in the Asia-Pacific region. The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans -- the Pacific and the Indian -- that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the world's population. It includes many of the key engines of the global economy, as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia. At a time when the region is building a more mature security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity, U.S. commitment there is essential. It will help build that architecture and pay dividends for continued American leadership well into this century, just as our post-World War II commitment to building a comprehensive and lasting

transatlantic network of institutions and relationships has paid off many times over -- and continues to do so. The time has come for the United States to make similar investments as a Pacific power, a strategic course set by President Barack Obama from the outset of his administration and one that is already yielding benefits.

With Iraq and Afghanistan still in transition and serious economic challenges in our own country, there are those on the American political scene who are calling for us not to reposition, but to come home. They seek a downsizing of our foreign engagement in favor of our pressing domestic priorities. These impulses are understandable, but they are misguided. Those who say that we can no longer afford to engage with the world have it exactly backward -- we cannot afford not to. From opening new markets for American businesses to curbing nuclear proliferation to keeping the sea lanes free for commerce and navigation, our work abroad holds the key to our prosperity and security at home. For more than six decades, the United States has resisted the gravitational pull of these "come home" debates and the implicit zero-sum logic of these arguments. We must do so again. Beyond our borders, people are also wondering about America's intentions -- our willingness to remain engaged and to lead. In Asia, they ask whether we are really there to stay, whether we are likely to be distracted again by events elsewhere, whether we can make -- and keep -- credible economic and strategic commitments, and whether we can back those commitments with action. The answer is: We can, and we will.

Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama. Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the

vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region's key players. Just as Asia is critical to America's future, an engaged America is vital to Asia's future. The region is eager for our leadership and our business -- perhaps more so than at any time in modern history. We are the only power with a network of strong alliances in the region, no territorial ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common good. Along with our allies, we have underwritten regional security for decades -- patrolling Asia's sea lanes and preserving stability -- and that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth. We have helped integrate billions of people across the region into the global economy by spurring economic productivity, social empowerment, and greater people-to-people links. We are a major trade and investment partner, a source of innovation that benefits workers and businesses on both sides of the Pacific, a host to 350,000 Asian students every year, a champion of open markets, and an advocate for universal human rights. President Obama has led a multifaceted and persistent effort to embrace fully our irreplaceable role in the Pacific, spanning the entire U.S. government. It has often been a quiet effort. A lot of our work has not been on the front pages, both because of its nature -- long-term investment is less exciting than immediate crises -- and because of competing headlines in other parts of the world. As secretary of state, I broke with tradition and embarked on my first official overseas trip to Asia. In my seven trips since, I have had the privilege to see firsthand the rapid transformations taking place in the region, underscoring how much the future of the United States is intimately intertwined with the future of the Asia-Pacific. A strategic

turn to the region fits logically into our overall global effort to secure and sustain America's global leadership. The success of this turn requires maintaining and advancing a bipartisan consensus on the importance of the Asia-Pacific to our national interests; we seek to build upon a strong tradition of engagement by presidents and secretaries of state of both parties across many decades. It also requires smart execution of a coherent regional strategy that accounts for the global implications of our choices.

WHAT DOES THAT regional strategy look like? For starters, it calls for a sustained commitment to what I have called "forward-deployed" diplomacy. That means continuing to dispatch the full range of our diplomatic assets -- including our highest-ranking officials, our development experts, our interagency teams, and our permanent assets -- to every country and corner of the Asia-Pacific region. Our strategy will have to keep accounting for and adapting to the rapid and dramatic shifts playing out across Asia. With this in mind, our work will proceed along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights. By virtue of our unique geography, the United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. We are proud of our European partnerships and all that they deliver. Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across the Atlantic. That is the touchstone of our efforts in all these areas. Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific. They have underwritten regional peace and security for more than half a century, shaping the

environment for the region's remarkable economic ascent. They leverage our regional presence and enhance our regional leadership at a time of evolving security challenges.

As successful as these alliances have been, we can't afford simply to sustain them -- we need to update them for a changing world. In this effort, the Obama administration is guided by three core principles. First, we have to maintain political consensus on the core objectives of our alliances. Second, we have to ensure that our alliances are nimble and adaptive so that they can successfully address new challenges and seize new opportunities. Third, we have to guarantee that the defense capabilities and communications infrastructure of our alliances are operationally and materially capable of deterring provocation from the full spectrum of state and nonstate actors.

The alliance with Japan, the cornerstone of peace and stability in the region, demonstrates how the Obama administration is giving these principles life. We share a common vision of a stable regional order with clear rules of the road -- from freedom of navigation to open markets and fair competition. We have agreed to a new arrangement, including a contribution from the Japanese government of more than \$5 billion, to ensure the continued enduring presence of American forces in Japan, while expanding joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities to deter and react quickly to regional security challenges, as well as information sharing to address cyberthreats. We have concluded an Open Skies agreement that will enhance access for businesses and people-to-people ties, launched a strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific, and been working hand in hand as the two largest donor countries in Afghanistan.

Similarly, our alliance with South Korea has become stronger and more operationally integrated, and we continue to develop our combined capabilities to deter and respond to North Korean provocations. We have agreed on a plan to ensure successful

transition of operational control during wartime and anticipate successful passage of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. And our alliance has gone global, through our work together in the G-20 and the Nuclear Security Summit and through our common efforts in Haiti and Afghanistan. We are also expanding our alliance with Australia from a Pacific partnership to an Indo-Pacific one, and indeed a global partnership. From cybersecurity to Afghanistan to the Arab Awakening to strengthening regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific, Australia's counsel and commitment have been indispensable. And in Southeast Asia, we are renewing and strengthening our alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, increasing, for example, the number of ship visits to the Philippines and working to ensure the successful training of Filipino counterterrorism forces through our Joint Special Operations Task Force in Mindanao. In Thailand -- our oldest treaty partner in Asia -- we are working to establish a hub of regional humanitarian and disaster relief efforts in the region.

AS WE UPDATE our alliances for new demands, we are also building new partnerships to help solve shared problems. Our outreach to China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Pacific Island countries is all part of a broader effort to ensure a more comprehensive approach to American strategy and engagement in the region. We are asking these emerging partners to join us in shaping and participating in a rules-based regional and global order.

One of the most prominent of these emerging partners is, of course, China. Like so many other countries before it, China has prospered as part of the open and rules-based system that the United States helped to build and works to sustain. And today, China represents one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States has ever had to manage. This calls for careful, steady, dynamic

stewardship, an approach to China on our part that is grounded in reality, focused on results, and true to our principles and interests. We all know that fears and misperceptions linger on both sides of the Pacific. Some in our country see China's progress as a threat to the United States; some in China worry that America seeks to constrain China's growth. We reject both those views. The fact is that a thriving America is good for China and a thriving China is good for America. We both have much more to gain from cooperation than from conflict. But you cannot build a relationship on aspirations alone. It is up to both of us to more consistently translate positive words into effective cooperation -- and, crucially, to meet our respective global responsibilities and obligations. These are the things that will determine whether our relationship delivers on its potential in the years to come. We also have to be honest about our differences. We will address them firmly and decisively as we pursue the urgent work we have to do together. And we have to avoid unrealistic expectations. Over the last two-and-a-half years, one of my top priorities has been to identify and expand areas of common interest, to work with China to build mutual trust, and to encourage China's active efforts in global problem-solving. This is why Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and I launched the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the most intensive and expansive talks ever between our governments, bringing together dozens of agencies from both sides to discuss our most pressing bilateral issues, from security to energy to human rights. We are also working to increase transparency and reduce the risk of miscalculation or miscues between our militaries. The United States and the international community have watched China's efforts to modernize and expand its military, and we have sought clarity as to its intentions. Both sides would benefit from sustained and substantive military-to-military engagement that increases transparency. So we look to Beijing to

overcome its reluctance at times and join us in forging a durable military-to-military dialogue. And we need to work together to strengthen the Strategic Security Dialogue, which brings together military and civilian leaders to discuss sensitive issues like maritime security and cybersecurity. As we build trust together, we are committed to working with China to address critical regional and global security issues. This is why I have met so frequently -- often in informal settings -- with my Chinese counterparts, State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, for candid discussions about important challenges like North Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and developments in the South China Sea. On the economic front, the United States and China need to work together to ensure strong, sustained, and balanced future global growth. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the United States and China worked effectively through the G-20 to help pull the global economy back from the brink. We have to build on that cooperation. U.S. firms want fair opportunities to export to China's growing markets, which can be important sources of jobs here in the United States, as well as assurances that the \$50 billion of American capital invested in China will create a strong foundation for new market and investment opportunities that will support global competitiveness. At the same time, Chinese firms want to be able to buy more high-tech products from the United States, make more investments here, and be accorded the same terms of access that market economies enjoy. We can work together on these objectives, but China still needs to take important steps toward reform. In particular, we are working with China to end unfair discrimination against U.S. and other foreign companies or against their innovative technologies, remove preferences for domestic firms, and end measures that disadvantage or appropriate foreign intellectual property. And we look to China to take steps to allow its currency to

appreciate more rapidly, both against the dollar and against the currencies of its other major trading partners. Such reforms, we believe, would not only benefit both our countries (indeed, they would support the goals of China's own five-year plan, which calls for more domestic-led growth), but also contribute to global economic balance, predictability, and broader prosperity. Of course, we have made very clear, publicly and privately, our serious concerns about human rights. And when we see reports of public-interest lawyers, writers, artists, and others who are detained or disappeared, the United States speaks up, both publicly and privately, with our concerns about human rights. We make the case to our Chinese colleagues that a deep respect for international law and a more open political system would provide China with a foundation for far greater stability and growth -- and increase the confidence of China's partners. Without them, China is placing unnecessary limitations on its own development. At the end of the day, there is no handbook for the evolving U.S.-China relationship. But the stakes are much too high for us to fail. As we proceed, we will continue to embed our relationship with China in a broader regional framework of security alliances, economic networks, and social connections. Among key emerging powers with which we will work closely are India and Indonesia, two of the most dynamic and significant democratic powers of Asia, and both countries with which the Obama administration has pursued broader, deeper, and more purposeful relationships. The stretch of sea from the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca to the Pacific contains the world's most vibrant trade and energy routes. Together, India and Indonesia already account for almost a quarter of the world's population. They are key drivers of the global economy, important partners for the United States, and increasingly central contributors to peace and security in the region. And their importance is likely to grow in the years ahead.

President Obama told the Indian parliament last year that the relationship between India and America will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, rooted in common values and interests. There are still obstacles to overcome and questions to answer on both sides, but the United States is making a strategic bet on India's future -- that India's greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security, that opening India's markets to the world will pave the way to greater regional and global prosperity, that Indian advances in science and technology will improve lives and advance human knowledge everywhere, and that India's vibrant, pluralistic democracy will produce measurable results and improvements for its citizens and inspire others to follow a similar path of openness and tolerance. So the Obama administration has expanded our bilateral partnership; actively supported India's Look East efforts, including through a new trilateral dialogue with India and Japan; and outlined a new vision for a more economically integrated and politically stable South and Central Asia, with India as a linchpin. We are also forging a new partnership with Indonesia, the world's third-largest democracy, the world's most populous Muslim nation, and a member of the G-20. We have resumed joint training of Indonesian special forces units and signed a number of agreements on health, educational exchanges, science and technology, and defense. And this year, at the invitation of the Indonesian government, President Obama will inaugurate American participation in the East Asia Summit. But there is still some distance to travel -- we have to work together to overcome bureaucratic impediments, lingering historical suspicions, and some gaps in understanding each other's perspectives and interests.

EVEN AS WE strengthen these bilateral relationships, we have emphasized the importance of multilateral cooperation, for we believe that addressing complex transnational challenges of the sort

now faced by Asia requires a set of institutions capable of mustering collective action. And a more robust and coherent regional architecture in Asia would reinforce the system of rules and responsibilities, from protecting intellectual property to ensuring freedom of navigation, that form the basis of an effective international order. In multilateral settings, responsible behavior is rewarded with legitimacy and respect, and we can work together to hold accountable those who undermine peace, stability, and prosperity. So the United States has moved to fully engage the region's multilateral institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, mindful that our work with regional institutions supplements and does not supplant our bilateral ties. There is a demand from the region that America play an active role in the agenda-setting of these institutions -- and it is in our interests as well that they be effective and responsive. That is why President Obama will participate in the East Asia Summit for the first time in November. To pave the way, the United States has opened a new U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN. Our focus on developing a more results-oriented agenda has been instrumental in efforts to address disputes in the South China Sea. In 2010, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, the United States helped shape a regionwide effort to protect unfettered access to and passage through the South China Sea, and to uphold the key international rules for defining territorial claims in the South China Sea's waters. Given that half the world's merchant tonnage flows through this body of water, this was a consequential undertaking. And over the past year, we have made strides in protecting our vital interests in stability and freedom of navigation and have paved the way for sustained multilateral diplomacy among the many parties with claims in the South China

Sea, seeking to ensure disputes are settled peacefully and in accordance with established principles of international law. We have also worked to strengthen APEC as a serious leaders-level institution focused on advancing economic integration and trade linkages across the Pacific. After last year's bold call by the group for a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific, President Obama will host the 2011 APEC Leaders' Meeting in Hawaii this November. We are committed to cementing APEC as the Asia-Pacific's premier regional economic institution, setting the economic agenda in a way that brings together advanced and emerging economies to promote open trade and investment, as well as to build capacity and enhance regulatory regimes. APEC and its work help expand U.S. exports and create and support high-quality jobs in the United States, while fostering growth throughout the region. APEC also provides a key vehicle to drive a broad agenda to unlock the economic growth potential that women represent. In this regard, the United States is committed to working with our partners on ambitious steps to accelerate the arrival of the Participation Age, where every individual, regardless of gender or other characteristics, is a contributing and valued member of the global marketplace. In addition to our commitment to these broader multilateral institutions, we have worked hard to create and launch a number of "minilateral" meetings, small groupings of interested states to tackle specific challenges, such as the Lower Mekong Initiative we launched to support education, health, and environmental programs in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands Forum, where we are working to support its members as they confront challenges from climate change to overfishing to freedom of navigation. We are also starting to pursue new trilateral opportunities with countries as diverse as Mongolia, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, and South Korea. And we are setting our sights as well on enhancing

coordination and engagement among the three giants of the Asia-Pacific: China, India, and the United States.

In all these different ways, we are seeking to shape and participate in a responsive, flexible, and effective regional architecture -- and ensure it connects to a broader global architecture that not only protects international stability and commerce but also advances our values.

OUR EMPHASIS ON the economic work of APEC is in keeping with our broader commitment to elevate economic statecraft as a pillar of American foreign policy. Increasingly, economic progress depends on strong diplomatic ties, and diplomatic progress depends on strong economic ties. And naturally, a focus on promoting American prosperity means a greater focus on trade and economic openness in the Asia-Pacific. The region already generates more than half of global output and nearly half of global trade. As we strive to meet President Obama's goal of doubling exports by 2015, we are looking for opportunities to do even more business in Asia. Last year, American exports to the Pacific Rim totaled \$320 billion, supporting 850,000 American jobs. So there is much that favors us as we think through this repositioning.

When I talk to my Asian counterparts, one theme consistently stands out: They still want America to be an engaged and creative partner in the region's flourishing trade and financial interactions. And as I talk with business leaders across our own nation, I hear how important it is for the United States to expand our exports and our investment opportunities in Asia's dynamic markets.

Last March in APEC meetings in Washington, and again in Hong Kong in July, I laid out four attributes that I believe characterize healthy economic competition: open, free, transparent, and fair. Through our engagement in the Asia-Pacific, we are helping to give shape to these principles and showing the world their value.

We are pursuing new cutting-edge trade deals that raise the standards for fair competition even as they open new markets. For instance, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement will eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of U.S. consumer and industrial exports within five years and support an estimated 70,000 American jobs. Its tariff reductions alone could increase exports of American goods by more than \$10 billion and help South Korea's economy grow by 6 percent. It will level the playing field for U.S. auto companies and workers. So, whether you are an American manufacturer of machinery or a South Korean chemicals exporter, this deal lowers the barriers that keep you from reaching new customers.

We are also making progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will bring together economies from across the Pacific -- developed and developing alike -- into a single trading community. Our goal is to create not just more growth, but better growth. We believe trade agreements need to include strong protections for workers, the environment, intellectual property, and innovation. They should also promote the free flow of information technology and the spread of green technology, as well as the coherence of our regulatory system and the efficiency of supply chains. Ultimately, our progress will be measured by the quality of people's lives -- whether men and women can work in dignity, earn a decent wage, raise healthy families, educate their children, and take hold of the opportunities to improve their own and the next generation's fortunes. Our hope is that a TPP agreement with high standards can serve as a benchmark for future agreements -- and grow to serve as a platform for broader regional interaction and eventually a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific. Achieving balance in our trade relationships requires a two-way commitment. That's the nature of balance -- it can't be unilaterally imposed. So we are working through APEC, the G-20, and our bilateral relationships to advocate for more open markets,

fewer restrictions on exports, more transparency, and an overall commitment to fairness. American businesses and workers need to have confidence that they are operating on a level playing field, with predictable rules on everything from intellectual property to indigenous innovation.

ASIA'S REMARKABLE ECONOMIC growth over the past decade and its potential for continued growth in the future depend on the security and stability that has long been guaranteed by the U.S. military, including more than 50,000 American servicemen and servicewomen serving in Japan and South Korea. The challenges of today's rapidly changing region -- from territorial and maritime disputes to new threats to freedom of navigation to the heightened impact of natural disasters -- require that the United States pursue a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture.

We are modernizing our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia -- and our commitment on this is rock solid -- while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean. For example, the United States will be deploying littoral combat ships to Singapore, and we are examining other ways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together. And the United States and Australia agreed this year to explore a greater American military presence in Australia to enhance opportunities for more joint training and exercises. We are also looking at how we can increase our operational access in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region and deepen our contacts with allies and partners.

How we translate the growing connection between the Indian and Pacific oceans into an operational concept is a question that we need to answer if we are to adapt to new challenges in the region. Against this backdrop, a more broadly distributed military presence across the region will provide vital advantages. The United States will be better

positioned to support humanitarian missions; equally important, working with more allies and partners will provide a more robust bulwark against threats or efforts to undermine regional peace and stability.

But even more than our military might or the size of our economy, our most potent asset as a nation is the power of our values -- in particular, our steadfast support for democracy and human rights. This speaks to our deepest national character and is at the heart of our foreign policy, including our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific region. As we deepen our engagement with partners with whom we disagree on these issues, we will continue to urge them to embrace reforms that would improve governance, protect human rights, and advance political freedoms. We have made it clear, for example, to Vietnam that our ambition to develop a strategic partnership requires that it take steps to further protect human rights and advance political freedoms. Or consider Burma, where we are determined to seek accountability for human rights violations. We are closely following developments in Nay Pyi Taw and the increasing interactions between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government leadership. We have underscored to the government that it must release political prisoners, advance political freedoms and human rights, and break from the policies of the past. As for North Korea, the regime in Pyongyang has shown persistent disregard for the rights of its people, and we continue to speak out forcefully against the threats it poses to the region and beyond. We cannot and do not aspire to impose our system on other countries, but we do believe that certain values are universal -- that people in every nation in the world, including in Asia, cherish them -- and that they are intrinsic to stable, peaceful, and prosperous countries. Ultimately, it is up to the people of Asia to pursue their own rights and aspirations, just as we have seen people do all over the world.

IN THE LAST decade, our foreign policy has transitioned from dealing with the post-Cold War peace dividend to demanding commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As those wars wind down, we will need to accelerate efforts to pivot to new global realities. We know that these new realities require us to innovate, to compete, and to lead in new ways. Rather than pull back from the world, we need to press forward and renew our leadership. In a time of scarce resources, there's no question that we need to invest them wisely where they will yield the biggest returns, which is why the Asia-Pacific represents such a real 21st-century opportunity for us. Other regions remain vitally important, of course. Europe, home to most of our traditional allies, is still a partner of first resort, working alongside the United States on nearly every urgent global challenge, and we are investing in updating the structures of our alliance. The people of the Middle East and North Africa are charting a new path that is already having profound global consequences, and the United States is committed to active and sustained partnerships as the region transforms. Africa holds enormous untapped potential for economic and political development in the years ahead. And our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere are not just our biggest export partners; they are also playing a growing role in global political and economic affairs. Each of these regions demands American engagement and leadership. And we are prepared to lead. Now, I'm well aware that there are those who question our staying power around the world. We've heard this talk before. At the end of the Vietnam War, there was a thriving industry of global commentators promoting the idea that America was in retreat, and it is a theme that repeats itself every few decades. But whenever the United States has experienced setbacks, we've overcome them through reinvention and innovation. Our capacity to come back stronger is unmatched in modern history. It flows from our model of free democracy and free enterprise, a

model that remains the most powerful source of prosperity and progress known to humankind. I hear everywhere I go that the world still looks to the United States for leadership. Our military is by far the strongest, and our economy is by far the largest in the world. Our workers are the most productive. Our universities are renowned the world over. So there should be no doubt that America has the capacity to secure and sustain our global leadership in this century as we did in the last.

As we move forward to set the stage for engagement in the Asia-Pacific over the next 60 years, we are mindful of the bipartisan legacy that has shaped our engagement for the past 60. And we are focused on the steps we have to take at home -- increasing our savings, reforming our financial systems, relying less on borrowing, overcoming partisan division -- to secure and sustain our leadership abroad.

This kind of pivot is not easy, but we have paved the way for it over the past two-and-a-half years, and we are committed to seeing it through as among the most important diplomatic efforts of our time.

Hillary Clinton is U.S. secretary of state.

Article 2.

The Financial Times

Don't be blind to Erdogan's flaws

Gideon Rachman

October 10, 2011 -- Recep Tayyip Erdogan's admirers stretch from the Arab street to the western salon. In the Middle East, the Turkish prime minister is regarded as a courageous champion of the Palestinians. Many western intellectuals also admire Mr Erdogan, believing he has made Turkey a model for an Arab world in turmoil. At home Mr Erdogan has won three successive elections, presided over an economic boom and enacted important social reforms – in particular the expansion of healthcare to cover the whole population. Internationally he has changed a Turkish foreign policy that was over-focused on the west – and turned his country into a major player in the wider region. Modern Turkey excites interest and admiration because it seems to show it is possible to combine Muslim piety with modernity, prosperity and democracy. The trouble is that all these dazzling achievements risk blinding Mr Erdogan's admirers to their hero's flaws – flaws that are becoming more pronounced as his second decade in power approaches.

The prime minister is becoming more autocratic at home and more reckless overseas. Taken too far, these flaws could endanger Turkey's democracy and its security.

In important respects Mr Erdogan's record so far has strengthened Turkish democracy. He has expanded minority rights, particularly for the Kurds. Turkey also used to be prone to regular military coups, but that danger has receded. The Erdogan government has arrested senior generals for their alleged involvement in a coup plot and the military seems now to be sullenly compliant with the country's elected government.

However the backlash against the alleged coup plot has become so widespread that it has swept up many people who are probably innocent of any wrongdoing – but who now languish in jail, awaiting trial or in, some cases, charges. It is not just military people who have been arrested. According to the International Press Institute, there are now considerably more journalists in prison in Turkey than in China. In Istanbul recently I watched a rally by journalists who were supporting their imprisoned colleagues. This is not something that would be tolerated in Beijing. But there is no doubt, talking to Turkish journalists, that they are now operating in a climate of fear. The autocratic side of the Erdogan era may become more pronounced. The prime minister has said he will step down after his third term in office. But he seems intent on moving on to the presidency – and on amending Turkey's constitution to endow the presidency with more extensive powers. If he succeeds, Mr Erdogan would be looking at almost 20 years in power – casting him as Turkey's answer to Vladimir Putin.

Mr Erdogan's fans in the west are inclined to overlook much of this because they see Turkey as a model for the Islamic world. One western diplomat says: "Turkey under Erdogan can be very difficult to deal with, but if you told me there was a chance that Egypt would end up looking like Turkey ■ accept it in a heartbeat."

But Turkey's regional role is not all positive. As he becomes more confident, Mr Erdogan is also becoming more willing to court confrontation. (That was mirrored recently by his bodyguards, when they beat up members of the UN security staff in New York.) If things go badly wrong, Turkey could find itself facing conflict on three fronts before the end of the year – with Cyprus, with Israel and with the PKK insurgency based in Iraq.

Mr Erdogan has threatened to use the Turkish fleet to escort "aid flotillas" to break Israel's blockade of Gaza – and to disrupt Cyprus's

efforts at gas exploration. Turkish bombers have been pounding PKK bases in Iraq and a land incursion is a distinct possibility.

Mr Erdogan's recent tour of the Middle East summed up the ambiguity of what he represents. In Cairo he held up Turkey's secular model as a potential model for Egypt – suggesting that Turkey could indeed show the Middle East how to separate mosque and state. In a speech in Libya, however, the Turkish leader played to the most conspiratorial instincts of the Arab street, hailing the Libyan revolution but suggesting that Britain and France had intervened militarily for commercial reasons. It was a piece of dazzling hypocrisy, given that Mr Erdogan had accepted a human rights prize from Muammar Gaddafi less than a year ago – and initially opposed Nato intervention in Libya, partly to protect Turkish commercial interests.

It is still entirely possible that Mr Erdogan will leave a very positive legacy. If things work out well he could be Turkey's equivalent of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, the much lauded former president of Brazil. The biographies of the two men are strikingly similar. Both emerged from humble origins, served spells in prison and became the political voice of groups that had traditionally been shut out from power. Both men are associated with economic booms and with the emergence of their nations as models for the wider region – and increasingly as global players.

But there are also important differences. Mr Lula da Silva pursued a foreign policy that sought always to reassure Brazil's neighbours. After less than a decade in power, the Brazilian leader stepped aside – resisting the temptation to amend the constitution to prolong his stay in office. Like Nelson Mandela, he knew when to go. Unfortunately there is little indication that Mr Erdogan has the same self-restraint or humility.

Article 3.

Today's Zaman

The roots of Israel's right-wing rage

Tuncay Kardaş & Ali Balcı

10 October 2011 -- More than two decades ago, Bernard Lewis explored the topic of “Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West and why their bitterness won’t be easily mollified,” in a paper of that title. Echoing ██████ question but diverging from his Orientalist answer, we shall ask and try to explain another pressing question: Why do right-wing Israelis, like Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, “deeply resent” the reign of the so-called “Islamist” Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in Turkey, and why won’t their “bitterness be easily mollified”? But first, a related observation: In a recently televised UEFA football match between Turkey’s Beşiktaş and Israel’s Maccabi Tel-Aviv, Turkish TV sports presenter Ertem Şener (of the secular Star TV) made mention of Israeli-made Heron unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles. Turkey needed these and ordered them to help spot its domestic terrorists, and they were supposed to arrive long ago for use in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). After Beşiktaş scored, Şener ecstatically cried out that “if they [Israel] have the Herons, we [Turkey] have the Eagles [the mascot for Beşiktaş].” Şener’s mantra was noteworthy not simply because it was an instant hit on Facebook and Twitter, but also because his quixotic fusion of sports and international politics means that once-detached secular segments of the public (to which he belongs) share the anti-Israeli frame of mind. Indeed, Turkish-Israeli relations have recently gone badly wrong. But it twists one’s mouth into a wry smile to read contemporary comments from the Israeli right-wing media on Turkish politics, which stand in stark contrast to the rosy depictions

of relations between the two back in the mid-1990s, when Turkey and Israel first established a military alliance. The alliance with Israel in the 1990s was a hard sell. It was the Turkish military that initiated and implemented the terms of the alliance. The ultimate cost of such a bold partnership, however, was anybody's guess, since as a rule there was virtually no supervision over military spending.

Nonetheless, Turkey's top brass had to represent Israel as a stable ally, not only in its long and lonely fight against the PKK but also against the "anti-secular" religious society and its representatives in the government. It helped that Israel and Turkey had a shared concept of the "Arab other," as well.

Toxic relations

But things change fast these days, and this time the changes in the Middle East and the dramatic volte face in Turkish-Israeli relations have been dramatic: Two years ago, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stormed off the stage at the World Economic Forum in Davos in protest, after saying that the Israeli state was very good at killing civilians, while sitting next to Israeli President Shimon Perez. He was proven right last year when, in the infamous flotilla attack, Israeli soldiers killed eight Turkish and one Turkish-American civilian activists who were on their way to bring humanitarian aid to Gaza. This time Erdoğan accused Israel of "state terrorism." Massive protests against Israel followed, and relations have been toxic since then. Now the Israeli right-wing press is awash in a rampant discourse of hate and fury against Turkey and its "Islamist" government. Even a cursory survey would reveal the widening scope of the raging right-wing commentary on the sea change Turkey and its neighbors have been experiencing. The extant mischaracterization is so wildly commonplace as to include portraying Prime Minister Erdoğan as "a hypocritical neo-Ottoman Pasha," "irresponsible and dangerous," his party as "new wannabe Ottomans opting for a

theocratic sultanate,” and the country as an “Islamist state” in “the Iranian axis,” bent on destroying its once much-revered military and secular establishment. Meanwhile, Israel’s right-wing politicians have jumped on the bandwagon, and the anti-Turkey rhetoric keeps pouring in. When Netanyahu claimed “Turkey is consistently gravitating eastward toward Syria and Iran rather than Westward,” the flotilla affair had yet to erupt. Lieberman accused Erdoğan of “slowly turning into [Libyan leader Muammar] Gaddafi or [Venezuelan President] Hugo Chavez.” In the words of Israeli right-wing politicians, Turkey has clearly become one of the countries in the so-called “Axis of Evil,” a narrative championed by pro-Israeli neoconservatives in the US. In a broader sense, Netanyahu’s placement of Turkey was part of his government’s strategy to sell the claim that Turkey’s “shift of axis” is to be blamed on the Islamic credentials of the AK Party and not on the secularist military, which, alas, has been implicated in numerous extra-legal activities including regular coup-plotting. This “shift of axis” discourse was publicized whenever the Turkish military was losing its grip on power in domestic politics. In the meantime, some influential think tanks in the US, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the most influential Jewish lobby on US Middle East policy, have been busily explaining how “Turkey’s ruling AK Party is increasingly pushing the country in an Islamist direction.” That the AK Party government has widened civil liberties more than any other Turkish government since the 1960s is unimportant to the pro-Israeli right-wingers, who seem to be losing sleep only over the fact that relations between the countries have become irreparably strained. But instead of a much-needed reconciliation, Lieberman is once again so furious that he has frantically threatened to support the PKK in response to Turkey’s demands for an apology for the Mavi Marmara incident. Reactions from right-wing academics have been in the

same vein. For example, Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Bassam Tibi and the like have persistently exalted the Turkish military while disparaging the Islamic credentials of either the wider Muslim population of Turkey or their representative politicians, namely the AK Party. They seem to believe that institutions like the military represented secular modernity, while pious Muslims are innately opposed to it. In an interview in *The Wall Street Journal* on April 2, 2011, Bernard Lewis imagined virtually every segment of Turkish society as mouthpieces of the “Islamist” AK Party government; he is so alarmed he believes “Turkey and Iran could switch places.” In another commentary in the *The Jerusalem Post* on April 17, 2008, Daniel Pipes likened Erdoğan to Osama bin Laden, while Basam Tibi drew a parallel between the AK Party and Hamas in the *Journal of Democracy*. Such comparisons are preposterous and grotesque, so why are they so commonplace?

Why do they deeply resent the new Turkey?

There are two primary answers to this question. First, in their assertions both academic and political critics are employing a rather outdated modernization paradigm with raw notions of modernity, secularism and progress. That the times have moved on from that modernization paradigm seems to be a foreign idea to them: They have either missed or misread the zeitgeist. Therefore they have failed to comprehend that militant secularism and its attendant political structures in the Turkish state were losing ground in recent times to a more pluralist secularity. They predicted that it would be the Turkish military that would carry on having close ties with the liberal West and Israel, while the AK Party and its “reactionary Islamist” base would opt for more authoritarian politics. The past decade has proved them wrong.

The second source of this resentment stems from the loosening grip of the military on Turkey’s domestic political space and foreign

policy, thanks largely to reforms under the rule of the AK Party government, in power since 2002. The signs of the times have been duly noted and acted upon by the AK Party, paving the way for a new pact between the state and society, as in the case of the constitutional referendum of September 2010. Although not without ups and downs, it has been the AK Party government, not the military, that has opted for further democratization with our without Europeanization, clearing the way for a new civilian visibility for Islam. It is not surprising, then, that we are seeing the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations to an all-time low, simultaneously with the recent fall of the military tutelage in Turkey, which was the architect of the alliance of the mid-1990s.

Why won't their bitterness be easily mollified?

In essence, the right-wing reactions are similar to an individual's reaction to a "harsh and unwanted change," as for example in the face of the "traumatic loss of a loved one." The latter motif has been a basic idea in Freudian psychoanalysis since his 1915 article "Mourning and Melancholia." Freud explains that "the aggrieved person initially is unable to withdraw attachment from the lost object." Instead, "The mourner turns away from reality, through denial, and clings to mental representations of the lost object. Thus the object loss is turned into an ego loss." To prevent further agony, the aggrieved should withdraw his energy (libido) from the object (decathexis), and the resumption of normal life necessitates the establishment of new relationships (recathexis). The latter, in turn, can only be achieved by "understanding, accepting, and coping with the loss and its circumstances."

What's next?

Now, it is clear that Israel has lost a loved partner. But it would be erroneous to assume that Israel's loss is the "secular Turkey." Its "lost loved one" is the Turkish military, whose top brass have been

implicated in the Ergenekon case and are thus unable to reconcile with Israel. So the latter is really mourning over the loss of the *carte blanche* it was previously given by the military, and clinging to flawed “mental representations” of Turkey. Given the loss of the military’s role in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy, the Israeli right-wing faces an ego test: to heal relations with Turkey’s “Islamist” government. But can the relationship be healed? The answer is a conditional yes. That is, to restore the relationship, Israel should be, as Freud counsels, “understanding, accepting, and coping with the loss and its circumstances.”

“Understanding and accepting the situation”: It is now generally accepted that we are living in a wildly unpredictable world. The staple ingredients of international politics are fast changing, so fast as to spur the rethinking of old certainties in world politics, particularly those in the Middle East. The latter has successfully defied the gravity of outdated international politics, shattering US and Israeli complacency along the way. But new gravity cannot be easily asserted either. The Turkish-Israeli alliance is officially dead, the political turmoil is afoot in Syria and Yemen and the Arab Spring is here to stay. There is an urgent need for Israeli politicians and right-wingers to hedge their bets each time they face an unwanted sea change in Turkey. The “unwanted” AK Party government is going nowhere, especially in light of the dwindling threat of military interventions in Turkish politics. It is likely to stay for at least another term. Therefore, instead of persistently bashing the supposedly “Islamist” character of the government, they should try to understand how it managed to win a staggering 50 percent of the vote in this year’s election. It is also pertinent to note that the Israeli right-wing’s hate rhetoric is counterproductive, feeding into the radical rhetoric of nationalist, religious and even secular segments of Turkish society, who do not always make a distinction between the Israeli

state and its people. The fact that dozens of Israelis were recently detained at Istanbul airport and questioned for about two hours in a case of what was perceived by many as punitive harassment clearly illustrates the point.

“Coping and moving on”: The list of recent diplomatic crises and subsequent showdowns demonstrate the urgent need for alternative visions for the future relationship between Israel and Turkey. The assumption that both states will bear the brunt of crises at will and at all costs cannot hold, nor can they simply continue to enjoy the close relations of the 1990s. A new rapprochement should grant that Turkey and Israel have joint interests to build on, but also differences to work out. A flexible and more pragmatic position for Turkey and a more justifiable stance for Israel are key, both to the future of their relationship and to the region as a whole.

But for action to occur on this, first, some change needs to occur in the pro-Israeli US political establishment, which should help to devise some new mechanisms for conflict prevention that attend to both Turkish-Israeli relations and the novel political realities of the Middle East. Both Turkey and Israel should make every effort to refrain from fiery rhetoric and bridge their yawning cultural gap, both in international politics and among their respective populations. Both states should renounce the Schmittian “emergency politics” that result from seeing states only as friends or enemies. They should stop turning foreign policy into a security matter whenever they encounter a crisis situation. It is high time for them to return to normal politics again.

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Article 4.

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Failing the Syria Test

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2011-10-10 – On October 2nd in Istanbul, Syria's disparate opposition movements gave the go-ahead for the formation of a "Syrian National Council." This is the most important step yet taken by the fragmented forces that have been trying since May to lead a peaceful uprising against President Bashar al-Assad's regime. The Council's formation boosted the morale of those who have been demanding stronger and more unified representation.

But a mere two days after its creation, the embryonic Council suffered its first big setback. France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Portugal, in collaboration with the United States, presented a draft resolution before the United Nations Security Council seeking to condemn repression in Syria and put an end to the use of force against civilians. The draft was a sugarcoated version of a previous text, proposed last June. This one contained nebulous terms such as "specific measures" or "other options." It stressed the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Syria, and emphasized the need to resolve the current crisis peacefully, by means of an inclusive political process – and called for a national dialogue led from within the country. The draft called for a 30-day period to study the options, up from 15 days in the earlier draft. The object was plain: to gain a Russian, and consequently, a Chinese abstention. But Russia and China vetoed the proposal anyway, and only nine members of the Security Council voted in favor, with Brazil, India, South Africa, and Lebanon abstaining. There are three key implications of the Security Council's vote. First, violence will increase. Since the protests erupted last March, there have been an estimated 2,700 deaths, more

than 10,000 people displaced to Turkey, and thousands more arrested. The Assad government does not hesitate to fire on civilians, lay siege to cities, or shut off their electricity and water. And a few days ago, it was reported that some 10,000 Syrian soldiers had defected, with several hundred joining rival movements such as the Free Syrian Army and the Free Officers Movement. Unless some international protection arrives, a movement that began peacefully risks entering a new and dangerous phase. Second, there will be grave consequences for regional security. Syria is a strategic hinge in the Middle East. It has been one of the countries most hostile toward Israel, mainly through its support of Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah. Chaos in Syria would threaten Lebanon's stability and alter Iran's geopolitical influence in the region. Iraq, governed by Shia political forces, also keeps close tabs on Syria's evolution, as does Turkey, which, until fairly recently, considered Syria a keystone of its regional policy. Finally, the Security Council vote exposed a clear division within the international community. Among the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, all of which happen to be on the Security Council currently – two vetoed and the rest abstained (along with Lebanon, for obvious reasons). In the case of the resolution on military intervention in Libya, the BRICS decided "to let" Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi be overthrown. Not so with Syria, where none aligned itself with the positions supported by the European Union and the US. The Security Council's composition wouldn't be substantially different if an "ideal" distribution of seats were to be achieved. So the fact that no agreement has been reached on Syria forces us to reflect on the future difficulties that we will face in managing global security. Of course, there is no "one size fits all" model for intervention, but that does not justify evading our "responsibility to protect" – a fine concept promoted by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and adopted by all UN member states

in 2005. Support for the resolution would have weakened Assad's position, as it would have revealed him as isolated from his traditional allies, Russia and China. It would also have shown the international community to be unanimous in its rejection of repression and committed to protecting the Syrian people (though the draft made no mention of military intervention).

The sanctions adopted by the EU and the US against Assad's regime are not enough. But, unless further measures are channeled through – and thus legitimized by – the Security Council, other alternatives are limited. In recent years, with countries such as China, India, and Brazil taking their rightful place on the international scene, the G-7 has given way to the G-20. Likewise, an ambitious reform of the International Monetary Fund was adopted in 2010 to reflect changes in the global distribution of power. But this change in global governance must not be limited to economic policymaking. After all, globalization has brought many overall benefits, but also less friendly aspects, such as the ones dealing with global security. Despite our growing interconnectedness, the UN Security Council has not yet been unable to achieve sufficient consensus to resolve pressing matters such as Syria. Nobody ever said that the road to stronger global governance would be straight or simple to navigate. But there are no detours: without effective structures of power and a genuine commitment from all players, the future does not look promising for global stability and prosperity.

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